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ABSTRACT  
   
"Bringing-before-the-eyes": Visuality and Audience in Greek Rhetoric examines 
how Greek rhetorical theories are understood through the lens of visuality and the ways 
in which orators accounted for audience knowledges and expectations in the creation of 
rhetorical texts and performances. Through a close reading of Greek rhetorical texts from 
the classical period, I develop three heuristics for analyzing the ways in which 
rhetoricians invite and encourage visualized images through rhetorical practice.  
By exploring (1) language cues that orators use to signal visualization, (2) the 
ways in which shared cultural memories and ideas allow orators to call upon standardized 
images, and (3) the influence of stylistic choices and audience emotions related to the 
vividness of rhetorical images, I argue that it is possible to analyze the ways in which 
classical Greek orators understood and employed visual elements in their rhetorical 
performances. I then conduct an analysis of the visual aspects of Demosthenes' On the 
Embassy using these heuristics to demonstrate the ways in which these three aspects of 
visuality are intertwined and contribute to a greater understanding of the relationship 
between the verbal and the visual in rhetorical theory.  
My findings indicate that Greek orators readily identified the influence of visual 
ways of knowing on rhetorical theory and presented early hypotheses of the ways in 
which sense perceptions affect social practice. This project complicates the ways in 
which rhetorical theory is categorized. Rather than considering visual rhetoric as a 
distinct field from traditional, verbal text-based rhetorical studies, this project explores 
the ways in which visual and verbal modes of thinking are interconnected in Greek 
rhetorical theory. By bridging these two areas of rhetorical study and arguing that verbal 
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rhetoric can instantiate internalized, visual phenomena for audiences, the dichotomy of 
verbal and visual is problematized. By focusing on the rhetorical theory of classical 
Greece, this project also invites future research into the ways in which dominant, Western 
historic and contemporary systems of epistemology are influenced by the co-mingling of 
verbal and visual in classical Greek philosophy and education. 
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CHAPTER 1 
VERBAL AND VISUAL IN GREEK RHETORIC 
Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to 
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of 
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and 
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man 
which the power of speech has not helped us to establish. (Isoc. 15.253-254)1,2 
 
Introduction 
 In the Antidosis, Isocrates defends himself against hypothetical charges of 
corrupting the youth of Athens, and as evidence of his innocence, brings to his testimony 
several excerpts from his earlier works. Isocrates relies on the power and images of his 
discourse to serve as a symbol of himself and to prove that he is not guilty. In doing so, 
he calls for his audience to consider the “art of discourse” in the same manner as other 
arts, explaining that the good and proper use of language “is the outward image of a good 
and faithful soul” (Isoc. 15.255).3 His use of the work εἴδωλον, image or perception, 
signals a visual component to the art of discourse; Isocrates asks the jury to consider his 
work as an “image” of his virtue. Facing imagined charges of corrupting the youth of 
Athens through teaching them “philosophy,” Isocrates asks his audience to reconsider 
their attitudes toward rhetorical education and to recognize the socially constructive 
                                                
1 ἐγγενοµένου δ᾽ ἡµῖν τοῦ πείθειν ἀλλήλους καὶ δηλοῦν πρὸς ἡµᾶς αὐτοὺς περὶ ὧν ἂν 
βουληθῶµεν, οὐ µόνον τοῦ θηριωδῶς ζῆν ἀπηλλάγηµεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνελθόντες πόλεις 
ᾠκίσαµεν καὶ νόµους ἐθέµεθα καὶ τέχνας εὕποµεν, καὶ σκεδὸν ἄπαντα τὰ δι᾽ ἡµῶν 
µεµηχανηµένα λόγος ἡµῖν ἐστιν ὁ συγκατασκευάσας. (Isoc. 15.253-254) 
 
2 Primary texts from the classical period are cited following standard classical 
abbreviations. Abbreviations in this dissertation follow the Perseus Digital Library 
Project abbreviation list.  
 
3 “καὶ δίακαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς ἔιδολόν ἐστι” (Isoc. 15.255). 
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powers of the art of persuasion.4 As a logographer and teacher of rhetoric, Isocrates 
positions himself as someone concerned with the civic work of oratory, and he 
emphasizes the people’s role in the civic and political conduct of their city. 
The role of the orator and of oratory comes under frequent scrutiny in the work of 
rhetoricians in classical Greece; from the Socratic dialogues to Demosthenean forensic 
speeches, the arts and mysteries of rhetoric are a source of regular contention. Tied to 
these uses and concerns regarding oratory are varied understandings of the power of 
discourse and discussions of the requisite characteristics for those who wish to employ 
the art of rhetoric. For some, oratory is seen as a means for deception and an opposition 
to the pursuit of virtue. Others such as Isocrates point to the benefits of oratory to 
uncover truth or to share in the moral and political work of the polis. Present in all these 
debates, however, is the implicit concern with how audiences understand and participate 
in the work of oratory. That is, how do orators and audiences relate to each other, and 
how does the content of speech serve to influence the thoughts and decisions of those 
involved in the exchange and spread of ideas. 
Visuality plays a key role in understanding the nature of Greek rhetoric, 
epistemology, and communication. Discussions of rhetoric that involve considerations of 
visuality appear with a high degree of frequency in Greek texts, and it is evident that for 
many Greek philosophers, the formation of knowledge has its basis in sense perception, 
especially through the sense of sight. Perhaps most famously, Aristotle defines rhetoric as 
“an ability, in each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion (trans. 
                                                
4 Isocrates famously refuses to label his lessons on oratory as rhetoric and instead uses 
the term “philosophy” to identify his educational system. 
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Kennedy, Aristot. Rh. 1.2.1.1355b).5,6 The concept of rhetorical skill being something 
that draws upon the ability “to see,” I argue, is deliberate and serves as a reflection of 
Greek attitudes toward knowledge and sense perception. In this dissertation, I argue that 
through the development of heuristics specifically aimed at analyzing the ways in which 
rhetoricians account for elements of visuality and the ways that audiences are prepared 
and invited to visualize the content of rhetorical performances, it is possible to develop a 
more complex understanding of the ways in which Greek knowledge and language are 
understood and built upon a system in which verbal and visual knowledges are the basis 
for successful rhetorical performance. Beginning with discussions of Greek epistemology 
and language cues within rhetorical performance and expanding to discussions of 
audience knowledge and the vividness of information, this dissertation establishes 
methods for exploring how concepts of verbal and visual modes of thinking and 
communicating are understood and explained in classical Greek rhetoric. By 
demonstrating through the analysis of rhetorical performances how these concepts are 
employed, I argue that these ideas were common among classical Greek rhetoricians and 
that theories of rhetoric should incorporate a new understanding of the comingling of 
verbal and visual in classical Greece and its lasting influence upon rhetorical study. 
 For the Greeks, the nature of rhetoric and performance builds upon a system in 
which the verbal and the visual are co-constructed and highly dependent on social 
knowledge and experience to be effective. In the introduction to the edited collection 
                                                
5 Unless otherwise noted, I rely on the Loeb translation of the Rhetoric by J. H. Freese. 
 
6 “ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δὐναµις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόµενον πιθανόν” 
(Aristot. Rh. 1.2.1.1355b). 
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Ways of Seeing, Ways of Speaking, Kristie Fleckenstein argues, “Community is 
constituted as much by the images we see and the visual conventions we share as it is by 
the words we speak and the discourse conventions we share” (2007, 5). In that collection, 
the contributing authors seek to answer the question, “How are the constitutions of our 
world and our identities composed of the intricate interweaving of word, image, and 
shared ways of seeing?” (2007, 6). I apply that question and others to the ways in which 
the Greek people in the classical period understood the visual and the verbal as 
interrelated and to explore the ways in which “shared ways of seeing” affect the 
development of Greek rhetoric. 
Research Questions 
 My research questions for this project reflect my dual concerns with visuality and 
the social nature of oratory. How are Greek rhetorical theories understood through the 
lens of visuality? How do rhetoricians discuss their concerns regarding shared cultural 
experiences, memories, or ideologies? How do considerations of visuality facilitate 
community building? What are the roles of style and emotion as they relate to visuality, 
audience, and performance? Ultimately, this dissertation aims to develop a set of tools 
that will allow for further inquiry into the ways in which internalized mental images and 
shared cultural ideas can be analyzed and understood in rhetorical texts. By establishing 
these tools, this dissertation helps to understand the ways in which the dichotomous 
relationship between verbal and visual rhetorics might be remediated to reflect the 
interrelation of word and image in classical Greek theory. 
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Why Study Visuality? 
 As the Greeks moved beyond their mythopoeic beginnings and started to question 
the ways that the world worked through the use of rudimentary forms of scientific 
observation, the role of sensory input in determining the nature of the world was central 
to how they framed knowledge. In this emerging system, the ability to observe or 
understand intellectual phenomena through the senses became essential to questioning 
and developing philosophy. Christopher Lyle Johnstone explores the transition from 
submissive acceptance of cultural myths to the “fundamentally interrogatory” nature of 
logos that encouraged a greater interaction with and questioning of the wisdom passed 
from others (2009, 40). While philosophers might ponder the existence of the human 
soul, the proofs they established to support those decisions were from their embodied 
experiences in the world. This physical grounding of philosophical discussions extended 
to the ways in which the Greeks considered the functions of language and rhetoric. The 
sensory underpinnings of Greek rhetorical theory play a prevalent role in the ways in 
which rhetoricians framed their art and in their approaches to engaging with audiences. 
Of those senses, Martin Jay argues, “Hellenic thought did on the whole privilege the 
visual over any other sense” (1994, 28). Jay’s work traces the influences of Greek 
thought and privileging of vision through history through twentieth century French 
philosophy; for Jay, the influence of sense perception in Greek philosophy is especially 
evident in discussions of vision, which he argues have affected the development of 
Western thought since then. While other senses do play roles in the rhetorical experience, 
it is evident that Greek philosophers use vision frequently to explore the art of 
persuasion. 
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In “Looking into Aristotle’s Eyes,” Debra Hawhee discusses the connections 
between the Aristotelian discussion of φαντασία [phantasia], imagination, and his 
writings in the Rhetoric. Hawhee coins the term “rhetorical vision” to describe, “the ways 
that language affects vision directly” (2011, 140). The concept of “rhetorical vision” thus 
serves as an entry into the ways in which visuality can be understood in Greek rhetorical 
theory; the words that are spoken in an oratorical performance can elucidate mental 
images within the minds of an audience. I argue that these effect can be further 
understood through an analysis of the ways in which an audience has been prepared to 
share in those visions through various means such as the spread of cultural memories or 
familiarity with particular images or ideas.  
In her book Ekphrasis, Imagination, and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical 
Theory, Ruth Webb explores the ancient concept of ekphrasis as it relates to visuality in 
rhetorical education during the Roman Empire, and she similarly describes ekphrasis as 
“the use of language to try to make an audience imagine a scene” (2009, 3). Webb argues 
that the contemporary understanding of ekphrasis as work describing art was not 
widespread in antiquity. Rather, ekphrasis in its earliest manifestations was primarily 
concerned with describing an image or idea so that an audience could “see” what was 
being discussed. In this sense, ekphrasis might relate closely to Hawhee’s concept of 
rhetorical vision. However, both of these concepts are primarily focused on the ways in 
which the orator wields rhetorical power to cause an audience to imagine; in contrast, I 
argue that it is necessary to do greater accounting of the ways in which an audience 
participates in the imaginative act and the influence that shared knowledge and ideas 
have upon those visions.  
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Discussions of sense perception in Greek epistemology and rhetorical theory also 
primarily focus on the ways in which speech or sensory input relate to imagination. 
Deborah K. Modrak first explores Aristotelian concepts of perception and thought in The 
Power of Perception and later turns to discussions of imagination and language in 
Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning (1987; 2001). In both of these works, 
Modrak explores the Aristotelian epistemological theories that situate the mental 
capacities associated with imagination and visualization within the realm of sense 
perception; the corporeal grounding of knowledge and imagination as a product of the 
senses is a fascinating area of study, and it has doubtless influence upon the development 
of Greek rhetorical theory, but more consideration of how the “recipients” of that shared 
knowledge are key participants in the development of ideas is necessary. Sara Newman’s 
article on the concept of “bringing-before-the-eyes” in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its 
connections to style and audience further draws connections between Aristotelian vision 
and persuasion. As Ned O’Gorman states in his article on phantasia and the Rhetoric, 
“Rhetoric is for Aristotle an art that may shape opinion and direct the affectations through 
the creation of images” (2005, 25). Newman’s and O’Gorman’s research into imagination 
and visuality in Aristotelian thought help move the discussion toward an investigation of 
shared ways of seeing, with an emphasis of how these ideas are discussed in the 
Aristotelian corpus. 
With the exception of Webb’s book, the sources listed above explore visuality and 
rhetoric primarily through the identification and analysis of works by Aristotle. Webb, in 
contrast, argues that the concept of ekphrasis as something that can lead an audience to 
imagine the content of a speech reached its highest sophistication during the first century 
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CE as Roman rhetorical education continued to develop from its Greek roots. Contrary to 
Webb, I argue that Greek theories of visuality are much more prevalent and developed 
than previously thought, and in this dissertation, I broaden the discussion of visuality and 
rhetorical performance in classical Greece as something that is prevalent in Aristotle’s 
corpus but also extends to texts and performances by many figures. To support this claim, 
I develop three methods for identifying rhetorical practices that activate or augment the 
visual experiences of an audience in order to allow for further inquiry into the ways in 
which specific rhetoricians or speeches function on visual levels. 
By exploring the ways in which ideas are visualized during the communication 
process and calling for attention to the ways in which verbal rhetoric may be better 
understood through a discussion if how ideas are shared among the orator and audience, I 
argue that studies in visuality can help revise the traditional dichotomy between verbal 
and visual rhetorics, and instead consider that ways of seeing and ways of speaking are 
intertwined, and developing new approaches to understanding that relationship can 
benefit scholars who study both visual and/or verbal rhetorical theories. 
Historiography and Re-Vision of Rhetorical Theory 
 To explore the concept of verbal-visual interrelation in Greek thought, the 
traditional division between the two must be reconsidered. Several contemporary 
historiographical works serve as models to demonstrate how Greek rhetorical theory can 
be understood in new ways. In Susan Jarratt’s Rereading the Sophists, she aims to 
“investigate the reasons why sophists have only lately begun to enter the conversation 
about histories of rhetoric,” and to establish a place for those Sophists in other histories of 
rhetoric (1991, xv). Jarratt reexamines Sophistic rhetorical theory by first exploring the 
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systematic discrimination against the Sophists found in prior histories of rhetoric and then 
offering a reinterpretation of the Sophist ideologies. Through her rereading of those texts 
that discuss the Sophists—texts such as the Platonic dialogues—she offers new insights 
into Sophistic pedagogy by distilling the arguments of the Sophists and casting them in a 
less antagonistic light. One important finding that Jarratt presents is that “Sophistic 
pedagogy defines the individual both as the location of a separate mind perceiving 
distinctive visual and aural stimuli and as a member of a group of like-minded individuals 
with responsibility to participate in the democracy” (1991, 92). This democratic 
consideration of Sophistic thinking renews the urge to examine how Greeks understood 
audience in the art of rhetoric and to value the input of Sophist orators in those 
discussions. Jarratt identifies her method in this book as a form of Sophistic 
historiography, in which she uses a text for multiple purposes or arguments within her 
research, and through a similar Sophistic move of “making the worse case the better,” she 
argues for contextually determinant readings of texts in order to understand the plurality 
of interpretations that an argument permits. 
 John Poulakos similarly revises the depiction of the Sophists in Greece, and he 
identifies the cultural practices of Greek competition, agonism, that gave rise to the 
Sophists (1995, 5). Poulakos uses reception theory as the framework through which he 
can best analyze the place of the Sophists in Greek culture. He argues that because the 
Sophists taught oratory as primarily persuasive, they “helped strengthen the instituted 
democracy by forging a mentality aware of the centrality of persuasion” (1995, 14). In 
employing this framework for understanding how Sophists were received by their 
contemporaries, Poulakos revises a history of rhetoric in which we find new 
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understanding of the attitudes of philosophers such as Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle and 
how those ideologies affected the preservation of Sophistic texts as well as those 
individuals’ motivations for producing their own works on rhetorical theory and 
education. 
 While the cultural positioning of the Sophists is Poulakos’ focus of 
historiographical examination, Johnstone considers the impact of new literacies toward 
Greek attitudes regarding rhetoric, myth, and knowledge-making. Listening to the Logos 
“examine[s] the relationship between speech and wisdom—between logos and sophia—
in early Greek thought both to illuminate Greek conceptions of wisdom and to clarify the 
role of the word—especially the spoken word—in its acquisition and exercise (Johnstone 
2009, 5). Johnstone’s work approaches research in antiquity through an emphasis on the 
dissecting the conditions because of which and through which rhetorical theory 
developed in Greece. Through identification and examination of the contexts surrounding 
the development of Greek texts—those readily identified as rhetorical texts, e.g., 
handbooks (technai), as well as those more commonly regarded as literary texts, e.g., epic 
poetry—Johnstone and Poulakos both recognize the need to extend conversations 
regarding the formation of rhetorical theory beyond the traditional classification of what 
texts and/or communication practices were readily identified as rhetorical. 
 While the social changes in Greece such as the development of democracy and 
the emergence of the Sophists provide frameworks for revisiting histories of rhetoric, 
considering the modal shifts related Greek thinking also provides methods for 
understanding the development of rhetorical theory. As Eric Havelock explores in The 
Literate Revolution in Greece and Its Cultural Consequences, the oral culture upon 
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which Greek society was founded functioned differently from the culture that emerged as 
a result of the newly developed written language. Havelock explains that while the 
delivery of oratory primarily remained an acoustic experience, the preservation of texts in 
writing allowed for greater opportunity to reread an argument and to refine the craft of 
persuasion; “There were new inventible ways of speaking about human life, and therefore 
of thinking about it, which became slowly possible for man only when they became 
inscribed and preservable” (1982, 88). Havelock explores this modal shift in Greek 
history and identifies the tension between “pictorialized image[s]” in the oral tradition, 
i.e., visualized images, with the tangible visual preservation on texts that could be 
recalled through reading. Havelock also calls to researchers to consider how the delivery 
of a given texts, especially the acoustic experience of hearing a particular speech, 
influenced the production, reception, and preservation of culturally shared knowledge. 
Richard Graff also explores this modal shift through identifying “those moments where 
Aristotle’s attention passes from ‘ear-language’ to ‘eye-language’” (2001, 31). In his 
examination, Graff reminds readers that the construction of classical Greek texts was 
influenced by the writing and reading practices of the society, and thus, that theories of 
rhetoric also reflect the relationship between style and delivery for Greek audiences. In 
these examinations, Havelock and Graff argue that the multimodality that accompanies 
Greek rhetorical texts should encourage greater attention to the ways that sight and sound 
affect rhetorical performance and theory. In my project, I argue that the connections 
between acoustic experience of rhetoric and the development of rhetorical texts to discuss 
the experience of an orator and audience during a performance serve to bridge these 
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distinct forms of literacy and offer insights into the ways that rhetoricians understood the 
relationship between word and image. 
 This dissertation project explores the concept of visuality in the rhetorical theories 
and performances of classical Greece, and in doing so, draws upon many of these 
revisionist historiographical frameworks to justify or conduct the analysis work contained 
within the project. By arguing that visuality as a concept related to audience experiences 
can be seen throughout Greek rhetorical theory and performance, I argue that the classical 
Greek society’s understanding of visuality, while perhaps not articulated directly in all 
instances, is still a major consideration for orators and the ways in which the 
development and performance of a speech is understood as socially driven and dependent 
on building relationships of image-making between orator and audience. 
Primary Text Selection 
 In consideration of the range of this dissertation and the concern with multiple 
areas of classical Greek rhetoric, visuality, and audience, I have selected primary texts 
that serve as treatises on theories of rhetoric or knowledge as well as performative works 
that employ those concepts. To limit the scope of my research, I have selected texts from 
Athenians writing in or around the classical period of Greece, with the exception of the 
commentaries on Athenian orators written by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who wrote 
under the Roman Empire in the first century BCE. 
 Aristotle’s Rhetoric is perhaps the most immediately accessible account of Greek 
rhetorical theory, especially as it relates to studies of visuality. His categorical 
examination of rhetorical theory provides an entry into my discussions of visuality and 
oratory. I use the Rhetoric, throughout the dissertation project, citing Aristotle’s treatise 
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as it also relates to issues of public knowledge, style, and emotions. In addition to the 
Rhetoric, I consult two works related to sense perception and to memory, On the Soul, 
and On Memory and Recollection. I also draw from Pseudo-Aristotle’s Rhetoric to 
Alexander’s discussion of emotion when discussing vividness in Chapter 3. These texts 
add further insight into the ways in which sense perception and memories affect the 
practices of visualization and the social nature of cultural images. 
 As an alternative perspective to Aristotle’s on the art of rhetoric and the social 
implications of rhetorical education, I turn to the works of Isocrates. The philosopher’s 
civic involvement and emphasis on logon paideia present an opportunity to view a more 
nuanced account of the relationship between the people and the art of rhetoric in Greek 
society. The Antidosis, from which I have drawn the epigraph for this dissertation, 
presents Isocrates’ views on the role of oratory in the development of Greek civilization. 
In addition to the Antidosis, I turn to Evagoras, Nicocles or the Cyprians, and To 
Nicocles. These works include discussions of the relationship between ruler (or speaker) 
and the public, discussions of visuality and knowledge, and manifestations of rhetorical 
principles in civics and philosophy. 
In addition to Aristotle and Isocrates, I use four Socratic dialogues from Plato to 
explore concepts of visuality and audience as discussed by the philosopher and the 
Sophistic orators with whom he is portrayed in conversation. In this dissertation, I draw 
from discussions of language and naming in the Cratylus; Aspasia’s “Funeral Oration,” 
as presented by Socrates in the Menexenus; concepts of visuality in the Gorgias, and 
discussions of audience in the Phaedrus. I see particular value in the discussion of 
naming in the Cratylus to discern the role of language in visuality, and a version of 
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Plato’s theory of forms appears in the dialogues. The Menexenus offers a recounted 
speech that Socrates claims to have been taught by Aspasia, and thus serves an important 
role of bringing her voice into my research.  
 To see how the rhetorical concepts explored in this dissertation can be used in 
rhetorical performances, I draw upon three speeches by the Attic orator Demosthenes. 
Demosthenes’ reputation as a skilled orator encourages me to consult these judicial and 
deliberative works to see how concepts are employed. Chapter 5 draws upon 
Demosthenes’ On the Embassy for a sustained analysis of visuality and audience using 
the three frameworks developed in chapters 2, 3, and 4. This primary text establishes the 
arguments that Demosthenes later employs more successfully in the more famous On the 
Crown, and thus helps demonstrate the ways in which visuality is employed with 
marginal success and provides insight into the ways in which the more successful On the 
Crown functions as discussed in the other chapters. I also draw upon Lysias’ Olympic 
Oration in Chapter 3 to discuss the audience considerations and contexts for performance 
that the orator employs in that speech. 
 In addition to Demosthenes, I consult the works of two other Attic Orators in 
Chapter 2 while discussing the language cues of rhetorical performances that invite 
visualized experience. I draw from three of Isaeus’ speeches regarding inheritances to 
demonstrate the ways in which he accounts for audiences by inviting them to “see” the 
content of his speeches. Additionally, Theophrastus’ Characters provides an example of 
inviting the imaginative processes that help audiences to visualize.  
 Finally, I consult Demetrius’ On Style as a direct commentary on the effects of 
rhetorical style, emotions, and vividness for building the framework in Chapter 4. The 
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discussion of style in Chapter 4 is also aided by commentaries by Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus on Lysias and Demosthenes. Demetrius’ On Style is consulted in 
conversation with the third book of Aristotle’s Rhetoric to identify key principles of style 
and visuality in Greek rhetoric. Dionysius’ assessments of these two orators accompanied 
by comparisons to other figures in Attic oratory help illustrate attitudes toward these 
orators and provide commentary that are closer in chronological time to the texts 
consulted above. 
In considering the scope and availability of Greek texts, it is challenging to select 
a variety of texts that inform the discussion of this dissertation and yet still provide a 
satisfactory depth of consideration of those selected. It is doubtless that the selection of 
texts limits perspectives that I can account for in this work. The consideration of voices 
within the selected texts introduces the concern with the accuracy of voiced others in the 
works. For example, Plato’s Aspasia doubtlessly represents a version of her that has been 
perverted through the lens of Socrates. Similarly, the accounts of various others in the 
works consulted demand particular attention to the frames through which they may be 
(mis)represented. Furthermore, the perspectives more broadly represented in these 
primary sources are those of a privileged class and thus do not encapsulate the whole of 
Greek society, and the voices that are represented are overwhelmingly male. While it is 
possible to discern the perspectives of other populations and social groups through 
different materials, the methodological approach to those materials falls outside the 
expertise I bring to this project at this time.  
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Method 
My method for this dissertation draws upon close readings of these texts as they 
apply to interrelated issues of visuality, audience, and persuasion. For each area of 
consideration, I consult works that inform the discussion thereof or serve as examples of 
rhetorical performances that employ the tactics related to the discussion. I have attempted 
to select multiple texts by authors to account for the understanding that each work may 
not find equal (or any) application among all of the areas of inquiry. As Jarratt and Rory 
Ong (1995) “reconstruct” an understanding of Aspasia through multiple readings, so too 
must I depend on multiple texts to inform the connections among various factors in Greek 
rhetorical theory. As Jarratt and Ong’s work on Aspasia demonstrates, my readings of 
text must be socially and historically situated as I investigate the ideas contained therein.  
In addition to considering the context in which texts are constructed, I also 
account for linguistic implications within various works. While my initial readings of the 
primary texts consulted in this dissertation draw from the provided translations, I do 
account for variation in translations by examining the original Greek text when nuance or 
concern with the translation’s accuracy demand closer attention. 
Much of the discussion in this dissertation related to epistemological theories and 
visuality draws from texts by Aristotle such as On the Soul or On Memory and 
Recollection. For Aristotle, knowledge is built from sensory information, and the role of 
sense perception in human cognition is essential—specifically the influence of sight on 
these cognitive processes. Because his epistemological theory is based on vision, 
Aristotle’s discussion and framing of visuality and its relationship to rhetorical theory and 
performance helps frame my own discussion of how language and performance can be 
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understood as visual/visualized phenomena. These Aristotelian texts are consulted in 
conversation with other, more performative or theoretical texts by authors who discuss 
visuality indirectly in their work. Because the central argument of this dissertation 
concerns the ways in which rhetoricians build and or draw upon concepts of visuality in 
their work, I rely upon Aristotle’s writings to help collect the multiple interpretations of 
visuality that these authors draw upon. As a result, there is a necessary “flattening” of 
concepts in order to collect them in shared discussion. This project represents a first step 
into exploring concepts of visuality in greater depth in subsequent projects, and the 
problematic challenge of gathering multiple perspectives into a cohesive argument that 
the visual and verbal are interconnected in classical Athenian oratory provides future 
opportunities to return to these texts at a later date and explore the ways in which these 
theories might depart from one another while supporting the central arguments posited in 
this dissertation project. 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 investigates the cognitive model of visuality as it relates to Greek 
rhetoric and the language cues within rhetorical theories or performance that illustrate the 
relationship between the verbal and visual in Greek rhetorical theory. This chapter builds 
a framework for analyzing the language uses of Greek orators to discover the ways in 
which an orator invites an audience to visualize the content of a speech and to invite 
those audiences to “perceive” the speech act. In particular, Hawhee’s concept of 
“rhetorical vision” provides the basis for exploring the mental processes that underlie 
visuality in Greek rhetorical theory. The key primary texts for this chapter include 
Isocrates’ Antidosis, Aristotle’s On the Soul and Rhetoric, and Plato’s Cratylus. 
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Chapter 3 explores the role of genre practices, historical contexts, and cultural 
memories and ideologies as used in Greek rhetorical theory. This chapter builds a 
framework for analysis from Poulakos’ discussion of “intellectual movements” to explore 
how orators draw upon shared knowledge in rhetorical delivery (1995, 12). To illustrate 
the practice of employing public knowledge, I draw from Lysias’ Olympic Oration and 
Demosthenes’ On the Crown to illustrate these concepts. Aristotelian discussions of 
memory in On Memory and Recollection and discussions of audience in his Rhetoric 
provide further commentary, as do selections from Plato’s Menexenus. 
Chapter 4 examines the roles of emotions and style in the development of Greek 
rhetoric and their impact on the vividness of a performance. As mentioned previously I 
draw from Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ commentary On Lysias and On Demosthenes to 
identify the effects of style on audience. Underlying this discussion of style is the 
consideration of sensory reception and the ways in which audiences understand or 
interpret those cues. This chapter discusses style and emotion as covered in Book III of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Demetrius’ On Style and uses selections from Isocrates and Plato 
to supplement those theories. In attempting to bridge Aristotelian discussions of visuality 
and emotion with socially driven discussions of epideictic, this chapter aims to provide a 
framework by which one can witness the interrelation of visual and social cues in Greek 
rhetorical style. 
Chapter 5 provides an extended analysis of Demosthenes’ On the Embassy using 
the analytical frameworks identified in chapters 2, 3, and 4 to demonstrate the ways in 
which these heuristics can provide insights into the interplay of language, knowledge of 
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cultural memories and expectations, and style as they encourage an audience’s vivid 
experience of a rhetorical performance.  
Chapter 6 serves as the conclusion to my dissertation, in which I synthesize the 
previous chapters’ arguments and the analysis of On the Embassy into a discussion of the 
multiple ways in which one can read visuality and audience in the rhetorical and 
philosophical schools of thought in classical Greece. Then, I connect my discussion of 
visuality and audience in classical Greek rhetoric with contemporary discussions of 
visuality and rhetoric in an effort to suggest the ways in which classical rhetoric may 
inform current investigations into these subjects. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RHETORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY, LANGUAGE CUES, AND VISUALITY 
Greek Vocabulary of Seeing 
 The verbs ὁράω, “to see, to look,” and οἶδα, “to know,” have a close etymological 
relationship in the ancient Greek language (Liddell and Scott 1998, 495, 476). The first-
person singular aorist active indicative form of οῥάω is οἶδα, which matches the first-
person singular perfect active form of the verb meaning to know. Translated into English, 
this results in the homonym οἶδα meaning “I saw” or “I have known.” The link between 
seeing something and having knowledge of it is more than coincidental; it bears 
testimony to the importance of the visual in Greek epistemology. Philosophers’ 
understanding of learning and knowledge in Greece was largely founded upon an 
understanding of the ways in which one could perceive, directly or abstractly, 
information, often through visual means. The connections between seeing and knowing 
also manifest in rhetoricians’ discussions of speech and communication, and this chapter 
seeks to explore the ways in which visuality and verbal-based rhetorics are intertwined 
for the Greeks. Specifically, this chapter develops a framework for understanding the 
ways in which rhetoricians invite their audiences to “perceive” the components of a 
speech act using different types of verbal cues. Through this method of inviting a visual 
component into speech, the orators can help to activate the cognitive processes within the 
minds of their audience related to visuality. 
 Perhaps the most well known Greek rhetorician who discusses visuality in 
rhetorical and epistemological theories is Aristotle. His theory of image in epistemology 
is best summed up in the statement, “The soul never thinks without a mental image” 
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(Aristot. De an. 3.7.431a).7 For Aristotle, image interacts with all aspects of thinking, 
leading from perception to more abstract forms of thought such as metaphor, and these 
processes are reflected in the vocabulary that he and other figures use to discuss 
rhetorical theory. In order to research the ways in which Greek rhetoricians discuss 
visuality, rhetoric, and audience concerns in terms of the cognitive processes that relate to 
visuality, I turn first to a discussion of the specific visual-based language that they 
employ and the ways in which those terms reflect a scaling of complexity within 
cognitive image-making processes. Verbs related to direct sight are often contrasted with 
more abstract terms related to vision in Greek rhetorical texts. Through the analysis of 
Greek language choices, I argue that the act of “seeing” the content of a speech functions 
on many levels in which varying amounts of abstraction are required. In addition to 
Greek verbs of seeing, this chapter identifies the use of Greek nouns that describe images 
or imagination as further evidence regarding the processes of visualization in Greek 
rhetorical theory. These primary source materials are coordinated with broader 
discussions of the ways in which visuality and rhetoric manifest in social settings, and the 
framework and evidence presented in this chapter help identify a Greek epistemological 
system in which visual and verbal cues are intertwined and are integrated into rhetorical 
performances. 
 Several words concerning visuality in Greek build upon each other in this 
discussion, so it may prove beneficial to discuss those terms in advance of their contexts. 
In addition to the words ὁράω and οἶδα discussed above, the Greek verb βλέπω, “to look, 
                                                
7 “τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φανταάσµατα οἷον αἰσθήµατα ὑπάρχει” (Aristot. De an. 
3.7.431a). 
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see; to look on, look at,” signifies that act of perception (Liddell and Scott 1998, 131). In 
this chapter, I identify the verbs βλέπω and ὁράω as related to direct or embodied acts of 
seeing. These verbs—as well as the nouns φαντασία, imagination; εἴδωλον, image; and 
φαντασµά, image—constitute my analysis of the ways in which Greek rhetoricians 
discuss more basic forms of seeing. As the cognitive processes undergirding rhetorical 
vision build in complexity, a separate set of verbs of seeing comes under my analysis. 
The verb θεωρέω, “to look at, view, behold, observe,” signifies a more abstract 
understanding of vision (Liddell and Scott 1998, 317). The English cognate verb 
“theorize” closely relates to this verb and the level of abstraction involved in that type of 
seeing. This verb represents sight that is more speculative or theoretical in nature than 
verbs of seeing or knowing, and θεωρέω is often translated as “to observe” or “to 
understand,” all while maintaining an emphasis on what is seen. In addition to θεωρέω, 
the verb σκοπέω, “to look at or after a thing; to behold, contemplate, survey; generally, to 
look; to look out” signals an abstract form of vision, one that is more reflective or 
theoretical in nature (Liddell and Scott 1998, 641). 
 Another verb that demonstrates the visual aspect of rhetoric is δηλόω, “to make 
visible or clear; to point out, make known” (Liddell and Scott 1998, 157). While this verb 
does not directly reflect the act of seeing, it does call upon the act of making something 
or someone visible—that is, preparing an object (tangible or intangible) to be seen. Often, 
this verb appears in discussions of how rhetoric may make oneself or an idea known to an 
audience. A similar verb that appears in my analysis is δείκνυµι, which translates 
similarly to δηλόω. In particular, these verbs more clearly signal the social nature of 
seeing and being seen in rhetorical theory. The noun that corresponds to these verbs is 
  23 
εἴκων, which represents a more abstracted understanding of image—more mental image 
or abstraction than object of direct perception. 
Epistemology and Vision 
 The idea that knowledge is embodied through sense perception creates a 
conundrum for philosophers who seek to understand the ways in which the mind might 
function independently of the body. Aristotle manages to keep the functions of the 
physical body independent from the mind—that is the body can function without the 
mind, but the mind cannot fully escape the body in Aristotle’s epistemological system. 
This embodiment of thought informs his theory of knowing; knowledge resides in the 
soul, and the soul resides in the body. As Michael V. Wedin explains, Aristotle’s writings 
on the nature of thought lead to the dependence of the mind on the body (1988, 109). In 
On Memory and Recollection, Aristotle compares thinking to drawing a diagram, and he 
asserts that all aspects of thought include some perception of size or magnitude, 
regardless of the object’s tangibility outside the mind: 
The same affection is involved in thinking as in drawing a diagram; for in this 
case although we make no use of the fact that the magnitude of a triangle is a 
finite quantity, yet we draw it as having a finite magnitude. In the same way the 
man who is thinking, though he may not be thinking of a finite magnitude, still 
puts a finite magnitude before his eyes, though he does not think of it as such. 
(Aristot. De mem. 449b-450a)8 
 
Part of this dependence on the body is due to Aristotle’s arrangement of a bottom-up 
approach when discussing the mind in On the Soul—the physical aspects of a living 
being give rise to the mental in Aristotle’s model, and the delineation between humans 
                                                
8 συµβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεὶ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν 
προσχρώµενοι τῷ τὸ ποςὸν ὡρισµένον εἶναι τὸ τριγώνου, ὅµως γράφοµεν ὡρισµένον κατὰ 
τὸ ποσόν· καὶ ὁ νοῦων ὡσαύτως, κἂν µὴ ποςὸν νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀµµάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ᾽ 
οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν. (Aristot. De. mem. 449b-450a) 
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and other living organisms occurs because of the mental capacities that the philosopher 
argues belong only to humans. Because of this construction where the mind is embedded 
in the physical realm, Aristotle’s discussion of cognition is rooted in the body, and thus 
sensory information provides the basis of thought. 
 The nature of sense perception is one that is unending, and it is distinguished from 
other cognitive functions such as imagination because of that constancy. Aristotle deems 
the perceptive ability as complete because of its inability to stop; he says that we cannot 
stop our ears from hearing or eyes from seeing, even when we close them off from the 
world. In On the Soul he writes, “Visions are seen by men even with their eyes shut” 
(Aristot. De an. 3.3.428a).9 Furthermore, the impact of sense perception continues: “Even 
when the objects of perception are gone, sensations and mental images are still present in 
the sense organ” (Aristot. De an. 3.2.425b).10 The interconnectedness suggested here 
reinforces the embodied nature of cognition in Aristotelian epistemology. Perception is 
the corporeal grounding in the world by which humans gather knowledge. “Thinking, 
both speculative and practical, is regarded as a form of perceiving; for in both cases the 
soul judges and has cognizance of something which is” (Aristot. De an. 427a).11 
Perception, then, provides the basis for seeing the available means of persuasion, 
although that form of seeing ultimately functions on a more theoretical level built from 
perception. 
                                                
9 “φαίνεται καὶ µύουσιν ὁράµατα” (Aristot. De an. 3.3.428a). 
 
10 “διὸ καὶ ἀπελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς 
αἰσθητηρίοις” (Aristot. De an. 3.2.425b). 
 
11 “δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι· ἐν ἀµφοτέροις γὰρ 
τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων” (Aristot. De an. 427a). 
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While direct perception remains an important aspect of knowledge building, the 
imaginative processes of thinking in images is often discussed using Greek verbs of 
direct vision. The concept of phantasia becomes central to discussion of how the visual 
interacts with knowledge. Phantasia is the next step in the cognitive process from simple 
sight perception that ultimately leads to rhetorical decision-making. In relation to 
perception, Aristotle explains that imagination occurs when we associate images with our 
thoughts—whether consciously or subconsciously. These associations can occur at the 
moment of perception or in recalling those perceived details later, for instance when 
those images are stirred in the mind of a listener by an orator’s words. In either case, 
phantasia changes the perceived object into a representational object rather than a direct 
observation, but imagination remains a simpler form of abstraction that relates more 
closely to perception. The distinction between perception and imagination is not a move 
to disconnect the two concepts; instead, imagination must be understood as dependent on 
perception in order to function. 
 As Modrak discusses, Aristotle connects the two faculties by the use of a 
phantasma, “an appearance, image, or phantom” (1987, 82). These are the images with 
which the soul never thinks, according to Aristotle (Aristot. De an. 3.7.431a). In her 
discussion of phantasia, Hawhee draws a parallel between voice and sound, and she 
claims that phantasia functions as “the faculty of meaning making” in terms of 
processing the content of received sound (2011, 143). This simple abstraction or 
processing capacity of imagination helps clarify the ways in which imagination might be 
tied to more direct forms of vision in Greek thought. 
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 Because of the low-level of abstraction that occurs during imagination, Aristotle 
devotes a great deal of discussion in On the Soul to establishing and maintaining distance 
between perceiving beasts that are able to discern simple meaning and humans capable of 
complex thought, but ultimately Aristotle claims that only humans are capable of 
abstracting the signals of sense perception and imagination into more complex 
representations of reality. As evidence of this abstraction, humans have developed 
language, which aids in the abstraction of perceptive input and allows for communication 
through those abstracted modes of language with increasing levels of complexity as seen, 
for example, in metaphor. Aristotle provides an abstract model through which one can 
theorize the relation between visuality and language in Greek thought, and that 
relationship is influenced and limited by the audiences to which an abstracted image is 
presented. 
In the Cratylus, Socrates converses with Hermogenes and Cratylus about the 
accuracy of names and that which they represent, and they debate whether names occur 
naturally or are rooted in popular convention. Through their conversation, Socrates 
explores the ways in which names have been associated with the objects they represent 
and how those associations may fail to accurately portray their object. Ultimately, 
Socrates decides that the inaccuracy of words due to social factors such as differing levels 
of knowledge means that he should study the objects being named rather than the 
language that represents those objects. His decision to focus on those objects serves as a 
prelude to the exploration of Platonic forms, that the unchangeability of those forms that 
are immaterial are more suited for philosophical study. The distinction between Platonic 
forms and visualized images within a speech is that the visualized images are reflective of 
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the material, social world in which those images are viewed rather than an ideal 
manifestation of those concepts as Plato would prefer. Within that dialogue, however, 
two statements from Socrates help frame the ways in which thought and language are 
situated within the body, and thus the ways in which language activates visual processes. 
The first example is from Socrates’ etymological lesson on the word “man”: 
[Socrates:] I will tell you. The name “man” (ἄνθρωπος) indicates that the other 
animals do not examine, or consider, or look up at (ἀναθρεῖ) any of the things that 
they see, but no man has sooner seen—that is, ὄπωπε—than he looks up at and 
considers that which he has seen. Therefore of all the animals man alone is rightly 
called man (ἄνθρωπος), because he looks up at (ἀναθρεῖ) what he has seen 
(ὄπωπε). (Plat. Crat. 399c)12 
 
In this passage four forms of the verb ὁράω, to see, are present: ὁρᾷ, ἑώρακεν, ὄπωπε, 
and ὄπωπεν. ῾Ορᾷ (hora) is in the subjunctive mood relating to the discussion of animals 
that do not “consider” (ἐπισκοπεῖ), which is an abstract verb of seeing. The verb ἑώρακεν 
refers to the seeing man who is capable of reflecting upon those sights. Animals that may 
see (ὁρᾷ) never consider (ἐπισκοπεῖ), and the act of considering represents the ability to 
recall those images into one’s mind. Socrates is concerned with the distinction between 
men and animals as he explores the relation of language to thought, a similar concern to 
the one Aristotle discusses when connecting perception to cognition in On the Soul. 
 Plato’s Gorgias also demonstrates how this physical-to-linguistic expression is 
understood through the use of verbs related to direct perception. During Socrates’ 
discussion with the Sophist of virtuous speechmaking, he discusses the importance of 
“how justice may be engendered in the souls of [the orator’s] fellow citizens” (Plat. Gorg. 
                                                
12 Σηµαίνει τοῦτο τὸ ὄνοµα ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι τὰ µὲν ἄλλα θηρία ὧν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ἐπισκοπεῖ 
οὐδὲ ἀναλογίζεται οὐδὲ ἀναθρεῖ, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἅµα ἑώρακεν—τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ ὄπωπε—καὶ 
ἀναθρεῖ καὶ λογίζεαι τοῦτο ὃ ὄπωπεν. ἐντεῦθεν δὲ µόνον τῶν θηρίων ὀρθῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
ἄνθρωπος ὠνοµάσθη, ἀναθρῶν ἃ ὄπωπε. (Plat. Crat. 399c) 
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504e).13 Earlier in this discussion, Socrates states that this principle of encouraging 
justice is what the orator “will have in view” during his speech (Plat. Gorg. 504d).14 In 
contrast to Aristotle’s use of the abstract verb θεωρῆσαι to demonstrate abstracted vision 
in his definition of rhetoric, here Plato uses a verb that indicates a more direct form of 
perceptual seeing (βλέπω). Given the distinction that Plato uses between direct and 
abstract sight in the Cratylus, this use in the Gorgias signals a way in which βλέπω might 
signal rhetoric in action. That is, Aristotle’s “seeing the available means” could be 
understood as an internal process that characterizes the art of rhetoric, but Socrates’ 
depiction of the virtuous orator keeping justice “in view” demonstrates the physical 
contexts of delivery in which a speech is performed for an audience; both speaker and 
audience literally see each other in the space but also witness each other through 
language cues. 
 Regarding theoretical sight, George A. Kennedy translates the verb θεωρῆσαι, the 
aorist active infinitive form of the verb θεωρέω, as “to see” in Aristotle’s definition of 
rhetoric; it indicates the association between theoretical knowledge of rhetoric—that is, 
understanding the available means—and the specular influence of knowledge as 
evidenced by Aristotle’s epistemological theory (trans. Kennedy, Aristot. Rh. 
1.2.1.1355b).15 In contrast, J. H. Freese translates Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric in the 
Loeb edition as “the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference 
                                                
13 “ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῖς πολίταις δικιαοσύνη µὲν ἐν ταῖς χυχαῖς γίγνηται” (Plat. Gorg. 504e). 
 
14 “πρὸς ταῦτα βλέπων” (Plat. Gorg. 504d). 
 
15 “Ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναµις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόµενον πιθανόν” 
(Aristot. Rh. 1.2.1.1355b). 
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to any subject whatever” (trans. Freese, Aristot. Rh. 1.2.1.1355b). Whether “seeing” or 
“discovering” the means of persuasion, Aristotle’s use of the verb indicates an abstracted 
form of sight—to see on a theoretical level. Later in the same paragraph, Aristotle 
explains that the subject of rhetoric “appears to be able to discover the means of 
persuasion in reference to a given subject” (Aristot. Rh. 1.2.1.1355b).16 Again, Aristotle 
uses a form of the verb θεωρέω to describe the “discovery” aspect of rhetoric; the use of 
the verb δοκεῖ, “appears,” in coordination with the infinitive verb phrase “δύνασθαι 
θεωρεῖν” reinforces the visual nature of rhetorical knowledge. Δοκεῖ is the third-person 
singular active indicative form of the verb δοκέω, “to seem, appear,” from which the 
Greek nouns ἡ δόκη, “vision, fancy,” and ἡ δόξα, “opinion or belief” are derived (Liddell 
and Scott 1998, 177). The use of an abstract, theoretical form of seeing in Aristotle’s 
identification of rhetoric’s subject suggests that the more basic forms of visual 
knowledge-making build to higher order thinking processes that are essential to 
successful use of the art of rhetoric. 
 Hawhee explores the constructs by which Aristotle roots rhetorical vision—the 
ability of rhetoric to activate visual images in the minds of an audience—in the 
imaginative power of cognition, and she traces the visual nature of imagination for the 
philosopher. In this cognitive model, the theory of visuality emerges through Greek 
epistemology. O’Gorman explains that Aristotle’s theory of language activates the 
imagination of the audience: 
Words can be used to move so as to activate phantasmatic capacities of audience 
members. What is absent before the eyes physically is made present to the mind 
                                                
16 “ἡ δὲ ῥητορικῆ περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανόν” 
(Kennedy, Rh. 1.2.1.1355b). 
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while imagining. Thus, the process of private cognition is made present to the 
mind while imagining. Thus, the process of private cognition analyzed in De 
Anima, and the process of lexical spectating in “bringing before the eyes” 
discussed in the Rhetoric, both entail a dynamic and visual form. (2005, 24) 
 
As explored in Aristotle’s theory of cognition, all thoughts are dependent on image. Since 
language is an action of thought, it follows that language is also visual. A formative level 
of abstraction for this visual input is through the use of phantasia, imagination. Newman 
asserts that the verbal act of constructing metaphor elicits visualization on the part of the 
audience through the use of language alone (2002, 14). According to O’Gorman, 
Aristotle’s version of rhetoric is one that “[shapes] opinions and [directs] the affections 
through the creation of images” (2005, 25). Additionally, Hawhee emphasizes the role of 
the audience in this exchange, saying, “The production of rhetorical vision, in other 
words, occurs on the part of the audience as a result of the ‘bundle’ of ideas contained in 
the images” (2011, 155). Thus, ideas are communicated through a visual connection. 
Modrak discusses Aristotle’s connections between language and truth in De 
Interpretatione and states, “Meanings are grounded in the world because the mental 
states, which are vehicles for meanings, resemble extramental objects. With meanings 
firmly anchored in the world, language can serve as the means for expressing truths” 
(2001, 51). Thus, the rhetor is called to tie language to those referent objects in order to 
create a persuasive argument, relying first on the abstraction of imagination for mental 
images and then calling upon further abstraction of image through use of metaphor or 
similar use of visual association. Laurent Pernot offers an explanation of how this 
Aristotelian actualization of discourse functions rhetorically: 
Aristotle highlighted this fundamental idea: persuasion requires exploiting the 
forces already present in the listener. The good orator knows the cognitive 
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competencies and pertinent mental associations of those listening to him. He 
builds on preexisting ideas and recognized values, and in this way he can effect 
the mystery of persuasion…: to induce someone to think something he was not 
thinking before. (2005, 43) 
 
The call for orators to be familiar with their audience situates Aristotle’s rhetoric as 
dependent on the interaction between orator and audience, and in that system, the orator 
must be able to theorize the ways in which persuasion would best occur. Part of that 
system involves understanding the ways in which abstracted ideas as mental images can 
connect with as many listeners as possible while remaining persuasive—that is, in what 
ways the audience will call upon abstract mental images in their memory. In order to 
theorize those phenomena, orators build rhetorical theories upon discussions of how 
abstracted forms of seeing, θεωρέω and σκοπέω, are defined and understood through 
language. 
In the third chapter of On the Soul, Aristotle claims that opinions and judgments 
are the result of imagination and that imagination functions when images are brought into 
the mind. The word he uses for image is φαντασµά (Aristot. De an. 3.3.428a). Liddell, 
Scott, and Jones note that the word is distilled from the noun εἴδωλον, which also 
translates as “image” (1940). Richard Sorabji clarifies that Aristotle’s visual emphasis 
“requires not any kind of image, but an image that is a likeness or copy of the thing 
remembered” (1972, 2). The likeness or copy discussed by Sorabji refers to the Greek 
word εἰκών. This εἰκών is distinct from φαντασµά or εἴδωλον in that εἰκώνες can adapt a 
degree of abstraction not afforded to the other types of images. Sorabji explains that the 
image constructed as εἰκών, takes on different levels of abstraction depending on how the 
image is utilized in connection with memory; the referent image may be directly 
  32 
perceivable in connection with the idea or may be associated with the object itself (1923, 
3). To clarify, an εἰκών can be constructed using varying levels of abstraction while 
φαντασµατά are more closely aligned with the recreation of a perceived image. To 
illustrate the connectedness of εἰκώνες, one could associate a specific facial feature with a 
man in order to remember him, or one could remember the man through the εἰκών of a 
clock because of his chronic tardiness.  
In his biography of the orator, the Greek historian Plutarch explains that one of 
Demosthenes’ nicknames was Argas, which “was given to him either with reference to 
his manners, which were harsh and savage, the snake being called ‘argas’ by some of the 
poets; or with reference to his way of speaking, which was distressing to his hearers” 
(Plut. Dem. 4.5).17 Here, the orator’s nickname serves as the referent to two possible 
εἰκώνες, a snake or harsh speech, to associate the man with images, and to make 
arguments regarding his character. Modrak further clarifies the role of εἰκών: “By using 
‘eikon’ as an explanatory term, Aristotle reveals his intent to limit the appeal to likeness 
as a relation between the image and the past event that the image refers to” (2001, 234). 
The introduction of a temporal factor of past experience into thought pushes the 
exploration of perception and imagination into the realm of memory as the modes of 
abstraction become increasingly complex and dependent upon established memories or 
systems of thought. Hawhee discusses the potential of words, through rhetorical vision, to 
transport audience members’ visions in time “by flooding their eyes with active images 
                                                
17 “ὁ δ᾽ Ἀργᾶς (καὶ τοῦτο γάρ φασι τῷ Δηµοσθένει γενέσθαι παρώνυµον) ἢ πρὸς τὸν 
τρόπον, ὡς υηριώδη καὶ πικρὸν ἐτέθη· τὸν φὰρ ὄφιν ἔνιοι τῶν ποιητῶν ἀργᾶν 
ὀνοµάζουσιν· ἤ προὸς τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἀνιῶντα τοὺς ἀκροωµένους” (Plut. Dem. 4.5). 
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from the past or projected into the future” (2011, 159). The concept of visuality as it 
relates to language includes discussions of recall and image association across time. 
It is in these acts of remembering or abstracting that the concepts of 
representation and visuality relate to verbs of theoretical sight such as θεωρέω and 
σκοπέω. As the discussion of εἰκώνες alludes, the imitation of thought can take on a 
variety of mental images, and those mental images can offer insights into the ways in 
which represented or imitated ideas connect with Greek audiences. Aristotle identifies 
metaphors as a particularly effective form of enthymeme, and characterizes the concept 
as inherently visual because it relies on the ability to connect an abstract idea with a 
visualized image that represents that idea. He discusses how a proper metaphor succeeds 
in “bringing-before-the-eyes” of an audience the image and concept related to that 
metaphor, and he explains that metaphor requires a speaker to use an image that can be 
broadly associated and understood by an audience. Newman writes, “Bringing-before-
the-eyes […] is crucial to effective metaphors because it allows rhetoricians to actualize 
actions immediately before audiences, and, through this actualization, lead those 
audiences to insight” (2002, 3). The duty of the rhetorician, then, is to identify the 
metaphor that will most clearly sway a particular audience during a specific performance. 
The emphasis on the visual aspect of metaphor and the audience’s participation in 
understanding that metaphor is discussed through the ways in which the orator and 
audience abstractly view those images within their minds. 
However, the image sharing functions are problematic when audiences are 
especially diverse and represent a broad range of literacies and knowledges. For example, 
Isocrates says Athens “is so large and the multitude of people living [there] is so great, 
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that the city does not present to the mind an image easily grasped or sharply defined” 
(Isoc. 15.172).18 In this passage from the Antidosis, Isocrates discusses the ways in which 
the city of Athens cannot be easily encapsulated, due to the size and the diversity of the 
city’s inhabitants. The idea that Athens does not present an image that is easily seen (οὐκ 
εὐσόνοπτός) complicates Aristotle’s idea that metaphors can consistently trigger similar 
responses in the mind of an audience. However, that complication also calls for orators to 
be deliberate and selective in the images that they present to an audience—the social 
weight of understanding an audience’s knowledge becomes even more relevant for 
choosing and depicting the proper verbal images. 
The charge for rhetoricians to make clear the messages that they are sending 
signals yet another shift within the cognitive system, one that is very closely related to the 
abstracted vision of θεωρέω but focuses instead on the ways in which verbs of seeing 
serve to clarify concepts, rather than relay direct images. In this framework, the verbs that 
correspond to making clear include δηλόω and δείκνυµι, to show. Related to the concept 
of “showing forth” is the verb φαίνω, to appear or give off light. In Nicocles, or the 
Cyprians, which serves as an example speech for the ruler being taught by Isocrates, the 
philosopher summarizes the ability of language to represent the values and ethos of a 
rhetorician when he poses the following question: “But why do I need to take the time to 
speak in detail, especially when I can make clear in a word the truth about myself” (Isoc. 
                                                
18 “διὰ γὰρ τὸ µέγεθος καὶ τὸ πλῆθος, τῶν ἐνοικούντων οὐκ εὐσύνοπτος ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ἀκριβής” 
(Isoc. 15.172). 
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3.35).19 Yet another Isocratean characterization of discourse occurs in the Antidosis when 
he tells the audience that he will “present in evidence the actual words which I have 
spoken and written” (Isoc. 15.54).20 As mentioned earlier in this paragraph, Isocrates uses 
forms of the verbs δηλόω and δείκνυµι, respectively, in these two passages in order to 
demonstrate the linguistic “showing forth” that occurs through providing verbal evidence. 
It is in this “showing forth” that the social implications of oratory and visuality are made 
clear; the function of speech is to bring to light before an audience those concepts related 
to the speech. 
One tactic for making clear the concept of a speech is through the use of proper 
language choices—that is, through the proper “imitation” of an image through words. In 
the dialogue between Socrates and Hermogenes in the Cratylus, Socrates describes an 
audience who sees (βλέπω) that which an orator shows or expresses. He says, “When we 
wish to express anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will not our expression by these 
means be accomplished in any given instance when an imitation of something is 
accomplished by them?” (Plat. Crat. 423b).21 This passage utilizes δηλόω in predicate 
and nominative forms, and an alternative translation might make the visual impact of the 
word choice clearer, I would summarize with the following translation: “When we wish 
to show anything by voice or tongue or mouth, will we not accomplish this by making 
                                                
19 “καὶ τὶ δεῖ καθ᾽ ἒν ἕκαστον λέγοντα διατρίβειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ συντόµως ἔχοντα δηλῶσαι 
περὶ ἐµαυτοῦ” (Isoc. 3.35). 
 
20 “αὐτοὺς γὰρ ὑµῖν δείξω τοὺς εἰρηµένους” (Isoc. 15.54). 
 
21 “ἐπειδὴ δὲ φωνῆ τε καὶ γλώττη καὶ στόµατι βουλόµεθα δηλοῦν, ἀρ᾽ οὐ τότε ἑκάστου 
δήλωµα ἡµῖν ἔσται τὺ ἀπὸ τούτων γιγνόµενον, ὅταν µίµηµα γένηται διὰ τούτων περὶ 
ὁτιοῦν;” (Plat. Crat. 423b). 
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those things visible through imitation?” In the Cratylus, that form of imitation occurs as a 
result of using the proper names to identify concepts. When language does not readily 
reflect a particular image that an orator hopes to use, the imitation is in danger of failing 
because it is unclear, and the rhetorical effect of visualization is lessened. 
Another major function of orators’ clarification efforts lies in establishing an 
ethos to prepare their audience. In his discussion of epideictic rhetoric, Aristotle states 
that in speaking those things that are virtuous or unvirtuous, “we shall incidentally bring 
to light the means of making us appear of such and such a character” (Aristot. Rh. 
1.9.1.1366a).22 Here, the topic of discussion also makes clear the content to an audience 
and provides a model for behavior that visually reinforces the ideas espoused by logos. 
Aristotle voices the importance of appearance for ethos when discussing deliberative 
rhetoric as well, saying, “The speaker should show himself to be of a certain character” 
which he contrasts with making the hearer “be disposed in a certain way” in forensic 
rhetoric (Aristot. Rh. 2.1.3.1377b).23 In characterizing deliberative rhetoric, Aristotle 
makes use of the verb φαίνεσθαι, which is much more readily identifiable as relating to 
vision since it is etymologically linked to the noun φάος, light, which the Greeks viewed 
as essential for the ability to see an object. 
The epistemological system presented thus far is primarily supported using texts 
written by Aristotle. As noted in Chapter 1, most of the research regarding Greek rhetoric 
and visuality is similarly focused upon Aristotle’s work on the subject. Other figures in 
                                                
22 γὰρ ἅµα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόµεθα κατὰ 
τὺ ἤθος)” (Aristot. Rh. 1.9.1.1366a). 
 
23 “τὸ µὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιµώτερον εἰς τὰς συµβουλάς ἐστιν [...] 
τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν” (Aristot. Rh. 2.1.3.1377b). 
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rhetorical theory, however, draw upon visual language and concepts of visuality in their 
rhetorical theories or performances. Although their discussions of visuality might not be 
as readily identifiable as Aristotle’s writings, I argue that connections between language 
and visuality can be discerned from rhetorical texts through the identification and the 
analysis of language cues related to visuality. The language that an orator uses to discuss 
the art of rhetoric or to invite visual actions within a speech, such as imagining or 
comparing image and concept, can be understood as a deliberate attempt to activate the 
sensory-based ways of knowing that are prevalent within Greek texts.  
The invitations to visualize can function in a variety of ways, and the specific 
words that relate to visual components might even be understood in multiple ways; for 
example, the verb θεωρέω may function as an invitation to consider concepts that follow 
through visual means or more abstractly imagine the connections between images or 
concepts. However, broadly categorized, I suggest that language cues relate to visuality 
in three ways: as an invitation to perceive the speech and its contexts, to activate 
imaginative processes such as visualizing events or picturing the comparisons of a 
metaphor, or as a means of clarifying what has been said within a speech by activating 
sensory knowledge. In the sections that follow, I explore these concepts in action, 
drawing upon primary texts to illustrate the use of language cues in Greek rhetorical 
performance and suggest the ways in which an audience is prepared to participate in the 
rhetorical act through these visualizations. 
Perceiving the Speech 
One of the key areas in which language cues invite visualization is through the 
orator’s attempts to invite an audience to visualize the speech act or specific images 
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within the text. While more abstract forms of seeing fall under the heading of 
imagination, language cues that invite an audience to perceive the speech are focused 
more directly on the ways in which an orator asks an audience to contemplate a rhetorical 
performance through sensory means. For example, in On the State of the Chersonese, 
Demosthenes invites his audience to consider the motivations of the ruler Philip of 
Macedon, who has lodged a complaint against Athenian forces who have invaded 
Macedonian settlements near the Chersonese, known today as the Gallipoli peninsula. 
Early in his speech, Demosthenes instructs his audience, “For you must first note what is 
going on at the present moment” (Dem. 8.14).24 The verb used in this statement is θεωρεῖτε, 
the abstract verb of seeing, and it signifies the activation of contextual images regarding the 
speech. Rather than calling upon specific images, Demosthenes instead encourages his 
audience to view more broadly the situation that has given rise to his speech. The images 
that follow this statement more clearly describe the context that Demosthenes wishes his 
audience to envision, but this initial statement serves as the invitation to visualize what 
follows. 
In the Cratylus, Socrates converses with Hermogenes about the use of physical 
imitation or pantomime in absence of having a voice with which to speak. Socrates asks 
whether people might “make signs with our hands and head and person generally” (Plat. 
Crat. 423a).25 Hermogenes assents, and Socrates presses further whether people might 
signal with their bodies in reference to the topic of their communication—for example, 
                                                
24 “θεωρεῖτε γὰρ τὸ παρὸν πρῶτον, ὃ γίγνεται” (Dem. 8.14). 
 
25 “ἐπεχειροῦµεν ἂν σηµαίνειν ταῖς χερςὶ καὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ σόµατι” (Plat. Crat. 
423a). 
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pointing toward the sky to indicate light or things above—which Hermogenes again 
assents. At that point, Socrates declares, “The expression of anything, I fancy, would be 
accomplished by bodily imitation of that which was to be expressed” (Plat. Crat. 423a).26 
While this conversation regarding the imitation of objects through body and eventually 
voice does not use any verbs of perception, the relationship of bodily expression to 
linguistic expression is constructed on the assumption that communication involves an 
embodied experience that is visible between speaker (or actor) and audience. And in this 
sense, the discussion relates to the ways in which an orator should consider how a 
rhetorical performance is perceived. 
 The Attic Orator Theophrastus describes a wide range of characteristics that an 
individual might possess and describes them in vivid detail in his treatise Characters; 
topics such as “flattery,” “boorishness,” “arrogance,” and “cowardice” are a small sampling 
of topics that the rhetorician explores in the text, and he produces a catalogue of images 
that relate to each of the qualities. Through this work, Theophrastus, who was a student of 
Aristotle, attempts to categorize these characteristics in a format similar to the style of his 
teacher, and in doing so, attempts to teach his audience how they might consider 
individuals possessing these qualities and understand their nature. In the preface to this 
work he says, “I shall now turn to my story; it is your task to follow it correctly, and see 
whether it is told correctly as well” (Thphr. Char. 0.4).27 The verb that Theophrastus uses 
here is εἰδῆσαι, a form of the verb ὁράω; he invites his audience to perceive these 
                                                
26 “οὕτω γὰρ ἄν, οἶµαι, δήλωµά του ἐγίγνετο, µιµησαµένου, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ σόµατος ἐκεῖνο ὃ 
ἐβούλετο δηλῶσαι” (Plat. Crat. 423a). 
 
27 “τρέψοµαι δὲ ἤδη ἐπὶ τὸν λὀγον. Σὸν δὲ παρακολουθῆσαί τε ὀρθῶς τε καὶ εἰδῆσαι, εἰ 
ὀρθῶς λέγω” (Thphr. Char. 0.4). 
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characters presented in the text, and the images that follow in the treatise benefit from 
Theophrastus’ initial instruction to visualize the words.  
The Attic Orator Isaeus, who most commonly wrote judicial speeches related to the 
inheritance of estates and wills, often invites his audience to visualize the content of the 
speeches that he writes. During his speech On the Estate of Hagnias, the orator uses the 
verb ὁράω to describe viewing the speech of his opponent, “I notice (ὁρῶ), gentlemen, that 
most of his speech is taken up with a discussion of my fortune and of that of the child” 
(Isaeus 11.37).28 By characterizing the speech as an object that can be viewed, the orator 
also allows his audience to consider the ways in which his own speech can be encapsulated 
as an image. In yet another judicial speech regarding an inheritance, Isaeus instructs his 
audience, “Observe, then, how difficult it is to discover whether those who claim under a 
will are telling the truth; those, on the other hand, who claim by right of kinship, in the first 
place, need not produce witnesses to prove that the inheritance is theirs” (Isaeus 4.15)29 In 
this excerpt from On the Estate of Nicostratus, Isaeus uses the imperative ὁρᾶτε to 
instruct the audience to consider the concept through visual means. The use of this verb 
of seeing, and specifically one that reflects a more direct form of perception than a verb 
such as θεωρέω, indicates that these instructions should be readily engaged for an 
audience and do not require a high level of abstraction in order to give consideration 
through visual means. 
                                                
28 “ὁρῶ δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες, τὴν πλείστην διατριβὴν τῶν λόγων ποιούµενον περὶ τὴν τοῦ παιδὸς 
οὐσίαν καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐµήν” (Isaeus 11.37). 
 
29 “τοὺς µὲν οὖν κατὰ τὴν δόσιν ἀµφισβητοῦντας ὁρᾶτε ὅσον ἔργον ἐστὶν αἰσθέσθαι εἰ ἀληθῆ 
λέγουσι, τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὸ γένος πρῶτον µὲν οὐδὲν δεῖ µάρτυρας παρασχέσθαι ὡς αὑτῶν ἐστιν 
ὁ κλῆρος” (Isaeus 4.15). 
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Imagination and Performance 
The role of imagination in rhetorical performance is in referring to and describing 
the mental images that occur in hand with the topics under consideration. To identify the 
moments when an orator is inviting an audience to imagine specific images or concepts, 
verbs that signal more abstract types of vision such as σκοπέω or θεωρέω are more 
common; additionally, concepts such as φανταµατά, εἰκώνες, or metaphors may represent 
the imaginative processes of visuality and rhetoric. 
In discussing metaphor in Book III of the Rhetoric, Aristotle describes the 
function of metaphor in “bringing-before-the-eyes” of an audience the images cited in the 
metaphor (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.1.1411b). He explains that words which set something before 
the eyes “indicate actuality” (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.2.1411b). Continuing this discussion, 
Aristotle explains that metaphor “speaks of inanimate things as if they were animate” 
(Aristot. Rh. 3.11.3.1411b).30 Through the imitation of animation, these words resemble 
actuality and make metaphor effective. In this, there is the energizing of language to 
enliven the effect on an audience’s visualization of the metaphor. For Aristotle, this 
actualization of metaphor is constructed through a visual understanding of discourse and 
the ways in which words call upon and excite those “mental images” within the minds of 
the orator and audience.  
The emphasis on the visual aspect of metaphor and the audience’s participation in 
understanding said metaphor is more clearly understood through Aristotle’s discussion of 
                                                
30 “προ ὀµµάτων ποιεῖν [...]ἐνεργοῦντα σηµαίνει [...] τῷ τὰ ἄψυχα ἔµψυχα λέγειν διὰ τῆς 
µεταφορᾶς [...] ” (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.3.1411b). 
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“beautiful” and “ugly” metaphors31: “One word does not signify in the same ways as 
another […] It makes a difference whether the dawn is called ‘rosy-fingered’ or ‘purple-
fingered,’ or worse still ‘red-fingered’” (Aristot. Rh. 3.2.13.1405b).32 The specificity 
associated with metaphor and image in this passage illustrates the visual connection that 
audiences make with a shared referent εἰκών. The abstraction allowed in personal 
memory is limited in rhetorical contexts to the clearest possible representations among 
ideas and images in order to connect with the listener through shared cultural images or 
metaphors. Metaphor that brings before the eyes of an audience a specific, intended effect 
is dependent on drawing upon a paradigm of visuality available to all participants. 
In his address To Nicocles, Isocrates offers advice to the ruler frequently through 
the use of imperative forms of the verbs θεωρέω and σκοπέω. He advises the ruler to 
“keep watch always on your words and actions,” “reflect on the fortunes and accidents 
which befall both common men and kings,” and “prefer to leave behind you as a 
memorial images of your character rather than your body” (Isoc. 2.33, 35-36).33 The use 
of verbs of theoretical seeing as well as the noun εἰκόνας demonstrate the way in which 
reflective practice for Isocrates signalled cognitive processes that involved verbs of 
                                                
31 Connected to “beautiful” and “ugly” metaphors is the topic of “pleasure,” and Hawhee 
connects understanding “how things appear as pleasurable” (2011, 145). As seen here in 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric, pleasure also extends to how audiences respond to metaphors and 
the images that are brought “before-the-eyes.” 
 
32 “ἔτι οὐχ ὁµοίως ἔχον σηµαίνει τόδε καὶ τόδε, ὥστε καὶ οὕτως ἄλλο ἄλλου κάλλιον καὶ 
αἴσχιον θετέον· […] διαφέρει δ᾿ εἰπεῖν, οἷον ῥοδοδάκτυλος ἠὼς µᾶλλον ἢ φοινικοδάκτυλος, 
ἢ ἔτι φαυλότερον ἐρυθροδάκτυλος” (Aristot. Rh. 3.2.13.1405b). 
 
33 “ἐπισκόπει τοὺς λόγους ἀεὶ,” “θεώρει τὰ γογνόµενα καὶ τὰ συµπίποντα κεὶ τοῖς ἰδώταις 
καὶ τοῖς τυράννοις,” and “βούλυ τᾶς εἰκόνας τῆς ἀρετῆς ὑπόµνηµα µᾶλλον ἢ τοπυ σώµατος 
καταλιπεῖν” (Isoc. 2.33, 35-36.). 
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seeing functioning on a more complex level than simple sight perception. Rooted in these 
commands, also, is the rhetorician’s concern with understanding the ways in which others 
view the words and deeds of the ruler. The instructions ask the ruler to reflect inward but 
also to consider the ways in which he was “seen” by those he ruled. 
In his notable discussion of the benefits of oratory, which appears similarly in 
both the Antidosis and Nicocles, Isocrates uses the concept of εἴδωλον and the verb 
σκοπέω to illustrate the ways in which the orator’s use of speech coincides with an 
audience’s deep understanding of the nature of an orator’s work and the ways in which 
rhetorical vision depends on higher level abstraction of language and image: 
For the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding 
and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good 
and faithful soul. With this faculty we both contest against others on matters 
which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are 
unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we 
speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts. (Isoc. 
3.7-8)34 
 
This passage, quoted from Nicocles, closely resembles the language used in the Antidosis 
and demonstrates the ways in which lasting images of orators and oratory are abstracted 
through memory and begin to function on theoretical levels of seeing. Similarly, Isocrates 
identifies how the external practices of rhetoric function internally for self-deliberation 
and reflection; we “seek light for ourselves (σκοπούµεθα)” through speaking well. 
Through drawing a comparison between internal deliberation and public oratory, 
Isocrates identifies a relationship between the internal cognitive processes that an orator 
                                                
34 τὸ γὰρ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ τοῦ φρονεῖν εὖ µέγιστον σηµεῖον ποιούµεθα, καὶ λόγος ἀληθὴς καὶ 
νόµιµος καὶ δίκαιος ψυχῆς ἀγαθῆς καὶ πιστῆς εἴδωλόν ἐστιν. µετὰ τούτου καὶ περὶ τῶν 
ἀµφισβητησίµων ἀγωνιζόµεθα καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀγνοουµένων σκοπούµεθα· ταῖς γὰρ πίστεσιν 
αἷς τοὺς ἄλλους λέγοντες πείθοµεν, ταῖς αὐταῖς ταύταις βουλευόµενοι χρώµεθα. (Isoc. 3.7-
8) 
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should consider prior to delivering a speech and the external exchange of information that 
inspires similar cognitive processes in the minds of the audience. While this is a linguistic 
exchange of information, the ways in which it is depicted on an ethical and 
epistemological level bear testimony to the visual underpinning of Greek thought. 
 Plato recreates Aspasia’s Funeral Oration in the Menexenus, and in this cited 
passage of the dialogue, she discusses the need for knowledge to be embodied through 
words. While the accuracy of the speech must be read through the filter of Plato’s 
dialogue (and Socrates’ retelling), she says, “For it is by means of speech finely spoken 
and that deeds nobly done gain for their doers from the hearers the deed of memory and 
renown” (Plat. Menex. 236d-e).35 While not utilizing language of imagery or seeing 
directly in this excerpt, Aspasia’s words call upon the performative nature of rhetorical 
delivery and the activation of images through social ties. 
Another example of imaginative vision can be found in the Phaedrus. In that 
dialogue, which discusses topics such as truth and beauty among other topics, both Socrates 
and Phaedrus create visually compelling images in the course of their discussion. These 
images often draw upon various metaphors or vivid descriptions in order to communicate 
the intensity of the emotions that accompany them. One particularly striking image occurs 
when Socrates describes the influence of beauty, saying, “All my discourse so far has been 
about the fourth kind of madness, which causes him to be regarded as mad, who, when he 
sees the beauty on earth, remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to 
stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird, gazes upward and 
                                                
35 “ἔργων γὰρ εὖ πραχθέντων λόγῳ καλῶς ῥηθέντι µνήµη καὶ κόσµος τοῖ πράξασι γίγνεται 
παρὰ τῶν ἀκουσάντων” (Plat. Menex. 236d-e). 
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neglects the things below” (Plat. Phaedrus 249d).36 Interestingly, the verbs used in this 
passage include ὁρῶν and βλἐπων, which more readily represent direct sight. However, the 
depiction of a feathered man stretching his wings for flight clearly encourages the listener 
to visualize these abstract images. 
Making Concepts Clear 
The final type of language cue to consider in this analysis regards the ways in 
which an orator clarifies or illuminates the content of the speech. In addition to verbs 
such as δηλόω, to make clear, this concept also manifests in discussions of how an orator 
brings those visualizations or mental images to an audience. It is a deliberate attempt for 
the orator to reveal the effects of a speech or to make an audience aware of the ways in 
which those concepts can be understood. “Making clear,” also allows the orator to 
establish or reinforce a particular ethos through creating an “image” of themselves. 
Isaeus speaks toward the drive to make principles a visual symbol of ones speech 
in On the Estate of Cleonymus. In this case, he must contrast the written will of 
Cleonymus with the actions of the man toward the proposed inheritors before his death. 
The individuals for whom Isaeus has constructed this speech were previously under the 
guardianship of Deinias, whom Cleonymus distrusted to properly care for them if he died 
while they were still under his care. After they were cleared from the former’s 
guardianship, Cleonymus took them into his home and showed them kindness. However, 
he did not amend his will to reinstate them as beneficiaries. In this situation, Isaeus 
                                                
36 “Ἔστιν δὴ οὖν δεῦρο ὁ πᾶς ἥκων λόγος περὶ τῆς τετάρτης µανίας, ἣν ὅταν τὸ τῇδέ τις ὁρῶν 
κάλλος, τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἀναµιµνῃσκόµενος, πτερῶταί τε καὶ ἀναπτερούµενος προθυµούµενος 
ἀναπτέσθαι, ἀδυνατῶν δέ, ὄρνιθος δίκην βλέπων ἄνω, τῶν κάτω δὲ ἀµελῶν, αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς 
µανικῶς Eδιακείµενος·” (Plat. Phaedrus 249d). 
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argues, “It is from these acts rather than from the will that his intentions must be 
discerned, and inferences must be drawn not from what he did under the influence of 
anger—through which we are all liable to err—but from his subsequent acts, whereby he 
made his attitude quite clear” (Isaeus 1.13).37 The discernment of motivation discussed 
here reflects the use of the verb θεωρεῖν, which signals the need for an audience to 
consider the ways in which the narrative of the case can be seen as evidentiary moreso 
than the written evidence of Cleonymus’ will. Isaeus pushes the Assembly to consider the 
events of the case through visual means in order to weigh their decision in his favor.  
Aristotle bridges the connection between one who has reflected on the knowledge 
gained and translated that information to the most effective enthymeme for audience 
understanding. As he explains in the first chapter of the Rhetoric, “An ability to aim at 
commonly held opinions [endoxa] is a characteristic of one who also has a similar ability 
in regard to the truth” (trans. Kennedy, Aristot. Rh. 1.1.11.1355a).38 In this model of 
rhetoric, the audience’s knowledge in the form of endoxa understands the ways in which 
an orator’s message “resembles the true.” Furthermore, the rhetor is responsible for 
constructing an argument that calls upon the image of that endoxa in order to construct an 
effective enthymeme. In many ways, this is also a charge for the rhetorician to “make 
clear” the message and images for the audience. Additionally, the rhetor must consider 
the ways in which he/she is demonstrating principles as a visual symbol of their speech. 
                                                
37 “καὶτοι χρὴ θεωρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐξ τούτων τῶν ἔργων µᾶλλον ἢ ἐκ τῶν διαθηκῶν, 
καὶ τεκµηρίοις χρῆσθαι µὴ τοῖς µετ᾽ὀργῆς πραχθεῖσιν, ἐν οἷς ἅπαντες πεφύκαµεν 
ἁµαρτάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ὧν ὕστερον φανερὰν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἔννοιαν ἐποίησεν” (Isaeus 1.13). 
 
38 “διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στιχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὁµοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν” 
(Aristot. Rh. 1.1.11.1355a). 
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Isocrates uses the imperative form of the same verb in his address To Nicocles: 
“Do nothing in anger, but simulate anger when the occasion demands it. Show yourself 
stern by overlooking nothing which men do, but kind by making the punishment less than 
the offence” (Isoc. 2.23).39 In addition to the command “show yourself (φαίνου),” the 
verb δόκει is translated as “simulate” in this passage. As mentioned earlier, this verb is 
linked to the Greek noun ἡ δόξα, opinion, and once again signals the social implications 
of visuality. Ekaterina Haskins speaks toward the importance that Isocrates’ works focus 
not solely on rhetorical instruction but also contain “self-reflexive and politically charged 
prose, [and] he assigns discourse a socially constitutive, not merely instrumental, 
function” (2004, 11). Isocrates’ combinatory discussion of virtuous rule over the people 
and rhetorical skill signals his civic emphasis. 
Extending to Shared Ways of Seeing 
 As this chapter has explored, the etymological linking between ὁράω and οἶδα, 
between seeing and knowing, is multifaceted and functions on varying levels of 
abstraction. While discussions of embodiment and visuality are doubtlessly interwoven 
due to their corporeal grounding, by tracing the ways in which base perception and 
epistemology link to abstracted forms of seeing and thinking, we in turn uncover the 
social factors by which and through which abstracted mental images are developed and 
used. By exploring the link between perceptive seeing and theoretical sight, this chapter 
establishes a framework through which the following chapters can explore how Greek 
concepts of commonplaces, style, and emotion manifest through discussions of visuality 
                                                
39 “ποίει µὲν µηδὲν µετ᾽ ὀργῆς, δόκει δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅταν σοι καιρὸς ᾖ. δεινὸς µὲν φαίνου 
τῷ µη δὲν σελανθάνειν τῶν γιγνοµένων, πρᾶος δὲ τῷ τὰς τιµωρίας ἐλάττους ποιεῖσθαι τῶν 
ἁµαρτανοµένων” (Isoc. 2.23). 
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as well as in Greek rhetoric and performance. To return to Fleckenstein’s framing 
question, this chapter has shown the ways in which “the intricate interweaving of word 
[and] image” function in Greek epistemology so that later chapters can more fully 
explore the ways in which “shared ways of seeing” make these interrelations evident 
(2007, 6). In particular, this chapter provides a framework by which one can identify the 
effects of language choice on the rhetorical performance and to theorize the ways in 
which those words might inspire vivid experiences within the minds of an audience. 
Building from the assumption that the words one uses can influence the ways in which a 
worldview is constructed and understood. While the social connections between mental 
images and rhetoric have begun to emerge in this chapter, the continued discussion of 
how rhetorical proofs are developed and draw upon social and visual factors in Greece 
draw further evidence of the pervasiveness of visuality in Greek rhetorical theory. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RHETORICAL PERFORMANCE, AUDIENCE, AND CULTURAL MEMORY 
The previous chapter discussed the ways in which the linguistic practices of 
rhetoricians signaled epistemological systems in which vision—both actual and 
abstract—played a role in the acquisition and spread of information and how the role of 
vision manifests in rhetorical theory and practice. In this chapter, I turn my attention to 
rhetorical performance and the ways in which rhetoricians call upon shared genre 
practices and audience expectations, cultural memories and historical contexts, and 
ideological trends in order to practice their art, and in doing so, I work through the 
understanding that orators “see the available means” of rhetorical performance and “bring 
before the eyes” of the audience those concerns and utterances that will effectively 
connect with established ideas and ideologies and create dialogue spaces for new ideas 
within those contexts. 
 The social components of rhetorical practice are rooted in an awareness of the 
varying types of literacies and familiarities with Greek cultural trends in the classical 
period as well as the influence of ancient mythopoeic practice. In discussing the 
relationship between literacies, audience knowledge, and visuality, I argue that the Greek 
noun ἡ δόξα, opinion, is not a static concept that can be applied universally; instead, δόξα 
and the ways in which rhetoricians refer to public opinion are understood through an 
awareness of how audiences are constructed for each rhetorical performance. That is, 
“seeing the available means” should include understanding the ways in which the makeup 
of an audience affects the invention of an argument. In the Cratylus, Socrates connects 
opinion with intention, arguing that the terms are etymologically linked. He argues that ἡ 
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δόξα, “is derived either from the pursuit (δίωξις) which the soul carries on as it pursues 
the knowledge of the nature of things, or from the shooting of the bow (τόξον); the latter 
is more likely” (Plat. Crat. 420b-c).40 For Socrates, an orator’s intent to shape an 
audience’s opinion is similar to aiming a bow at one’s target. Intentionality is connected 
to opinion, and shooting a bow (τόξον) and opinion (δόξα) signify a spirit of practice—a 
focus on the ways in which visualizing one’s goal is essential for successful rhetorical 
practice. 
 I argue that the intention of “aiming” discourse toward establishing or reinforcing 
a particular opinion is a feature of Greek rhetorical practice that finds its origins in poetic 
and epideictic literate practices and reflects the ways in which an oral culture integrated 
audience concerns into the production of language and rhetorical practice. In particular, I 
argue that intentional discourse builds from shared cultural memories and ideologies and 
relies on shared audience experiences or ideas to build “mental pictures.” Furthermore, I 
argue that through rhetorical practice, orators can create cultural critiques by asking 
audiences to view the “spectacle” of visualized rhetorical performance. 
 Storytelling as a mode of entertainment as well as the prevalence of myth in early 
Greek cultural practices established a system in which listeners were trained to visualize 
the words that they received through aural channels. In this, the aural experiences and 
shared stories among Greek audiences affected the ways in which the people likely 
visualized information or received narratives. For example, narrative cues describing the 
boarding of ships in Homeric works served as placeholder phrases for the performer, but 
                                                
40 “δόξα δὴ ἤτοι τῇ διώξει ἐπωνόµασται ἣν ὡ ψυχὴ διώξουσα τὸ εἰδέναι ὅπθῃ ἔξει τὰ 
πράγµατα πρεύεται, ἢ τῇ ἀπὸ τοπυ τόξου βολῇ. ἔοικε δὲ τούτῳ µᾶλον” (Plat. Crat. 420b-c). 
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they also shaped and standardized the ways in which the listeners viewed the action of 
the stories. In the Homeric epic The Odyssey, the process of boarding ships, sitting at the 
oars, and “beating the grey sea” to begin or resume travel occurs each time with little 
variation. It could safely be assumed that those Greeks without firsthand experience of 
this process would thus rely on the Homeric visualization to understand departure by ship 
(Hom. Od. 9.560-564).41 Fleckenstein argues, “visual conventions affect discourse 
conventions,” and “the prevailing means of persuasion within a period cannot be excised 
from shared ways of seeing” (2007, 15). The pervasiveness of visual signals in a society 
has impact on the ways in which a society constructs its beliefs, and the discourse 
conventions of a society are reflected in the visual texts that are created—internally 
visualized and externally realized. Furthermore, broadening the scope beyond shared 
ways of seeing to shared ways of seeing by considering the ways in which oral texts are 
received can encapsulate the ways in which sensory information affects the production 
and reception of rhetorical texts—be they performed orally or captured in writing. 
 In discussing the development of written literacy in Greece, Havelock states that 
the relationship between the written alphabet and the letters’ corresponding phonic 
qualities resulted in a system where “the sense perception is visual but the triggered 
memory is acoustic” (1982, 50). Havelock’s depiction of this system applies to those 
members of the culture who had reading and writing literacy skills, and the relationship 
between visual and aural here focuses on the ways in which a written language can 
represent and embodied use of language through oral and aural modes. Using Havelock’s 
                                                
41 “ἦµος δ᾽ ἠριγένεια φάνη ῥοδοδάκτυλος Ἠώς, δὴ τότ᾽ ἐγὼν ἑτάροισιν ἐποτρύνας 
ἐκέλευσα αὐτούς τ᾽ ἀµβαίνειν ἀνά τε πρυµνήσια λῦσαι· οἱ δ᾽ αἶψ᾽ εἴσβαινον καὶ ἐπὶ κληῖσι 
καθῖζον, ἑξῆς δ᾽ ἑζόµενοι πολιὴν ἅλα τύπτον ἐρετµοῖς” (Hom. Od. 9.560-564). 
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linguistic-visual model in which seen letters trigger aural memories, I suggest that we 
reverse this directionality and theorize the ways in which aural stimuli trigger visualized 
memories or ideas, and in doing so, complicate the scope of what is regarded as visual 
rhetoric, considering instead visualized rhetorical practices. Maureen Daly Goggin 
explains that the tension between word and image manifests in the multiple definitions of 
visual rhetoric that often dichotomize the “visual and verbal features of textualized 
objects” (2004, 87). This split between visual and verb can be attributed to a focus on the 
ways in which communication is produced rather than received—specifically, what 
happens when an audience perceives and processes a text. In a system where the audience 
of a text is key to understanding the rhetorical impact, the conditions for reception and 
interpretation of a text matter. 
In this chapter, I examine the ways in which two speeches—Demosthenes’ 
defense of his oratory and political actions in On the Crown and Lysias’ ceremonial 
Olympic Oration—call upon audiences to consider the genre practices related to each 
speech, forensic and epideictic respectively; political and military contexts that led to the 
delivery of those speeches; and the ways in which the orators call upon ideas and images 
for their specific audiences and purposes in order to create rhetorically conducive texts. 
Prior to that analysis, however, I explore concepts related to shared cultural ideas and 
memories and the ways in which public opinion can be understood as a context-driven, 
socially determined concept among Greek rhetoricians. 
The social contingencies of rhetoric come into greater focus in this chapter, and in 
making the social turn more directly here, I aim to illuminate the ways in which the 
Greek epistemological system functioned through a visual framework and offered a 
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clearer view into the reception of a text by an audience. Janet Atwill defines perceptions 
as “situated acts of judgment, open to question and challenge” (2009, 140). Atwill’s 
discussion focuses on the ways in which the private self and the external world can be 
examined through differing methods, and she argues that the key to conducting these 
examinations is by understanding the ways in which the perceptive processes are 
influenced by external and internal cultural forces. One particular area of concern is the 
influence of visual forces, an area that Cara Finnegan argues should lead rhetoricians “to 
(re)consider aspects of rhetorical theory in light of the persistent problem of the image” 
(2004, 198). As evidenced in the previous chapter, by expanding the definition of 
“image” to include “mental pictures” and through understanding the processes that 
underlie the production and transmission of those images, we also push the ways in 
which one might consider the interrelation of word and image. 
Furthermore, we must examine the ways in which societies are primed for the 
continued spread of those images through verbal modes. Gunther Kress illustrates this 
need to explore how ideas propagate by posing the question, “How is human engagement 
with the world shaped by specific modal representations, and reconfigured in the 
transduction from one mode to another?” (2007, 131). Kress’ question seems particularly 
relevant to the newfound literate practices of classical Greeks; the introduction of a 
written alphabet and the capability to transmit information through the written word 
served not only as new modes of communication for the Greeks but also provided them 
with opportunities to clarify the purposes of orality distinct from written literacy. The 
literate practices of Greeks were not widespread across all demographics, and oratorical 
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performance remained important, but as Havelock explores, this modal shift allowed for 
greater reflection on language practices.  
In oral performances, the role of the audience in the transduction from aural 
stimuli to visualized internal images as the products of those stimuli had profound impact 
on the ways in which rhetorical performances were composed. Being able to document 
and revisit those performances—despite the flattening or removal of specialized audience 
concerns—allowed for orators to theorize more effective modes of rhetorical delivery. 
Classical Greek rhetoricians can provide models of effective verbal rhetoric that allowed 
audiences to translate those words into mental pictures, thus giving some insight to the 
effects of this modal shift. Hawhee describes this translation from aural stimuli to 
visualized mental pictures as discourse “producing visible effects through invisible, 
‘furtive’ force” thus reflecting “discourse’s ability to, quite simply, move” (2004, 185). 
How that movement is facilitated by social connections is what I examine in this chapter. 
In his encomium to the father of Nicocles, Evagoras, Isocrates speaks toward the 
greater effectiveness of words in spreading the “thoughts and purposes” of honorable 
men in ways that are “embodied in the spoken word” (Isoc. 9.75).42 In this speech 
honoring the deceased ruler, Isocrates provides an interesting juxtaposition between the 
inability of statues and portraits to be easily shared across distances and the ease of 
spreading information via verbal modes. Furthermore, Isocrates regards statues as less 
effective than words at communicating the ideas or qualities that a statue might try to 
represent. The embodiment of discourse discussed in the Evagoras signals a sort of 
verbal seeing, which is claimed to be more effective than the direct perception of a statue. 
                                                
42 “τὰς διανοίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς λεγοµένοις ἐνούσας ῥᾴδιόν ἐστι µιµεῖσθαι” (Isoc. 9.75). 
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Considering the ability of statues or portraits to communicate a man’s honorableness, 
however, signals an awareness of how memories of one’s deeds are shared by people, and 
through the remembrance of one’s deeds and character, a visual text can carry meaning 
that verbal means reinforce or strengthen.43 That is, words assist the people in knowing 
about those qualities and become the transmitter for cultural memories across distances 
and times, which the statue or portrait might assist in sustaining. Implicit in Isocrates’ 
discussion is also a concern about the ability for audiences to understand and interpret 
visual texts. Because works such as portraits or statues are subject to interpretation rather 
than direct verbal instruction, Isocrates is concerned about the ways in which an audience 
with limited literacy skills or philosophical knowledge can interpret the statues. 
Furthermore, he assumes that audiences for speeches or texts are more highly educated 
and renowned in Athenian society. While Isocrates is concerned with the civic image that 
a rhetorician or ruler maintains, it is clear that he still positions the pursuit of philosophy 
as something for a more elite class of Athenian man. 
Importantly, the vessels by which these transmissions of cultural memories and 
ideologies occur are those audiences who share in those texts. Aristotle’s discussion of 
audience is interesting when placed in the context of the role of θεωρία, spectator, which 
he describes as the position of audiences for epideictic rhetoric (Aristot. Rh. 
2.18.15.1391b). In his oft-cited definition of rhetoric, Aristotle uses the verb θεωρῆσαι to 
describe the act of an orator in seeing the means of persuasion, but he does not directly 
                                                
43 Kathleen Lamp argues that the Augustan cultural campaigns were effectively 
constructed because of the capability of individuals to connect visual texts with cultural 
ideas, thus resulting in Octavian’s successful assertion of his right to rule the Roman 
people (2013). 
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connect this verb to the actions of a spectating audience. I argue that the implicit 
connection between spectator and theoretical seeing or assessment in Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
signals audience participation in their own abstracted forms of seeing as they determine 
and interpret an orator’s works. A major premise of this audience participation arises 
through the acceptance and actualization of common images shared among the people, 
partially attributed to cultural myth and memories, but also to the willingness of an 
audience to propagate the mental images connected to them.  
Aristotle has been criticized for his depiction of universal, monolithic audiences 
and ideas—a critique that is not uniformly applied but does give a reader pause when 
considering the value of Aristotelian discussions of audience. Haskins best represents 
those critiques: “In spite of his attention to appearances and opinions, however, Aristotle 
atomizes and reassembles bits of ‘popular wisdom’ contained in endoxa to shape a 
system that is intended to minimize, if not exclude, contradiction or conflict” (2004, 23). 
I argue that the mechanics underlying Aristotle’s theory of images and shared vision 
remain an important feature of Greek rhetorical theories of visuality and social 
engagement of orators, but it is necessary to incorporate greater contextual work into 
Aristotle’s characterization of audience and ideologies. 
While the discussion of audience in this dissertation project assumes that the 
orators are concerned with audiences across a broad range of literacies, the audiences for 
Athenian oratory and the concern for litetracy reflect the orators’ privileging of a select 
group of people. As Walker discusses in The Genuine Teachers of This Art, Aristotle 
identifies “the best type of audience for practical civic discourse, with the best emotional, 
ethical, and prudential predispositions—is mature men in positions of power, hoi 
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dunamenoi in the ‘prime of life’” (2011, 21). Walker argues that Aristotle and Isocrates 
share a similar sentiment that education and highly literate skills should be reserved for a 
privileged group of individuals because less prestigious individuals will inconsistently 
and/or inaccurately apply the arts that they have learned and be swayed by their 
influence. While these figures might ideally want to address their education and words 
toward a select group of Athenians such as the Areopagus, the audiences that ultimately 
comprise the listeners of rhetorical performances represent a more diverse group of 
individuals. Rather than consider these more diverse audiences as problematic for the 
discussions of audience that Isocrates, Aristotle, and others present, I argue that 
audiences and the knowledges that they bring to rhetorical performances are still 
incredibly important for Greek orators to consider. While the audiences that are present 
for performances might be less than ideal for these canonized rhetorical figures 
preferences, it is evident that the knowledges and beliefs that they bring to performances 
are accounted for by the orators who are addressing them. 
Δόξα, Memories, and Cultural Consciousness 
 In Chapter 2, I examined the ways in which abstract verbs of seeing were used to 
discuss the cognitive functions that relate to language processing and visualization. In 
addition to the abstract form of sight indicated by the verb θεωρέω, the verb σκοπέω 
indicates an abstracted form of seeing; Isocrates often uses that particular verb in his 
works. In addition to its cognitive and visual characteristics that were explored in Chapter 
2, Takis Poulakos’ interpretation of Isocrates’ use of the verb theorizes the ways in which 
it relates to social connections: 
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Σκοπεύειν [present active infinitive form] integrates the sense of considering in 
general with the sense of looking into something specific. Logos guided humans 
to progress by directing them not only to courses of action but also to inquiries 
about the ends such discourses were meant to attain—namely, the quality of their 
ties as a people. (T. Poulakos 1997, 20) 
 
By including the consideration of social ties in his definition of σκοπέω, Poulakos 
emphasizes the social implications of discourse in Greece. Rather than just considering 
the ways in which language cues encourage visualization, Poulakos’ description 
introduces the concern regarding how an audience’s “ties as a people” influence the 
visualized experience of rhetorical performances.  
One particular aspect of social viewing that this chapter explores is the role of 
vision and social ties in relation to memories. Kjeldsen describes the Greeks’ concepts of 
memory as “a storage of visual signs and places,” and he argues that “the orator must 
create a presentation which comes as close to reality as possible. This is best done 
through the eye—if not the actual eye, then the eye of the mind” (2003, 135, 137). As 
memory and public belief are considered in rhetorical analysis of a text, one must 
consider the ways in which those memories are stored and distributed within an 
individual’s mind but also the ways in which those memories and ideas are shared across 
a culture. 
Contemporary linguist Wallace Chafe explores the cognitive processes related to 
language use and memory, and he argues that the visual images stored in the mind serve 
as the “only ways” that one can manage such a large amount of information (1994, 35). 
That is, the relation between memory and knowledge functions on an imagistic level. The 
social implications of a represented memory are dependent on the knowledge of the 
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viewer and viewed. Chafe summarizes the ideal function of language as it relates to 
memory and imagination: 
The listener’s mental processes recapitulate the speaker’s in reverse, except of 
course, that the listener is led to imagine, not remember the distal experience. To 
the extent that the language bridging the two minds causes the contents of the two 
distal consciousnesses to be similar, language will have fulfilled its 
communicative purpose. (1994, 280) 
 
While this description is rather utilitarian in nature, I believe that it encapsulates the 
process by which ideas can be shared and developed across linguistic paths; ideas and 
memories can be shared through the imaginative cognitive processes that underlie 
language use. The key idea, however, is that remembered images do not have to originate 
in the perceptions of the person remembering them but instead can figure from related 
knowledge. That is, the audience of a speech might be able to draw connections between 
the message delivered and the knowledges or memories that they already possess; the 
message does not have to activate a specific image in order to successfully communicate 
an idea. This is relevant to the issue of audience in Greek rhetorical theory because the 
likelihood of an audience having complete knowledge of all topics or images discussed in 
a speech is quite small, but an orator can assume that those portions that are unfamiliar to 
an audience member might still be understood through analogous knowledge. Hawhee 
speaks to this concept of associative knowledge as well: 
The visible, in turn, depends on the knowable, an associative knowledge of 
bodies: Aristotle’s perceiver, for example, must recall instances of healthy men 
walking, and such recalling requires a prior articulation of walking style as 
healthy. Aeschines’ example invokes the cultural knowledge of what an athletic 
body looks like, and Demosthenes sees, observes, and tries to emulate orators. 
(2004, 162) 
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In many ways, this associative knowledge functions similarly to the logical construction 
of an enthymeme, which the listener should arguable be able to follow without extensive 
discussion of all major and minor premises. Aristotle says that enthymemes can be 
deduced “from fewer [premises] than the regular syllogism; for if any of these is well 
known, there is no need to mention it, for the hearer can add it himself” (trans. Kennedy, 
Aristot. Rh. 1.2.13.1357a).44 The Aristotelian enthymeme relies on the knowledges of an 
audience in order to reach their logical conclusions succinctly. Among the enthymematic 
forms, the metaphor seems especially prone for interpretation through visualized means. 
In his description of metaphor, Aristotle explains that they “should be drawn from objects 
which are proper to the object, but not too obvious” (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.5.1412a).45 In this 
definition, the mental images associated with metaphors should not be too literal to the 
subject being discussed, but they obviously rely on associative knowledge of the images 
in order to be successful. Those images must tie to Hawhee’s “associative knowledge” on 
some level in order for audiences to understand those enthymematic premises and 
conclusions. The combination of a referent perceived image to its metaphorical 
connection figures into the methods by which mental images might be figured in the 
minds of the audience. Ann Vasaly explains that philosophers in antiquity regarded the 
epistemological functions of the mind “As the creation or remembrance of coherent, 
retrievable pictorial images rather than as a manipulation of abstractions” (1993, 98). In 
                                                
44 “καὶ πολλάκις ἐλλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὣν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισµός· ἐὰν γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθησιν ὁ 
ἀκροατής” (Aristot. Rh. 1.2.13.1357a). 
45 “δεῖ δὲ µεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ µὴ φανερῶν” (Aristot. 
Rh. 3.11.5.1412a) 
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other words, metaphors function through image and through audiences who are able to 
connect those images to new ideas. 
 Chafe offers the explanation that language represents visualized ideas, and we 
“store categories and schemas that allow us to ‘make sense of’ those ideas” by 
contextualizing them in reference to “familiar” thoughts (1994, 35). That is, new thoughts 
or ideas are integrated into memory by finding connections to known thoughts, not unlike 
the effect of metaphor in connecting two distinct but relatable ideas together. Jeffrey 
Olick defines these connections between ideas as “figurations of memory”: 
The analytical goal of research on collective memory should be to understand 
figurations of memory—developing relations between past and present—where 
images, contexts, traditions, and interests come together in fluid, though no 
necessarily harmonious ways, rather than to measure collective memory as an 
independent or dependent variable, a thing determined or determining. (2007, 91) 
 
The function of collective memory in cultural contexts allows for heterogeneous 
remembrances of these figurations of memory, which can be understood in the rhetorical 
contexts of speaker and audience. That is, remembering speakers and audiences might not 
envision the same ideas during the course of remembering, but collectively, the images 
presented are likely to be similar in nature. Olick argues that “material means of 
remembering” play an essential role in our understanding of how memory functions, and 
he notes that “storytelling” and “patterns of behavior” are common externalizations of 
memories to shared cultural identities (2007, 87). Finally, Olick claims, “certain words 
[…] can serve as mnemonic lightning rods within one profile while not attracting 
particular attention in others” (2007, 113). Those “lightning rod” moments likely occur 
because of shared cultural experience within a particular context of use; when 
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experiences or ideas are outside one’s memorial field of vision, however, they attract less 
attention.  
Additionally, when images are called upon in unfamiliar contexts, those images 
might not be as readily identified and understood. However, with sustained use in new 
contexts or with particular attention to leading an audience to make those connections, 
memorial associations can form and facilitate further use. In the context of rhetorical 
performance, then, an orator must consider the ways in which an audience is prepared to 
make those associations, and when those connections are assumed to be absent, the 
speech must draw those initial connections for the audience. Thus, images, memories, 
and ideas are co-constructed in rhetorical performance, and it is possible to see those 
constructions through an analysis of how an orator encourages imagistic connections for 
a particular audience. 
 Pertinent to understanding memorial field of vision is the social experience of 
memory making and memory recall. Edward Casey explains that remembering functions 
“by being reminded, by recognizing something, and by reminiscing with others” (2004, 
21). He continues, “The latter has proven more significant than I had first thought: it is a 
primary prop of social memory; and it introduces the crucial factor of language into 
memory, and thus narrative and history” (2004, 21). Casey’s claim that the act of 
“reminiscing with others” serves as a key component of memory readily connects to the 
rhetorical concept of shared ways of seeing, thinking, and remembering. In Greek 
settings, then, one can argue that the practices of myth-telling, epideictic speeches at 
festivals or ceremonies, public deliberations, and judicial proceedings all contribute to the 
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ways in which rhetoricians can call upon images across, and because of, these publicly 
viewable contexts. Johnstone elucidates: 
A culture’s ways of accounting for its own existence and for its experience of the 
world—its creation myths and stories, its theogonies and cosmogonies, its 
philosophies and cosmologies—articulate various ways of relating to the world 
and of dwelling in it. These “ways” are embodied in artifacts as diverse as painted 
or carved images, religious images and objects, preserved stories and tales, 
metaphysical doctrines, and cosmological theories. Each discloses a sense of 
being-in-the-world that is rooted in convictions about the essential character of 
the world and our place in it. (2009, 7) 
 
As mentioned earlier, Havelock’s exploration of the development of literate practice in 
Greece provides a model for understanding the epistemological functions of an oral 
society, and in tracing the transition to written language, he provides further evidence of 
the ways in which language affects cultural constructs. He writes, “The words employed 
[in oral societies] identify not merely the objects but fields of meaning surrounding the 
objects. They carry associations, as we say, and are customarily arranged in syntactical 
situations which express these associations” (1982, 113). In contemporary settings, 
Fleckenstein defines community as “constituted as much by the images we see and the 
visual conventions we share as it is by the words we speak and the discourse conventions 
we share” (2007, 5). The mythopoeic practices that preceded the development of more 
deliberate theories of rhetoric provide important insights into the ways in which image is 
constructed socially. Furthermore, the continued oral practices reify visualization 
practices and create cultures where the limited availability of channels for information 
helps construct shared ways of seeing that are intimately tied to cultural memories, 
stories, and ideologies. 
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When considering historical context as it relates to the memory of an audience, 
Casey points to the purpose-driven function of social memory as concept. That is, the 
social ties among people are key to the function of social memory, whether those people 
are “affiliated either by kinship ties, by geographic proximity in neighborhoods, cities, 
and other regions, or by engagement in a common project” (2004, 21-22). While social 
memory relies on those immediate connections of purpose or proximity, collective 
memory, as discussed earlier in this chapter, can be more widely distributed across a 
population. However, considering social and collective memory in combination as a more 
broadly identified idea of cultural memory can take into account both forms of memory 
as they relate to rhetorical performance and analysis of the ways in which an audience 
could be understood to know events and ideas that inform and necessitate rhetorical 
performance. 
While the integration of civic and religious ceremonies into Greek life doubtlessly 
influenced the ways in which the people understood the social systems of their society 
and Greek cultural history, left alone, these displays were not fully effective. Gould 
argues that the “commemorative ceremonies” in Greek culture influenced the people’s 
collective memory making, but far stronger an influence was the role of oral narrative in 
storytelling, which served “as the principle medium for the transmission of those 
memories” (2001, 418). A pairing of ceremony and oral discourse cemented a strong 
cultural identity among the Greek people, one that is reflected in their social 
categorization as either Ἥλλην, Greek, or βάρβαρος, barbarian—an “us versus them” 
linguistic categorization that further strengthened the cultural narratives that defined the 
nation. Surely the oral tradition of the culture helped reinforce the idea that Greece could 
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be understood as a unified entity, even while the conditions of different classes created 
disparate experiences of Greek daily life. 
Cultural Considerations Regarding Audience 
 While the idea of a unified, monolithic Greek identity can and should be 
problematized, especially in contemporary understandings of Greek society, the political 
and social structures of Greek life may be understood through analyzing the conditions 
for successful rhetorical practice as found in textual evidence. How do rhetoricians 
determine audience expectations, memories, and ideologies for each rhetorical 
performance? To answer that question, I turn to J. Poulakos’ discussion of Sophism and 
the conditions in which Sophistic rhetoric emerged. In his examination of that period, 
Poulakos argues that prior conditions of the Sophistic movement were far too limited in 
the ways that they considered the movement. Poulakos argues that in order to correctly 
identify the conditions in which intellectual movements develop, scholars should 
consider three key ideas: 
First, intellectual movements are born not in vacuo, but in the midst of a set of 
cultural givens of practice and thought already in motion. Second, they spring up 
not simply as the result of a conducive climate but in order to address particular 
circumstances and to fulfill certain societal needs. Third, they inadvertently grow 
alongside some established cultural practices and against others, producing 
innovative results despite the resistance of the tradition or the potential risks of 
criticism that may eliminate them. (J. Poulakos 1995, 12) 
 
Poulakos’ discussion of intellectual movements can be adapted to form a heuristic of 
analysis by which one can determine the ways in which an orator’s work is functioning in 
social climates and to predict how audiences will perceive, internalize, and react to the 
content of a speech act. When examining a rhetorical artifact, each characteristic of 
intellectual movements as described by Poulakos can be connected to features of a text or 
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the context of its performance. In the paragraphs that follow, I will briefly describe the 
tools for rhetorical analysis that correspond to the features and functions of intellectual 
movements, suggesting ways in which the tools can help uncover the perceptions of an 
audience and considerations regarding that audience that rhetors must give. Following 
that discussion, I use these descriptions of intellectual movements to explore the ways in 
which Greek orators draw upon audience expectations, memories, and ideologies in order 
to construct rhetorically effective speeches. Using Poulakos’ definition, then, provides 
three levels of analysis in which to determine the social factors and considerations 
present within a rhetorical performance. 
 The first characteristic of intellectual movements is that they “are born not in 
vacuo, but in the midst of a set of cultural givens of practice and thought already in 
motion” (J. Poulakos 1995, 12). This quality reflects the performance features of a text; 
the history of practice regarding its delivery; the makeup and positioning of an audience, 
the author of a text, and its mode of performance; and the ways in which that text might 
be recorded. In many ways, these qualities are found near the surface and genre 
identification of a text, requiring interpretation of data that’s relatively accessible for 
analysis. When analyzing the “cultural givens of practice,” rhetoricians should consider 
the genre and performance expectations of a text—for example, the epideictic and 
rhetorical qualities of funeral orations, the audience for which the text is created, and the 
orator’s position text are basic qualities of rhetorical analysis that set the groundwork for 
understanding less obvious features of a text. 
 In many ways, the characteristics for the first level of analysis help determine the 
ways in which an audience is prepared for a rhetorical performance through longstanding 
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practice and awareness of how the modes of rhetorical performance are determined 
through social and spatial constraints. The second characteristic, that intellectual 
movements “spring up not simply as a result of a conducive climate but in order to 
address particular circumstances and to fulfill certain societal needs” (J. Poulakos 1995, 
12), pushes the rhetorician to consider the historical contexts of a speech act—what are 
the exigencies for its creation, in what ways do the conditions that surround its 
performance create a space for its delivery, and how is an audience prepared to interpret a 
text through understanding of shared cultural memories and awareness of existing 
political climates. The second characteristic moves audience analysis from a 
consideration of the genre practices of a speech act to the reasons for which the speech 
act is being produced. Also involved at this level may be historical concerns regarding 
the patterns of behavior or events of the state that must be accounted for in the rhetorical 
performance.  
 The final characteristic of intellectual movements that Poulakos discusses in his 
definition is that “they inadvertently grow alongside some established cultural practices 
and against others, producing innovative results despite the resistance of the tradition or 
the potential risks of criticism that may eliminate them” (J. Poulakos 1995, 12). It is at 
this third level of analysis where an awareness of ideological systems and cultural 
memories comes into scope. The intellectual, artistic work of “seeing the available 
means” of persuasion which are dependent on the social construction of one’s audience, 
relies on the orator’s ability to determine which values, beliefs, experiences, memories, 
and ideas that audience can reasonably be expected to hold, and to determine the most 
successful approach to creating within the minds of audience members the visualized 
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results of that speech. It is important to note that this level of analysis allows not only for 
an awareness of existing ideas but also that the rhetorician is able to draw audiences into 
“innovative results” by navigating the tension between precedent and innovation of ideas. 
Analyzing Genre and Performance Expectations 
 The features of genres and conditions for performance serve as the first level of 
analysis for understanding the ways in which an audience is constructed and prepared for 
a performance. In On the Crown, the orator Demosthenes must defend his actions and 
advice for Athens against the charges of treason brought against him by his political rival, 
Aeschines. This speech functions as a forensic defense of Demosthenes’ political actions 
and advice, and thus must call upon specific images and ideas that are fitting for political 
audiences in order to succeed. Additionally, the audience can be understood to fulfill 
certain social expectations that a more widely broadcasted speech would not fit—such as 
measures of decorum in judicial settings. In contrast, Lysias’ Olympic Oration is an 
epideictic performance probably performed in a large public space during the Olympic 
Festival, where varying levels of audience literacies demand greater reliance on images 
and ideas that are universally understandable, especially because the Festival drew 
attendees and competitors from all regions of Greece. Some of these conditions are 
structural—a panegyric oration is composed differently and for different purposes than a 
forensic defense, but they can also be understood as socially constructed. The first level 
of heuristic analysis begins to allow rhetoricians to understand how these conditions are 
determined. 
 The Hellenic Olympic Festival served as a celebration of Greek athletic and 
physical prowess of her citizens and as a celebration of the agonistic system that 
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encouraged achievement and development of the society. It was an opportunity for the 
Greeks from all over to see not only physical contests but also contests of wit in the form 
of oratory. Drawing into consideration Gould’s claims regarding narrative and ceremony, 
it is likely that the Greeks associated the spectacle of athletics in close consideration with 
the oratorical contests that accompanied them, but perhaps greater clarity of meaning was 
to be assigned to the discourse surrounding the games than to the games themselves. As I 
explore later, the content of Lysias’ speech relies on historic and cultural ideas in order to 
exhort his listeners. However, the conditions for the speech at the festival itself come into 
view while analyzing the first level of audience awareness. As W. R. M. Lamb discusses 
in the Loeb introduction to the Olympic Oration, Lysias uses the opportunity to speak at 
the Olympic Festival because he has been “debarred at Athens, as a resident alien, from 
public speech,” and he uses a direct, simple style to speak to the crowds gathered there 
(1930, 682). The delivery of the speech to the people, urging them to turn against 
Dionysius of Syracuse, capitalizes on the kairotic moment of the Festival and an audience 
that may be more prone to action than the governing bodies of Greece. That is, epideictic 
here is directed and delivered to the people affected by Dionsyius’ tyranny. Jeffrey 
Walker describes the potential power of epideictic: 
Epideictic discourse carries great suasive power. This power derives, in part, from 
its felt authority as “permanent” or “timeless” discourse embodying ancient, 
ancestral wisdom. We might say, to speak in more contemporary terms, that the 
epideictic discourse of an oral or “traditional” society enunciates, or is felt to 
enunciate, that society’s archival knowledge, its deep belief systems, its sacred 
postulates, its precedents and premises. (2000, 12) 
 
In his epideictic delivery, Lysias calls upon genre practices of panegyric that require him 
to connect his speech to ancient and sacred depictions of the Greek hero Heracles (in this 
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scenario). By connecting the current political environment to Heracles’ actions—the 
significance of which I will explore later—Lysias fulfills the genre expectations of his 
audience and sets the stage for his epideictic exhortation to be regarded as authoritative. 
This fits Walker’s description of epideictic as “leading its audience of theoroi to 
contemplation and insight and ultimately to the formation of opinions and desires on 
matters of philosophical, social, ethical, and cultural concern” (2000, 9). While the form 
and arrangement of Lysias’ speech do matter, Haskins argues that formulas for 
performance do not impact audience as much as “the ‘product’ of performance”: 
The performance of an authoritative speech-act in Homer is measure not by how 
well it fits the formula for a certain type of address but how powerfully this action 
reverberates in the hearers, both those attending recitations of Homeric poetry and 
those within the epic itself. The ‘product’ of performance is not a textual artifact; 
it is epos—the word designating the perceived effect of speech as well as its 
discursive fabric. (2004, 69) 
 
While the genre practices and constraints of an epideictic delivery are important, Haskins 
argues, “The ‘product’ of performance is not a textual artifact; it is epos—the word 
designating the perceived effect of speech as well as its discursive fabric” (2004, 69). In 
this consideration, the embodied experience of orators and audience should also be 
considered, not only for performance constraints but also for the experience of 
embodying and being embodied by rhetorical texts. 
 In her examination of Greek agonistic practice, Hawhee identifies the ways in 
which rhetoric was “fused and infused with dynamics and terminology from athletics, 
and … required a particular modality of knowledge production—knowledge held and 
made by bodies” (2004, 43). Hawhee’s book explores the ways in which the competitive 
mode of Hellenic discourse was situated in bodily practice and knowledge could be 
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conceptualized as embodied. Cultural memories, ideologies, and shared ways of seeing 
were also an embodied experience for Greeks, and the key to successful rhetorical 
training was to teach orators to call upon that embodied shared knowledge for 
speechmaking. While discussing the practice of Isocrates’ students in delivering famous 
speeches, Walker explains: 
The students were memorizing speeches to perform them, and performing them to 
learn to inhabit them, and to be inhabited by them, on the way to acquiring a feel 
for discursive art—what it feels like to be Demosthenes, or Lysias, or Thucydides 
speaking—so that the technical precepts of the art, when they were discussed, 
would have something that the student had experienced and was intimately 
familiar with to elucidate and would thus be meaningful. (2011, 295) 
 
This embodiment of speech as part of an educational program of imitation can be seen as 
an understanding of how the shared experience that results from speaking allows 
developing rhetors to conceptualize audience in new ways—these imitators of speeches 
are simultaneously audience and orator in this role; the speech is external to their 
experience but internalized through reception and reproduction. The progymnastmatic 
program of education encouraged the processing from pure imitation to manipulation of 
speech acts so that orators could better understand the ways in which discourse shares the 
reception of meaning. Hawhee defines the dual meaning of epideixis as the rhetorical 
genre from Aristotle’s Rhetoric but also the primary use of the term to mean “a material 
or bodily display” (2004, 175). This embodied imitation of famous speeches fulfills the 
dual meaning of the rhetorical genre of epideictic. In action, this reflects Hawhee’s 
characterization of the agon as “a full-on, whole body encounter between rhetor and 
rhetoric or teacher and student” (2004, 190). The Isocratean theory of rhetoric, in 
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particular, offers a richer understanding of how the kairotic moment is an embodied 
experience. 
 This embodied consideration also brings to mind the charge of Ann Vasaly to 
consider “the text as a component in something that extends beyond it: the rhetorical 
performance, which is an instance of communication that makes use of more than words 
to convey meaning” (1993, 11). Embodied performance of speech doubtlessly served to 
help educate orators on their craft and encouraged an understanding of the communal 
nature of rhetoric. Havelock argues that the use of rhetoric and language allowed for 
greater understanding of abstract, ethical considerations of the culture” (1982, 230). A 
key component of this abstract cultural understanding results from the inclusion of texts 
traditionally considered as outside the realm of traditional rhetorical genres. Walker 
argues that the philosophical nature of Isocrates’ training in particular “is partly the 
literary education that it presupposes, builds on, and continues: readings in the canonic 
poets, historians, philosophers, and orators” (2011, 286). It is doubtless that these 
philosophers would ask orators to be widely educated and rehearsed in rhetorical and 
literary performances so that they can call upon these performances in their work. 
Isocrates clearly situates his work as “a performative view of the rhetorical training as a 
mimesis of civic excellence” (Haskins 2004, 31). In this, rhetors embodied civic virtues, 
gained knowledge of literary and mythic stories, and experienced the roles of speaker and 
audience through embodied practice. 
Historical and Contextual Cues for Performance 
 Lysias’ Olympic Oration is in direct response to the military campaign of 
Dionysius of Syracuse, who had conquered a large portion of Western Greece and was 
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widely regarded as a despot. In the face of aggression to the Greeks and tyrannical rule, 
Lysias finds himself needing to boost the spirits of the Greek citizens while also 
acknowledging their martial defeat. Poulakos’ second characteristic of intellectual 
movements is that they “spring up not simply as a result of a conducive climate but in 
order to address particular circumstances and to fulfill certain societal needs” (J. 
Poulakos 1995, 12). Understanding how this characteristic applies to audiences requires 
the orator to consider the historical contexts that surround their speech and the memories 
that the audience can be expected to possess. The contexts of this second characteristic 
are perhaps more readily understood by rhetor and audience, and are potentially easier to 
analyze because they are largely based in accepted historical “fact.” However, they 
prepare the rhetor to analyze the issues of social ideology that come into play in the third 
characteristic of analysis. 
 Events and ideas, however, are not uniformly accepted by an audience, and the 
historiographical framing of events does require artistic rhetorical skill. When Lysias 
speaks to the crowd at the Olympiad, he relies on the social ties among the Greek city-
states and the myth of Heracles unifying Greece through the games to frame the current 
political climate of the city-states. In describing the Greek situation, Lysias identifies the 
“many of her cities ravaged by despots … due to faction and mutual rivalry” (Lys. 
33.4).46 The events are further complicated by in fighting among the Greek city-states, 
which Lysias says should be ceased so that they can focus on foreign threats. In framing 
                                                
46 “πολλὰς δὲ πόλεις ὑπὸ τυράννων ἀναστάτους γεγενηµένας. ... ἐπειδὴ δὲ διὰ στάσιν καὶ 
τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους φιλονικίαν” (Lys. 33.4). 
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the historical context, Lysias gives special attention to the role of the Spartans, the 
“leaders of the Greeks,” and the ways in which they resist aiding their Hellenic brethren: 
But I wonder at the Lacedaemonians most of all: what can be their policy in 
tolerating the devastation of Greece, when they are leaders of the Greeks by the 
just claims alike of their inborn valour and their martial science, and when they 
alone have their dwelling-places unravaged though unwalled and, strangers to 
faction and defeat, observe always the same rules of life?47 (Lys. 33.7) 
` 
There is a definite cultural critique in this description of the Spartans, which I will 
explore in the next section. In terms of contextualizing the “particular circumstances” and 
“certain societal needs” that are the subject of analyzing the contexts of social rhetorical 
performance, it is clear that Lysias must contextualize a divided and conquered Greece 
that has the capacity for recovery in his speech. Greece is not lost, and the cultural 
memory of the Heraclean myth provides precedence for the exhortation to unify Greece 
against despotic rule that Lysias delivers. Whether Greece is truly capable of recovery is 
questionable, but by establishing it as a possibility through comparing Greece to 
Heracles, Lysias asserts that they can be restored. This might not be factually accurate, 
but it is rhetorically effective. 
 The question of factual accuracy is, of course, of greater importance in judicial 
proceedings, such as the context for Demosthenes’ defense On the Crown. The basis for 
Demosthenes’ argument is that his accuser, Aeschines, has levied “dishonest and 
untruthful” charges against his actions and his character (Dem. 18.17). In response to 
those accusations, Demosthenes delivers a painstakingly detailed account of the historical 
                                                
47 θαυµάζω δὲ Λακεδαιµονίους πἀντων µάλιστα, τίνι ποτὲ γνώµῃ χρώµενοι καοµένην τὴν 
Ἑλλάδα περιορῶσιν, Ἡγεµόνες ὂντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων οὐκ ἀδίκως, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἔµφυτον 
ἀρετὴν καὶ διὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πόλεµον ἐπιστήµην, µόνοι δὲ οἰκοῦντες ἀπόρθητοι καὶ 
ἀτείχιστοι καὶ ἀστασίαστοι καὶ ἀήττητοι καὶ τρόποις ἀεὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χρώµενοι· (Lys. 33.7) 
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and political contexts for the advice that he previously gave to the Athenian assembly and 
the speeches and declarations made in response to those Athenian actions, all of which he 
uses to frame not only the virtue of his civic work but also to discredit Aeschines as an 
irresponsible citizen who withheld his criticisms during debates and attacked 
Demosthenes from personal, rather than legitimate, concerns: 
That is the salient difference between the statesman and the charlatan, who are 
indeed in all respects unlike one another. The statesman declares his judgement 
before the event, and accepts responsibility to his followers, to fortune, to the 
chances of the hour, to every critic of his policy. The charlatan holds his peace 
when he ought to speak, and then croaks over any untoward result” (Dem. 8.189). 
 
Demosthenes focuses his defense on refreshing and reframing his audiences’ views on 
the historical and political contexts surrounding the accusations that Aeschines has made. 
By introducing textual evidence from previous rhetorical performances and declarations, 
Demosthenes invites the jury of his peers to re-view the contexts of his work. In this 
retelling, Demosthenes is able to frame the memories of his audience to support himself 
and to discredit his accuser.  
 As he nears his conclusion in On the Crown, Demosthenes defends his ability as 
an orator while still reliant on the interaction and relationship he has with his audience. 
He admits to his skill as an orator with the caveat, “in general an audience controls the 
ability of a speaker, and that his reputation for wisdom depends upon your acceptance 
and your discriminating favour” (Dem. 18.277).48 It is evident throughout On the Crown 
that Demosthenes recognizes and honors the relationship he has with his audience, and 
through his historical and political context-building, he creates an environment where the 
                                                
48 “ὡς γᾶρ ἂν ὑµεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἒχητ᾽ εὐνοίας, οὕτως ὁ λέγων ἔδοξε 
φρονεῖν” (Dem. 18.277). 
  76 
shared cultural memories of the politicians present allow for him to successfully defend 
his character and actions to a jury of his peers. While the context-building work that 
Demosthenes completes in his defense was an integral part of his success, the orator also 
relies on connecting to cultural ideologies present in the audience in order to emphasize 
their significance. That focus on cultural values and ideologies, leads to the third 
characteristic of analysis in this chapter. 
Cultural Ideologies and Memories Connected to Performance 
When considering the third condition for intellectual movements—that “they 
inadvertently grow alongside some established cultural practices and against others” (J. 
Poulakos 1995, 12)—the role of audiences and the mental images that they may imagine 
during a speech comes into the focus. Understanding how audiences are conditioned to 
see the reasoning and persuasiveness of existing and new ideas in a speech through 
shared cultural values is perhaps the most important feature of understanding how 
audiences impact rhetorical invention and performance. The influence of audience on this 
concept calls back upon Olick’s idea that certain words or ideas “serve as mnemonic 
lightning rods” for audiences (2007, 113). This third measure of analysis asks us to 
determine how and why particular ideas function as stimuli for mental images and 
encourage coherence in the context of specific audiences and purposes. 
The idea that intellectual movements “grow alongside” accepted practices speaks 
to the readiness of an audience to agree with an orator, and it is a common critique that 
successful rhetoric is so much soothsaying. For example, Socrates says, “When a man 
makes his effort in the presence of the very men whom he is praising, it is no difficult 
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matter to win credit as a fine speaker” (Plat. Menex. 235d).49 The idea of an Athenian 
orator speaking platitudes to an Athenian audience depicts rhetoric as impotent, an 
unimportant form of flattery. While some oratory may have readily fallen into this 
characterization, the majority of rhetorical performances are more accurately described as 
functioning within and pushing the boundaries of cultural ideas. Even the simple “praise 
or blame” characterization of epideictic rhetoric relies on a rhetorical system in which the 
judgment of an audience as θεωρία, spectator, requires an audience to be more than 
passive recipient of oratory. This is not to discredit the ability of an orator to speak 
toward accepted practices and ideas. In fact, to effectively connect with an audience, an 
orator must be able to connect with an audience through those existing ideas, but the 
power of rhetoric resides in the ability to change ideas. Without the difficult work of 
creating new ideas and values, rhetorical performance lacks value. Similarly, the work of 
government requires action. Demosthenes critiques his peers in On the State of the 
Chersonese as a passive audience for their complacency and resistance to the difficult 
work of leadership: 
For it ought to have been the reverse, men of Athens; all your politicians should 
have trained you to be gentle and humane in the Assembly, for there you are 
dealing with rights that concern yourselves and your allies, but in preparing for 
war they should have made you threatening and intractable, because there you are 
pitted against your enemies and rivals. As it is, by persuasive arts and caresses 
they have brought you to such a frame of mind that in your assemblies you are 
elated by their flattery and have no ear but for compliments, while in your policy 
and your practice you are at this moment running the gravest risks. (Dem. 8.33-
34)50 
                                                
49 “ὅταν δὲ τις ἐν τούτοις ἀωνίζηται, οὕσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεῖ, οὐδὲν µέγα δοκεῖν εὖ λέγειν” 
(Plat. Menex. 235d). 
50 ἐχρῆν γὰρ, ἧ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὐναντίον ἦ νῦν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολιτευµοένους ἐν µὲν 
ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις πράους καὶ φιλανθρώπους ὑµᾶς ἐθίζειν εἶναι (πρὸς γὰρ ὑµᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ 
τοὺς συµµάχους ἐν ταύταις ἐστὶ τὰ δίκαια), ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρασκευαῖς ταῖς τοῦ πολέµου 
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Demosthenes’ critique here demonstrates the limitations of audiences to set aside flattery 
and engage with new or challenging ideas. This critique is one that is not uncommon in 
rhetoric texts. For example, in his rather unflattering depiction of audiences in book two 
of the Rhetoric, Aristotle says that maxims are effective because they “hit upon the 
opinions which [the hearers] specially hold,” due in large part to their “vulgarity 
(φορτικότητα)” (trans. Kennedy, Aristot. Rh. 2.21.15.1395b).51 The idea that universal 
truths are successful in rhetorical performances because of audiences’ homeostatic 
tendencies and the “vulgarity” or “obtrusiveness” of those audiences severely limits the 
power of the listeners to participate in the rhetorical act. Haskins is critical of Aristotle’s 
depiction of audiences; and she writes, “In the Rhetoric, however, Aristotle does not 
postulate the rules of communicative interaction among those who are engaged in a 
pursuit of virtue but specifies the verbal means of influencing opinion under corrupt 
constitutional conditions of a democratic regime” (2004, 99). In contrast, Haskins offers 
the civic virtue of Isocratean rhetorical theory as a more responsible perspective on 
rhetorical education and value. 
 However dismissive of audiences Aristotle appears to be in his discussion of 
maxims, it is evident that he recognizes that audiences recognize cultural ideas, and he 
discusses the ways by which rhetoricians can use those ideas for rhetorical performance. 
                                                                                                                                            
φοβεροὺς καὶ χελεποὺς ἐπιδειχνήναι· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀντιπάλους ἐκεῖνος 
ἐσθ᾽ ὁ ἀγών, νῦν δὲ δηµαγωγοῦντες ὑµᾶς καὶ χαριζόµενοι καθ᾽ ὑπερβολὺν οὕτω 
διατεθήκασιν, ὥστ᾽ ἑν µὲν ταῖς ἐκκλησίας τρυφᾶν καὶ χολακεύεσθαι πάντα πρὸς ἡδονὴν 
ἀκούοντας, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγµασι καὶ τοῖς γιγνοµένοις παρὶ τῶν ἐσκάτων ἢδη κινδυνεύειν. 
(Dem. 8.33-34) 
 
51 “ἐπιτύχῃ τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἐκεῖνοι κατὰ µέρος ἔχουσιν” (Aristot. Rh. 2.21.15.1395b). 
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For example, Aristotle discusses how audiences will readily acknowledge the practice 
among Spartan men to wear one’s hair long, a practice that is widely understood to 
demonstrate the nobility of a Spartan (Aristot. Rh. 1.9.26.1367a); orators can refer to this 
concept in their performances—speaking of a long-haired Spartan—and the audience can 
make enthymematic connections to the noble status of that individual. Additionally, when 
referring to a noble Spartan man, an audience might visualize him with long hair. Both 
concept and image can be interchanged through varied use.  
In addition to recognizing that audiences can identify these cues based on visual 
input, Aristotle’s discussion of physical traits and cultural values also speaks to the ability 
of an orator to interpret the concerns and values of audiences.52 For instance, armed with 
the knowledge of Spartan hair practices, an orator could recognize the social ranking of 
men in a Spartan audience and alter his approach to a speech depending on the makeup of 
the crowd. Considering hair length as a social practice is a rather limited application of 
rhetorical knowledge, but considering the pervasive and overlapping visual cues available 
to a performing orator, this system of perceiving and adapting rhetorical practice would 
be effective for understanding how to tailor one’s speech for a particular audience.  
In addition to visible cues, intangible or invisible qualities of an audience can be 
understood through assumptions of social and/or collective memory. Casey says, “Social 
memory derives from a basis in shared experience, shared history or place, or shared 
                                                
52 Walker argues that for Aristotle, if an orator embodies the “vulgarity” of his audience, 
“the performer will himself become habituated to those moods and emotions […] and in 
consequence he will be vulgarized and rendered morally corrupt” (2011, 20). While 
Aristotle’s views toward the general population are notoriously prejudiced, it is clear that 
the rhetorician understands the necessity for an orator to appeal to that audience, although 
he cautions the degree to which one mimics those values. 
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project. Collective memory, in contrast, has no such basis but is instead distributed over a 
given population or set of places” (2004, 23). Casey continues to explain that collective 
memory can be remembered “severally,” and that the person remembering the events can 
have overlapping or differing remembrances. This idea of social and collective memories 
relates to the role of myth and shared cultural images within classical Greek society. The 
visualized memories do not stem from a homogenous background but instead build from 
shared stories and norms that may or may not align consistently. Casey’s classification of 
social memory does allow for social ties among smaller communities that might elicit a 
more homogenized visualization of a particular concept, but these social memories are 
potentially less reliable for the orator’s art, hence the Aristotelian approach to common 
topics, which allows for a broader approach to persuasion and audience consideration—a 
broadness that is not without its own weaknesses. The structures that underlie the usage 
of these social and collective memories extend beyond shared events to manifestations of 
cultural myths or commonplaces within a culture or population. To account for these 
diverse influences on shared ideas, John Gould encourages scholars to incorporate 
multiple views of social structures: 
The ways in which any society defines its own structure to itself and 
communicates that structure to its members are likely to constitute a composite of 
formal and informal, of conscious and unconscious, of explicit rules and implicit 
norms and patterns, and that to grasp the thing with any faithfulness we need to 
look at more than one of these ways: the formal rules of law will tell us one thing, 
the half-conscious paradigms of myth perhaps another. (2001, 121-122) 
 
Gould’s identification of conscious and unconscious information also signals how these 
ideas might be embodied or habitual and might thus escape immediate notice. Calling 
attention to these ideas, however, can bring their existence into the forefront of 
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consideration. By conceptualizing the third characteristic of intellectual movements as 
Poulakos defines them as a tool for understanding how audiences are prepared to think 
about and respond to presented ideas in rhetorical performances, one can theorize the 
ideologies and memories that an orator assumes an audience to possess. 
 This claim is perhaps most evident through Lysias’ Olympic Oration. In his 
speech, Lysias calls upon the mythic journey of Heracles as a symbol of the first 
unification of Greece—the unification that occurred through the Olympiad. Lysias uses 
Heracles’ feats as a standard by which he can critique the current Greek military 
situation. Johnstone speaks to the ability of myth to convey knowledge to the common 
man: 
Ordinary folk could acquire some measure of divine wisdom—some 
understanding of what would be pleasing to the gods and thus of what ought to be 
done—through knowing the divine origins of things and their sacred meanings. 
Such knowledge, moreover, comes in part through intimacy with the myths 
themselves. (2009, 32) 
 
Relying on mythic connections to the famed Greek hero allows Lysias to speak to a wide 
range of attendees at the Olympic Festival. In the oral culture, telling the tales of 
Heracles’ feats would be a common form of entertainment. Lysias can assume that the 
audience for his speech would have heard about the first Olympiad and its unifying act. 
Despite this, Lysias does remind his listeners of the formation of the first games and says 
that Heracles “judged that our assembly here would be a beginning of mutual amity 
amongst the Greeks” (Lys. 33.2).53 Making the connection to mythic origins is a common 
genre move of panegyric orations, and it also allows Lysias to prepare his audience to 
                                                
53 “ἡγήσατο γὰρ τὸν ἐνθάδε σύλλογον ἀρχὴν γενήσεσθαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους 
φιλίας” (Lys. 33.2). 
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compare the ancient origins of the games with the contemporary political climate. Lysias 
describes Greece “in this shameful plight, with many parts of her held subject by the 
foreigner (Βαρβάρω), and many of her cities ravaged by despots (τυράννων)” (Lys. 33.3), 
and he argues that the Greeks did not arrive at their current condition through a moral 
weakness of her citizens but instead by the conquering forces of another army; the defeat 
by a militaristically superior force is morally redeemable in terms of Greek cultural 
values and perceptions. It is more virtuous to be defeated in battle than to be dismantled 
by internal strife. Lysias relies on the audience’s understanding of Greek cultural values 
of militarism, cultural memories of Olympic festivals, and the myth of Heracles in order 
to execute his oration. This layering of ideology, memory, and myth allows for him to 
comment on the political/military climate in ways that can speak to varied levels of 
understanding within the audience.  
 Another oration that relies on Greek audiences to view events through cultural 
ideals and memories is the Funeral Oration that Socrates reports hearing from Aspasia in 
the Menexenus. In that speech, Aspasia refers directly to the ways in which the rhetorical 
performance signals memories and thoughts about the deceased that align with Greek 
cultural values of militarism and the glorification of soldiers who die in battle. 
[Aspasia] But in respect of words, the honour that remains still due to these 
heroes the law enjoins us, and it is right, to pay in full. For it is by means of 
speech finely spoken that deeds nobly done gain for their doers from the hearers 
the meed of memory and renown. And the speech required is one which will 
adequately eulogize the dead and give kindly exhortation to the living, appealing 
to their children and their brethren to copy the virtues of these heroes, and to their 
fathers and mothers and any still surviving ancestors offering consolation. (Plat. 
Menex. 236d-e)54 
                                                
54 λόγῳ δὲ ὴ τὸν λειπόµενον κόσµον ὅ τε νόµος προστάττει ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ἀνδράσι καὶ 
χρή· ἔργων γὰρ εὖ πραχθέντων λόγῳ καλῶς ῥηθέντι µνήµη καὶ κόσµος τοῖς πράξασι 
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Aspasia’s performance, recreated by means of Socrates, demonstrates also the ways in 
which epideictic performance functions as active rhetoric. She conceptualizes of her 
audience not simply as mourners hoping to hear words of consolation, but as active 
participants in the rhetorical exchange who perceive her words, associate those words 
with images of the deceased and translate those images to cultural memories and 
ideologies that continue to be shared after the speech’s end. This performance aligns with 
Walker’s characterization as epideictic: 
as that which shapes and cultivates the basic codes of value and belief by which a 
society or culture likes; it shapes the ideologies and imageries with which and by 
which, the individual members of a community identify themselves; and, perhaps 
most significantly, it shapes the fundamental grounds, the ‘deep’ commitments 
and presuppositions, that will underlie and ultimately determine decision and 
debate in particular forums. (2000, 9) 
 
Walker’s discussion of epideictic rhetoric as suasive force obviously speaks to the 
cultural connections between rhetorical performance and audience beliefs and values.  
Athenian judicial rhetoric, as well, discusses not only the legality of actions but 
also their cultural acceptability. The historical events that lead to judicial debate and the 
actions of ancestors are postulated on cultural ideologies. For example, in discussing the 
Athenian role of pursuing justice and prudence in political affairs, Demosthenes reminds 
the jury of prior Athenian interventions in other city-states’ conflicts, arguing that those 
interventions “taught to all Greece the lesson that, however gravely a nation may have 
offended against you, you keep your resentment for proper occasions, but if ever their life 
                                                                                                                                            
γίγνεται παρὰ τῶν ἀκουσάντων. Δεῖ δὴ τοιούτου τινὸς λόγου, ὅστις τοὺς µὲν τετελευτηκότας 
ἱκανῶς ἐπαινέσεται, τοῖς δὲ ζῶσιν εὐµενῶς παραινέσεται, ἐκγόνοις µὲν καὶ ἀδελφοῖς 
µιµεῖσθαι τὴν τῶνδε ἀρετὴν παρακελευόµενος, πατέρας δὲ καὶ µητέρας καὶ εἴ τινες τῶν 
ἄνωθεν ἔτι προγόνων λείονται, τούτους δὲ παραµυθούµενος. (Plat. Menex. 236d-e) 
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or their liberty is endangered, you will not indulge your rancor or take your wrongs into 
account” (Dem. 18.99).55 Clearly, prior Athenian politics grant Demosthenes a prime 
example of the ways in which his advice to the Assembly carried on this pursuit of justice 
and focus on the honorable nature of those actions. Earlier in his defense, Demosthenes 
compares the Athenians to other Greek states that fell to Philip’s conquering forces 
through in-fighting and corruption, and in doing so, he attempts to raise the standards of 
Athenian political standing, and position her status as moral leader of the Greek city-
states. Aeschines has censured Demosthenes for his conduct, and Demosthenes argues 
against that censure with the question, “If [Athens] rejected that truly shameful policy, 
was she to stand by and permit aggressions which she must have long foreseen, and knew 
would succeed if none should intervene?” (Dem. 18.63).56 Because the Assembly 
represents the Greek polis, the men represent the whole of Athens, and in this forum, the 
beliefs and actions cast an image of the entire Athenian people. Charged with this 
representation, the emphasis on justice and righteousness calls upon well-established 
Greek privileging of these qualities.  
The civic focus of Demosthenes’ defense centers on the ways in which an 
individual serves as a representative of a larger democratic body. Demosthenes calls upon 
this representation by describing a generalized, idealized man, and asking each individual 
                                                
55 “καὶ γάρ τοι πᾶσι τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδείξατ᾽ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι, κἂν ὁτιοῦν τις εἰς ὑµᾶς ἐξαµάρτῃ, 
τούτων τὴν ὀργὴν εἰς τἄλλ᾽ ἔχετε, ἐὰν δ᾽ ὑπὲρ σωτηρίας ἢ ἐλευθερίας κίνδυνός τις αὐτοὺς 
καταλαµβάνῃ, οὔτε µνησικακήσετ᾽ οὔθ᾽ ὑπολογιεὶσθε” (Dem. 18.99). 
 
56 “ἢ τοῦτο µὲν µὴ ποιεῖν, δεινὸν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἃ δ᾽ ἑώρα συµβησόµεν᾽, εἰ µηδεὶς 
κωλύσει, καὶ προῃσθάνεθ᾽, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐκ πολλοῦ, ταῦτα περιιδεῖν γιγνόµενα;” (Dem. 
18.63). 
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juror to imagine himself in that role. For example, he argues that the ideal Greek citizen 
is one whose focus in on the wellbeing of his fatherland: 
The man who deems himself born only to his parents will wait for his natural and 
destined end; the son of his country is willing to die rather than see her enslaved, 
and will look upon those outrages and indignities, which a commonwealth in 
subjection is compelled to endure, as more dreadful than death itself. (Dem. 
18.205)57 
 
Demosthenes’ rhetorical success can be attributed in part to this association of 
generalized, idealized Greek citizen to the men present in the Assembly. Demosthenes 
does not simply praise the Assemblymen for their righteousness and justice; in fact, he 
criticizes their earlier lack of action when faced with the threat of Philip. However, he 
does allow the jury to imagine themselves as ideal Greeks, embodying the patriotism and 
civic virtue that are so highly valued by the society. That the Greeks so clearly delineated 
Hellene from barbarian, and readily identified these differences speaks to the ways in 
which the Greeks value homogenized identity among their countrymen, and 
Demosthenes’ rhetorical skill allows him to reinforce his self-developed image as “an 
orator […] supporting the policy of the people, and having the same friends and the same 
enemies as [his] country” (Dem. 18.281).58 Demosthenes recognizes that in order to 
successfully construct a defense, he must persuade his audience not only of his own 
patriotism and just actions, but also associate those listening with those same qualities. 
He must allow his audience to envision themselves as part of the cultural memory of 
                                                
57 “διαφέρει δὲ τί; ὅτι ὁ µὲν τοῖς γονεῦσι µόνον γεγενῆσθαι νοµίζων τὸν τῆς εἰµαρµένης καὶ 
τὸν αὐτόµατον φάνατον περιµένει, ὁ δὲ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι ὑπὲρ τοῦ µὴ ταύτην ἐπιδεῖν 
δουλεύουσαν ἀποθνῄσξειν ἐθελήσει, καὶ φοβερωτέρας ἡγήσεται τὰς ὕβρεις καὶ τὰς ἀτιµίας, 
ἃς ἐν δουλευούσῃ τῇ πόλει φέρειν ἀνάγκη, τοῦ φανάτου” (Dem. 18.205). 
 
58 “ἀλλὰ τὸ ταὐτὰ προαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ τὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς µισεῖν καὶ φιλεῖν οὕσπερ 
ἂν ἡ πατρίς” (Dem. 18.281). 
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honorable Athenians, circumventing the tyrannical rule of Philip and protecting their 
countrymen from similar control. 
Conclusion 
 In the beginning of this chapter, I asked the question: how do rhetoricians 
determine the audience expectations and ideologies for each rhetorical performance? 
Through applying Poulakos’ framework for understanding intellectual movements to an 
analysis of the ways in which genre practices, historical contexts, and ideological and 
memorial associations are navigated based on audiences, I believe that this some insight 
into this audience-driven rhetorical concept has been achieved. The discussion of 
memory and the ways in which cultural images were stored, spread, and recalled that 
preceded Poulakos’ framework also illuminates the ways in which cultural memories and 
meaning making processes were formative for the development of a cohesive social 
identity for the Greeks, one that is created and maintained through the propagation of 
shared cultural images and ways of seeing. 
The analytical framework applied here does in many ways depends on a 
movement from individual to group in order to determine the ways in which contexts of 
use and ideology can be used, and a challenge to understanding the ways in which 
tailoring rhetorical performances to specific audiences remains the need to account for 
individual diversity. The shift from civic ideology to individual visualization processes 
demands an ability to understand the rhetoric of difference. However, the process of 
unifying audience needs and expectations does provide insights into the ways in which a 
civic theory of rhetoric functioned in Greece. As T. Poulakos states, Isocrates’ focus on 
civic good and responsible leadership fail to develop a method “to form a genuine ‘we’ 
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out of diversity. To be sure, Isocrates does not provide any solutions to our condition; he 
confronts another set of problems and inherits another rhetorical tradition” (T. Poulakos 
1997, 3). Similarly, this chapter does not resolve the issue of individuating audiences, but 
I believe that it does help mitigate the asocial tendencies of Aristotelian treatment of 
audience and offer instead tools that can permit one to understand how an orator responds 
to specific audience needs, to make oratory civic-visioned instead of abstract. That is, 
through developing a framework through which to analyze the ways in which rhetoricians 
placed the beliefs, knowledges, and concerns of their audiences as a central concern of 
rhetorical invention. 
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CHAPTER 4 
AFFECT AND STYLE IN RHETORICAL PERFORMANCES 
This chapter explores the ways in which discussions of style and emotions 
influence rhetorical performance and audience reception. In particular, this chapter 
examines the ways in which different styles and emotional appeals are understood as 
possessing varying levels of vividness that impact the experience of rhetorical 
performance. Inherent in this discussion is the belief that the orator’s job is to “bring 
before the eyes” of an audience the vivid effects of style and emotional appeals in order 
to engage with them through visual means. Some of these effects occur as features of 
rhetorical performance—that is, the embodied experience of a rhetorical performance—
while others are reflective of linguistic and stylistic choices present within a text. In this 
chapter I review scholarship on vividness, emotion, and style. Following that discussion, 
I identify a heuristic for analyzing vividness as it relates to these concepts and cite 
examples of vividness in rhetorical theory and performance. Drawing upon Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, Demetrius’ On Style, and Demosthenes’ On the Crown, I argue that the social 
nature of emotions and decisions of style are understood as visually influenced in 
classical Greek rhetorical theory. 
 In consideration of style, I turn to Dionysius of Halicarnassus’ commentaries On 
Demosthenes and On Lysias in which he discusses the effects of these orators’ styles. In 
these commentaries, Dionysius also compares the orators to other rhetoricians, and he 
discusses the ways in which classical Greeks may have received performances by orators. 
I turn to Demosthenes’ On the Crown for examples of stylistic choice as discussed in this 
chapter, and Dionysius’ comments help illuminate the effects that the orator achieved in 
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his performances. Dionysius wrote during the early Roman Empire, so his commentary is 
removed from the classical Greek period but represents a relatively contemporary review 
of these orators. Dionysius’ reviews allow some additional insight into how these 
rhetorical performances were situated, and his identification of individual styles and 
purposes for those styles are also useful for the analysis of style and emotion. Dionysius 
insists that an orator “should aim above all at making his style capable of arousing 
emotion and evoking moral tone and assuming the force of live debate” (D.H. Dem. 
455).59 This style speaks toward the importance of ἐναρηεία, vividness, in Greek 
rhetorical theory, which also relates to concepts of visuality in rhetoric and provides a 
measurement for understanding the ways in which stylistic choices can elicit emotional 
and visualized experiences for audiences. 
 In his discussion of visual rhetoric and emotion, Hill challenges the contemporary 
attitude that emotional responses to images “tend to override [the viewer’s] rational 
faculties, resulting in a response that is unreflective and irrational” (2004, 26). He argues 
that dismissing emotional response as irrational has resulted in neglected study of the 
ways that emotionally evocative images can achieve persuasive effects. The tendency 
among rhetorical scholars is to dismiss emotional elements of rhetorical performances in 
favor of analyzing more concrete concepts such as argumentation; however, the dismissal 
of studying emotions may produce a more limited understanding of how audiences 
interact with rhetorical performances. Emotional response to a message does factor into 
the way that one receives and responds to presented information. Chafe notes that 
                                                
59 “ὑπὲρ ἄπαντα δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ παθητικήν τε καὶ ἠθικὴν καὶ ἐναγώνιον ποιεῖν τὴν λέξιν” 
(D.H. Dem. 455). 
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internalized, “evaluative emotions, opinions, attitudes, and desires” affect the ways that 
“externally induced experiences” are evaluated (1994, 32). Understanding the ways in 
which these emotions affect human consciousness and response is key to learning how 
discourse functions as a social exchange of ideas and images. 
 Hill’s description of vivid information helps provide a guideline for determining 
the degree to which stylistic choices in a rhetorical performance can have lasting visual or 
emotional effect: 
Vividness itself, like any single persuasive trait, will not make a bad argument 
convincing, but it will, if properly employed, enhance the persuasiveness of a 
reasonably strong position. And operationally speaking, vividness is almost a 
direct synonym for visualization, whether one is creating mental images through 
the use of concrete language or actually presenting a visual image to a viewer. 
(2004, 32) 
 
Hill’s concept of vivid information as something that elicits emotional responses in 
viewers can be identified along a spectrum of vividness. He argues that images that 
reflect an experienced event are the most vivid and can result in the greatest emotional 
response; this high emotional response is often charged with supplanting reason in favor 
of emotional fervor (2004, 31). For example, images related to the terror attacks on 
September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center towers in New York City remain 
highly vivid triggers for emotional response for many people in the United States; in the 
face of those images, the rational response to a message that is accompanied by those 
images might be limited. In contrast, Hill argues that “abstract, impersonal language and 
statistics” present less vivid information for most audiences, and those abstract messages 
are less inducive of emotional responses (2004, 31). The higher degree of vividness that a 
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message employs—that is the amount of visualization that is encouraged through a 
particular message—the more likely an audience will react to that message.  
While highly vivid information might limit rational response depending on the 
accompanying images, it is possible to employ stylistic elements that increase the 
vividness of information without sacrificing rational deliberation. For example, while 
abstract statistics will likely result in low vividness, translating those statistics into an 
infographic that presents the same image visually will likely engage an audience more 
because the means to visualize that information have been provided for an audience. 
Although Hill’s scale might suggest that images are consistently more vivid than words, 
he states, “vivid information takes on the form of concrete and imagistic language, 
personal narratives, pictures, or first-hand experience” (2004, 31). It is possible, then, that 
rhetorical performances that use techniques to activate mental images for an audience can 
be highly vivid.  
As Hill notes, the use of images directly can also “prompt an immediate, visceral 
response, to develop cognitive (though largely unconscious) connections over a sustained 
period of time, or to prompt conscious analytical thought” (2004, 37). Eliciting emotions 
through direct images is highly efficient, and contemporarily facile with the proliferation 
of visual media and means to communicate visual information quickly and broadly. In 
classical Greece, however, the means of spreading images in a similar manner were much 
more limited. However, by considering the ways in which language, especially language 
that is visual in its usage, interrelates with visual means of conveying information, we can 
develop better tools for recognizing the ways in which language functions on those 
visceral levels. As Goggin suggests, “We might flip the term, visual rhetoric, to rhetoric 
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of the visual to signify that meaning-making material practices and artifacts that engage 
in graphic representation are visual, whether the graphic is dealing in glottographic or 
semasiographic systems or both” (2004 106).  
Goggin’s “rhetoric of the visual” challenges the dichotomy between perceptual 
cognition and linguistic cognition, between sight and visualization. Similarly, Newman 
contrasts sight and clarity, saying, “Sight is the actualization of the mean between the 
extremes of black and white, while clarity, by analogy, is the actualization of the mean 
between the contrasted metaphorical terms brought about when ‘bringing-before-the-
eyes’ prompts audiences to visualize images” (2002, 18). Highly vivid information often 
presents through stylistic choices that bring a detailed level of description, capitalize on 
high emotions of an audience, or function within a speech to draw special attention to a 
key image in the performance.  
In some instances, understanding the ways in which a performance might evoke 
highly vivid images, especially emotionally charged images, requires flattening the 
complexity of an audience’s make-up in order to make predictions about their reaction. 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides one model, albeit a flattened one, for understanding an 
audience’s emotional response and the impact on rhetorical theory. Aristotle’s text serves 
as an entry into understanding the ways in which Greek rhetoricians might have 
understood the social components of style, emotion, and rhetoric. In addition to 
theorizing the emotional states and responses of audience in the abstract, Aristotle’s 
discussions of style in Greek rhetoric can be read as providing a framework to understand 
audiences as dynamic and responsive bodies who participate in performance; that is not 
to say that Aristotle regards audiences as particularly dynamic, but the importance of 
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accounting for audience in the Rhetoric—that is, inventing an argument that is partly 
determined by the disposition of an audience—introduces audiences as something more 
than passive recipients of rhetorical performances. This chapter explores the ways in 
which emotions and style were understood through the contexts of audiences and builds a 
heuristic for approaching specific performances and analyzing the degree of vividness as 
well as the purposes for particular stylistic choices. 
Audience and Emotion in Rhetorical Theory 
 Pertinent to the discussion of vividness is understanding the ways in which a 
rhetorician conceptualizes their audience when crafting their performance. For example, 
Socrates’ distrust of rhetoric stems from his belief that audiences are held captive to the 
will of an orator. Socrates believes that an audience is persuaded blindly, absent the 
ability to critically engage with a performance. In the Phaedrus, Socrates asks Phaedrus, 
“Is not rhetoric in its entire nature an art which leads the soul by means of words, not 
only in law courts and the various other public assemblages, but in private companies as 
well?” (Plat. Phaedrus 261a-b).60 Socrates uses the term ψυχαγωγία, soul-leading, to 
describe the effects of rhetoric on a listener, and he distrusts the integrity of an orator to 
do that which is right and just by means of speech alone. The effect of ψυχαγωγία is that 
of activating an emotional response so strongly that an audience is blinded to the true 
intentions of the orator; Socrates sees it as simple manipulation and something that is 
likely to befall audiences regularly. It is evident that Socrates has little regard for an 
audience and places the power of persuasion solely in the speaker’s abilities. 
                                                
60 “Ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὐ τὸ µὲν ὅλον ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἄν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, οὐ µόνον ἐν 
δικαστηρίοις καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι δηµόσιοι σύλλογοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἰδίοις” (Plat. Phaedrus 261a-
b). 
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 Socrates’ distrust of oratory and audience rises out of concerns regarding the 
Sophists, who offer rhetorical education to any willing to pay for the service. Poulakos 
claims that Sophists such as Gorgias and Thrasymachus also emphasize the role of the 
speaker over an audience. In contrast, he says that Aristotle attempts to “subject the 
emotions for reason” as a way for people “to think rationally about their feelings or the 
orator’s rhetoric seeking to excite or pacify them” (J. Poulakos 1995, 174-175). 
Aristotle’s focus on educating audiences regarding emotions also helps establish 
rhetorical theory as a bilateral form of communication, adding a depth of power dynamics 
that helps salvage some of the essentialized treatment of audience of which Aristotle is 
guilty. Johnstone describes Aristotle as “[situating] the human being as a sentient, social 
creature in the realm of change, particularity, possibility—the moral realm,” which he 
claims reflects an interest in the ways that humans interact (2009, 213). In another 
example of concern for audience, Isocrates presents a model of rhetorical and political 
theory in which the opinions of the audience, often discussed as those who governed by 
his students, play a primary role in the ways that a ruler should approach that work. 
 One of the main arguments made concerning audiences is that of their emotional 
responses. Pseudo-Aristotle describes the interaction of emotion and audience in the 
Rhetoric to Alexander, and says that proofs “arise from the speeches themselves, the 
actions, and the people” (Rhetoric to Alexander 1428a).61 He continues: 
One is when in accusing or defending, we call in to aid our argument those 
emotions that humans naturally experience—if, for instance, it happens that 
certain persons despise or fear someone, or have often done the thing in question 
themselves, or again feel a pleasure or a pain or a desire, or have ceased to feel 
                                                
61 “αὐτῶν τῶν λόγων καῖ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώποων” (Rhetoric to Alexander 
1428a). 
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the desire, or have experienced in mind or body or any other field of sensation 
some other feeling of the sort that we jointly experience; for these and similar 
feelings being common experiences of human nature are intelligible to the 
audience. (Rhetoric to Alexander 1428b)62 
 
Including the audience as part of the construction of proofs is important when 
considering the role that commonly held beliefs and expectations have on rhetorical 
invention. More importantly for this chapter, the impact of an audience’s emotions on the 
construction of rhetorical performance becomes a principle concept for understanding 
visuality in rhetorical theory. Connected to this idea of emotion is the ability of an 
audience to associate with the experiences that are described or enacted in a performance.  
 Greek discussions of visuality spring up around the Peripatetic school of thought, 
beginning with Aristotle, according to D. A. Russell. He identifies Book III of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, the lost treatise on rhetoric by Theophrastus, and Demetrius’ On Style as the 
“most important sources” that discuss style in antiquity, and the texts from which later 
concepts of style derive (1981, 129). Peripateticism also focuses on the ways in which 
knowledge and human experience are situated within the body. As Aristotle explains in 
On the Soul, this embodiment of experience extends to the emotions, which he classifies 
as a kind of imagination that functions as an extension of visuality and sense perception. 
 
 
                                                
62 µία µὲν οὖν ἐστι τὸ τὰ πάθη τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀκολουθοῦντα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις <ἐν> τοῖς 
λόγοις συµπαραλαµβάνειν ἐν τῷ λατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐὰν τύχωσί τινες 
καταφρονήσαντές τινος ἢ δείσαντες, εἰ καὶ αὐτοὶ τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγµα πολλάκις πεποιηκότες, ἢ 
πάλιν ἡσθέντες ἢ λυπηθέντες ἢ ἐπιθυµοῦντες ἢ πεπαυµένοι τῶν ἐπιθυµιῶν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον 
ἕτερον πεπονθότες πάθος ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ τοῖς σώµασιν ἢ τινι τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οἷς 
συµπάσχοµεν· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις ὅµοια κοινὰ τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὄντα πάθη 
γνώριµα τοῖς ἀκύουσίν ἐστιν. (Rhetoric to Alexander 1428b) 
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Emotions and Visuality 
 That emotions can manifest visually and are observable is perhaps unsurprising. 
In fact, some neuroscientists who study mirror neurons suggest that this ability to 
recognize emotions in other humans was essential to the development of larger social 
groups. Benjamin Rathgeber and Mathias Gutmann describe the initial discovery of 
mirror neurons as “a particular class of visumotorical neurons, originally discovered in 
area F5 of the monkey premotorical cortex. They discharge both (1) when the animal 
performs a specific action and (2) when it observes a similar action” (2008, 233). 
Although originally discovered in monkeys, mirror neurons have since been identified in 
the brains of humans. The pairing of action and vision in neurological function suggests 
that the bond between an action and perception of that action can be strengthened even 
when not occurring simultaneously. Marco Iacoboni discusses that mirror neurons can 
also be activated by aural stimuli, and “Mirror neuron responses to auditory stimuli are 
essential evidence for the hypothesis that mirror neurons are important neural elements in 
language evolution. The other implication of the auditory properties of mirror neurons is 
that they show that mirror neurons are multimodal cells” (2009, 661). Iacoboni argues 
that the presence of mirror neurons in human brains is also responsible for our ability to 
empathize with another individual through perceiving those emotions in another person 
(2009, 666). 
 Isocrates speaks toward one’s ability to observe and demonstrate emotions when 
he instructs Nicocles to “simulate anger when the occasion demands it. Show yourself 
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stern” (Isoc. 2.23).63 In the Rhetoric, Aristotle recounts the proverb, “The eyes are the 
abode of shame,” and describes emotions as socially driven phenomena (Aristot. Rh. 
2.6.18.1384a).64 That is, shame functions effectively when there are social consequences 
in its identification. When Aristotle writes, “shame is in the eyes,” he places social 
consideration on emotions. David Konstan identifies Aristotle’s discussion of shame as 
“the fullest and clearest analysis” of the emotion in ancient Greek works (2003, 1037). 
Aristotle defines shame as “an impression about dishonor, and that for its own sake and 
not for its results; and since no one heeds the opinion of others except on account of those 
who hold it, it follows that men feel shame before those whom they esteem” (Aristot. Rh. 
2.6.14.1384a).65 It is important that shame is tied to “an impression of dishonor” rather 
than to a concrete act. Demosthenes argues that shame is dependent on one’s social 
standing, for “the strongest necessity that a free man feels is shame for his own position,” 
while slaves’ greatest shame comes from their bodily injuries (Dem. 8.51).66 In terms of 
vividness, one could readily argue that physical harm to one’s body also belies a higher 
degree of vividness than an injury to one’s social standing. 
 Konstan draws special attention to the role of perception in understanding Greek 
ideas of shame. For example, he explains that there is “no distinction between 
                                                
63 “δόκει δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὅταν σοι καιρὸς ᾖ. δεινὸς µὲν φαίνου” (Isoc. 2.23). 
 
64 “τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλµοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ” (Aristot. Rh. 2.6.18.1384a). 
 
65 “ταῦτα ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχ´θνη, καὶ ταύτης 
αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ µὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλ᾽ ἢ διὰ τοὺς 
δοξάζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὧν λόγον ἔχει” (Aristot. Rh. 2.6.14.1384a). 
 
66 “ὅτι ἔστιν ἐλευθέρῳ µὲν ἀνθρώποῳ µεγίστη ἀνάγκη ἡ ὑπὲρ τῶν γιγνοµένων αἰσχύνη” 
(Dem. 8.51). 
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prospective or restrictive shame” or between “retrospective or remorseful shame,” but the 
emphasis instead lies in whether the shame is perceived or imagined; he identifies this 
through the Greek word φαινόµενα, those things that are seen (Konstan 2003, 1040). The 
emphasis on seeing an emotion is also discussed by Hawhee, who says that Aristotle’s 
depiction of shame is “irreducibly visual in that it must be visible” (2011, 151). Paul 
Nieuwenburg similarly identifies shame as “a painful (quasi-) perceptual appearance 
concerning disrepute” (2002, 99). Ultimately, shame takes on a social role because it is 
not only felt deeply when “in the eyes” of others. It is important to note that shame is not 
the sole emotion to have such a strong visual component, but the discussion of shame is 
quite thorough in the Rhetoric, and it serves as an example of emotions as visual 
phenomena.  
 In classical Greece, the experience of shame must be in part a visual experience. 
Konstan outlines three elements that lead to shame: “a particular act (throwing away 
one’s shield in battle); the fault of character that is revealed by the act (cowardice); and 
the disgrace or loss of esteem before the community at large” (2003, 1043). As seen in 
this example, shame functions when the act is observed, associated with a particular vice, 
and regarded as shameful by a community. Without these three elements, shame is 
inconsequential or nonexistent. For Aristotle, Nieuwenberg claims, the essential concern 
with emotions has to do with the ways in which one is perceived and consequently 
judged (2002, 92). I argue that orators who wish to activate a particular emotion “before 
the eyes” of an audience must call upon imagistic language or features of style in order to 
bring activate those emotional responses, whether witnessed or experienced by the 
audience.  
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 When one judges their own or others’ emotions, the mind calls upon mental 
images in order to help process the judgment. Although one may see the shame another 
feels in the moment, that feeling of shame is connected with abstract ideas of what one 
should find shameful and the degree to which that event brings shame. In this sense, 
shame is “in the eyes” but also connected to social ideologies that influence how 
particular events are read. O’Gorman discusses how the linguistic and imagistic 
discussions in the Rhetoric and On the Soul “mirror each other’s forms (that is, their 
dynamic and visual aspect) and power (that is, in their capacity to affect opinion and 
emotion through the production of images” (2005, 25). These images are socially 
constructed and moderated. Following O’Gorman’s pairing of language and vision, then, 
calling into words can achieve similar effects as presenting an image or emotion directly 
to an audience. If we look to the art of rhetoric as an art of calling into vision, we can see 
the ability of those speech acts to “evoke emotional states in audiences” (2005, 25). 
 This process of bringing-before-the-eyes through calling connected ideas or 
images to mind “begins with the comparison/contrast between two seemingly dissimilar 
metaphorical terms; this disparity then resolves to a mean and linguistic clarity as well as 
to pleasure and insight in the audience” (Newman 2002, 17). The act of visualizing 
connects images, words, and emotions through varying levels of vividness. Placing 
metaphor, then, in a scale of vividness is highly dependent on the type of comparison 
being made as well as the concepts that are actualized within that metaphor. The 
vividness of metaphors, then, is highly contextual, but placed within this chapter’s 
heuristic, moderation seems most appropriate, especially given Aristotle’s own argument 
that, “Metaphors should be drawn from objects which are proper to the object, but not too 
  100 
obvious; just as, for instance, in philosophy it needs sagacity to grasp the similarity in 
things that are apart” (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.5.1412a).67 
Fleckenstein cites Aristotle’s assertion of “the importance of, first, the impact of 
media on modes of representation, and second, the role of ‘spectacle’ in tragedy, created 
on the stage and created in readers” (2007, 15). As discussed in previous chapters, this 
spectacle is complex because it can function in multiple modes, places, and degrees of 
intensity. When considering the vividness of a particular image or visualized idea, it may 
be difficult to identify all the “emotional states” that might manifest in and in which 
ways. For example, the suitability of one beautiful metaphor over another as Aristotle 
asserts, might elicit a bevy of mental images and emotional states when comparing a 
“rosy-fingered morn” rather than a “purple-fingered,” or “red-fingered” morn (Aristot. 
Rh. 3.2.13.1405b). With this variability of imagery, it might seem preferential to offer 
more specific, contextual information to evoke a specific emotional and imagined 
response in an audience. Demetrius of Phalerum, in discussing metaphor, makes an 
argument for why this might not hold true: 
All such expressions as “foam-crested” or “eager” activate a personification. 
Some things are, however, expressed more clearly or properly by metaphor than 
by the actual proper terms, for example, “the battle shuddered.” No change of 
phrasing to introduce the proper terms could convey the meaning with greater 
truth or clarity. Home has renamed the “shuddering battle” the clash of spears and 
the low, continuous sound they make. In doing so he has simultaneously exploited 
the personifying metaphor of our earlier discussion when he represents the battle 
shuddering as if alive. (Demetrius 81-82)68 
                                                
67 “Δεῖ δὲ µεταφέρειν, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἀπὸ οἰκείων καὶ µὴ φανερῶν, οἷον καὶ ἐν 
φιλοσοφίᾳ τὶ ὅµοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσι θεωρεῖν εὐστόχου” (Aristot. Rh. 3.11.5.1412a). 
 
68 πάντα γᾶρ ταῦτα, τὸ ‘φαληριόωντα’ καὶ τὸ ‘µενεαίνων,’ ζωτικαῖς ἐνεργείαις ἔοικεν. ἔνια 
µέντοι σαφέστερον ἐν ταῖς µεταφοραῖς λέγεται καὶ κυριώτερον ἤπερ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς κυρίοις, 
ὡς τὸ ‘ἔφριξεν δὲ µάχη.’ οὐ γὰρ ἄν τις αὐτὸ µεταβαλὼν διὰ κυρίων οὔτ᾽ ἀληθέστερον εἴποι 
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The discussion of using “proper terms” rather than metaphors in this excerpt identifies 
the ways in which those specific terms, while factual, would rate low on the scale of 
vividness. In contrast, metaphor leads to greater vividness. The metaphor described here 
also activates an emotional response of fear on the part of the audience. As Demetrius 
and other rhetoricians discuss, these style choices are important for the delivery of vivid 
information, especially related to emotion. 
Style and Rhetorical Performance  
We have therefore next to speak of style; for it is not sufficient to know what one 
ought to say, but one must also know how to say it, and this largely contributes to 
making the speech appear of a certain character. (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.2.1403b)69 
 
Aristotle’s and Demetrius’ discussions of metaphor above speak to the importance of 
making stylistic changes that encourage the activation of vivid information for an 
audience. In his commentary On Lysias, Dionysius of Halicarnassus says that it is 
difficult to logically determine exactly why certain style choices are more effective at 
eliciting responses in audience, and ultimately states, “In each case it is our senses and 
not our reason that provide the key” to choosing the best option of delivery (D.H. Lys. 
11).70 Dionysius regards the emotional and vivid effects of style with a high degree of 
reverence, and the good use of language is almost mystical in nature. In contrast, 
                                                                                                                                            
οὔτε σαφέστερον. τὸν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν δοράτων κλόνον <καὶ τὸν> γινόµενον τούτοις ἠρέµα 
ἦχον συνεχῶς φρίσσουσαν µάχην προσηγόρευσεν, καὶ ἅµα ἐπεῖληπταί πως τῆς 
κατ᾽ἐνέργειαν µεταφορᾶς τῆς προειρηµένης, τὴν µάχρν φρίσσειν εἰπὼν ὥσπερ ζῶον. 
(Demetrius 81-82) 
 
69 “Περὶ δὲ τῆς λέξεως ἐχόµενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόχρη τὸ ἔχειν ἃ δεῖ λέγειν, 
ἀλλ᾽ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν, καὶ συµβάλλεται πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι ποιόν τινα 
τὸν λόγον ” (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.2.1403b). 
 
70 “αἰσθήσει γὰρ τούτων ἕκαστον καταλαµβάνεται καὶ οὐ λόγῳ” (D.H. Lys. 11). 
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Aristotle argues that “the difference [between styles] is not so very great, but all these 
things are mere outward show for pleasing the hearer” (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.6.1404a).71 His 
comments on the lack of difference notwithstanding, Aristotle’s insistence that style is 
used as “outward show” for the hearer is important. The word used for “outward show” 
in this statement is phantasia, which, as discussed in chapter 1, relates to visualized 
mental images.  
That both Dionysius and Aristotle focus on audience is an important consideration 
for style. While discussions of cognition and mental images can be located within an 
individual, discussions of style necessarily include the audience. And while discussions 
of shared cultural beliefs and memories in the second chapter of this dissertation did 
account for a greater role in how social groups interact with audience, it is in these 
discussions of style that we see an increased importance of the people for rhetorical 
consideration. Discussing the process of visualizing language and the beliefs upon which 
those images draw can be highly individualistic, but in style we are asked to consider not 
only the individual but also the group more broadly.72 For the Sophists, the tension 
between differentiating individual and group perhaps is not as challenging of an issue 
when considering the effects of style. As Jarratt describes, “An integrated picture of the 
subject of sophistic pedagogy defines the individuals both as the location of a separate 
                                                
71 “οὐ µέντοι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ἅπαντα φαντασία ταῦτ᾽ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀκροατήν” (Aristot. 
Rh.3.1.6.1404a). 
 
72 Cicero later writes about the relationship of the orator to the community. Joy Connolly 
summarizes,, “The citizen is a body among other bodies, who originally formed political 
associations by communicating with one another through speech. […] Republican 
citizenship, like eloquence, is the practice of spectacular virtue in the course of an active 
life in the setting of a political community—which, like Aristotle, Cicero treats as the 
natural end of human existence” (2007, 143). 
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mind perceiving distinctive visual and aural stimuli and as member of a group of like-
minded individuals with responsibility to participate in the democracy” (1991, 92). How 
these groups of individuals “participate” in rhetorical performances also reflects the ways 
in which the scale of vivid information invites their emotional and performative 
participation in the rhetorical act. 
In Kennedy’s discussion of “spatial visualization and actualization” in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, he identifies the audience of epideictic rhetoric as “the spectator or one who 
sees,” θεωρός, and then notes that “The practitioner of rhetoric is also a theoros, a 
spectators of the available means of persuasion” (1996, 170). While epideictic is not the 
sole focus of rhetorical style, the identification of audience within epideictic rhetoric 
provides a stable basis for considering the interaction between rhetor and audience. 
Although some judgment of an orator’s skill doubtlessly occurs in epideictic rhetoric, the 
typical types of judgment that we see in judicial and deliberative rhetoric are suspended. 
Because the audience is not asked to dwell upon past events (judicial) or consider future 
courses of action (deliberative), we instead encounter an audience who is asked to be 
fully present within the moment, considering the words of the speaker and the effects that 
occur because of those words. To impress an audience and sway them with style creates a 
great benefit for an orator. Donovan Ochs argues that Demosthenes is victorious in his 
speeches because “the verbal portrait Demosthenes presented in his several attacks on the 
person of Aeschines more closely corresponded to the aesthetic standards of the time than 
did those of Aeschines” (1996, 144). Dionysius suggests as much in his discussion of 
Demosthenes, stating: 
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While the orator ought admittedly to aim at clarity, vividness, amplification and 
good rhythmical composition, he should aim above all at making his style capable 
of arousing emotion and evoking moral tone and assuming the force of live 
debate, because the art of persuasion depends most on these. The best means of 
achieving each of these qualities is not brevity, but the pleonastic use of certain 
words; which is what Demosthenes actually employs. (D.H. Dem. 455)73 
 
The aesthetic standards of a particular audience, as well as the performance of a 
particular speech can far outweigh the effects of clear, rational construction. One 
common critique of Isocrates, for example, is that because he was more frequently a 
logographer than performing speeches on his own, his style lacks the vocal patterning 
that can captivate an audience; Isocrates is best read. In contrast, Demosthenes’ use of 
pleonastic words demonstrates an awareness of the spaces in which he is performing 
speeches. Through pleonasm, Demosthenes not only serves to increase the vividness of a 
particular image but also to ensure that those images reach a wider audience in settings 
with potentially poor acoustics. 
 The features of a successful oratorical performance would likely need to consider 
the settings in which a speech occurs, an impact of style that perhaps went without saying 
in antiquity but might escape the notice of one reading a preserved text from that period. 
Haskins identifies the importance of considering performance when looking at works 
from antiquity. She illustrates the distinction between “muthos as an act of enunciation 
and epos as a residue of this act,” stating: 
                                                
73 οὐκέτι συνορῶντες ὅτι καὶ τῆς σαφηνείας δεῖ στοχαζεσθαι τὸν ῥήτορα καὶ τῆς ἐναργείας 
καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων εὐρυθµίας, ὑπὲρ ἅπαντα δὲ 
ταῦτα τοῦ παθητικήν τε καὶ ἠθικὴν καὶ ἐναγώνιον ποιεῖν τὴν λέξιν, ἐν οἷς ἐστιν ἡ πλείστη 
τοῦ πιθανοῦ µοῖρα. τούτων δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἑκάστην οὐχ ἡ βραχυλογία κράτιστα δύναται 
ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ πλεονασµὸς ἐνίων ὀνοµάτων, ᾧ καὶ ὁ Δηµοσθένης κέχρηται. (D.H. 
Dem. 455) 
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The performance of an authoritative speech-act in Homer is measured not by how 
well it fits the formula for a certain type of address [muthos] but how powerfully 
this action reverberates in the hearers, both those attending recitations of Homeric 
poetry and those within the epic itself. The “product” of performance is not a 
textual artifact; it is epos—the word designating the perceived effect of speech as 
well as its discursive fabric. (Haskins 2004, 69) 
 
In many ways, it may seem like the “residue” of a speech act is ineffable, simply 
something to marvel at once the performance has ceased. It calls to mind the electric 
sensation of a beautiful performance. And there may very well be qualities of rhetorical 
performances that escape ready identification and replication, but the concepts of 
visuality, vividness, and the actualization of mental images perhaps lead us to reach into 
that ether of inspiring performance outside form alone. 
 Kjeldsen states that “direct ocular rhetoric,” or rhetoric that calls upon visual 
images in the minds of an audience, serves to keep an audience from becoming bored, but 
also “to create understanding of what is being said by visually underscoring the meaning 
and the emotional appeals” of a particular speech act (2012, 134). Kjeldsen continues, 
saying that the value of visuality in style “is probably most prominent in the detailed and 
vivid illustration which makes events come alive before the eyes of the audience” (2012, 
135). Some of these illustrations are alive through descriptive language; others through 
calling to mind memories or ideas that are common among an audience; and more still 
that elicit an emotional response through many different means, including the kairotic 
conditions of a particular performance. This is where the vividness of style achieves its 
power. And rather than “frown upon eloquence,” Isocrates instead states, “[Men] should 
not, therefore, condemn these means by which one may gain advantage without sacrifice 
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of virtue, but rather those men who do wrong in their actions or who deceive by their 
speech and put eloquence to unjust uses” (Isoc. 3.1-2).74 
Analyzing the Vividness of Information 
I return now to Hill’s identification of vividness as a measurement for emotional 
response. Hill’s concept of vividness suggests that it is possible to develop a heuristic by 
which one can measure the potential effectiveness of information to elicit emotional 
response. As Hill describes, “vividness is a matter of degree,” so this chapter explores the 
scale from low, moderate, and high vividness as described or performed in Greek texts as 
well as the means by which Greek rhetoricians understood these stylistic tools to be 
effective. Through examining texts that describe the effects of style and emotional 
positioning of audience and speaker and analyzing how Demosthenes uses varying levels 
of vividness in On the Crown, I demonstrate how this heuristic of vividness allows for 
increased understanding of the ways in which style and audience are connected to 
concepts of visuality. 
Low Vividness 
 Low vividness in rhetorical performances results from ideas that do not require 
extended discussion, instead functioning as building blocks for more vivid ideas that 
activate higher levels of visualization within the minds of the speaker and the audience. 
Some of the “residue” of speech-acts that dwells within the audience probably owes its 
basic function of low vividness, but the features of those speeches are likely remembered 
                                                
74 “δυσκόλως ἔχουσι πρὸς τοὺς λόγους […]ὥστ᾽ οὐ κατηγορητέον τῶν πραγµάτων τούτων 
ἐστί, δι᾽ ὧν ἄν τις µετ᾽ ἀρετῆς πλεονεκτήσειεν, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπςν τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις 
ἐξαµαρτανόντων ἢ τοῖς λόγοις ἐξαπατῶντων καὶ µὴ δικαίως χρωµένων αὐτοῖς” (Isoc. 3.1-
2). 
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because of their higher levels of vividness. However, features such as discussion of 
context or events, generic description of conditions, and choice of oratorical style can 
impact the sustained vividness of a speech, and thus might be understood to be mildly 
vivid. 
In a contradiction to what he states elsewhere, Aristotle begins Book III of the 
Rhetoric by saying, “One should aim at nothing more in a speech than how to avoid 
exciting pain or pleasure” (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.5.1404a).75 In these introductory remarks, 
Aristotle also characterizes the audience as being in a “bad condition,” and he appears to 
regard the vividness of rhetorical performance as highly likely to sway this unskilled 
audience. Instead, he says, “Justice should consist in fighting the case with the facts 
alone, so that everything else that is beside demonstration is superfluous” (Aristot. Rh. 
3.1.5.1404a).76 Aristotle’s attitude toward style and audience here feels very different 
from the Aristotle who encourages “beautiful” metaphors later in the same book. 
Regardless of this inconsistency, Aristotle’s charge to present “the facts alone” 
demonstrates a low level of vividness in rhetorical style.  
In Demosthenes’ On the Crown, the orator defends himself from charges brought 
about by his political rival Aeschines, and instead argues that the man has done harm to 
the Athenian people through his associations with Philip of Macedon. Demosthenes 
argues, “And the man who was hand-in-glove with Philip, and helped him to win that 
blind confidence, who brought lying reports to Athens and deluded his fellow-citizens, 
                                                
75 “πλείω ζητεῖν περὶ τὸν λόγον ἢ ὡς µήτε λυπεῖν µήτε εὐφραίνειν” (Aristot. Rh. 
3.1.5.1404a). 
 
76 “δίκαιον γὰρ αὑτοῖς άγωνίζεσθαι τοῖς πράγµασιν, ὥστε τἆλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι 
πρείεργα ἐστίν” (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.5.1404a). 
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was this same Aeschines who to-day bewails the sorrows of the Thebans and recites their 
pitiful story, being himself guilty of those sorrows, guilty of the distresses of the 
Phocians, guilty of all the sufferings of every nation in Greece” (Dem. 18.41).77 While 
Demosthenes’ description here does relate to issues of emotion—he calls upon the sorrow 
of the Thebans, the Phocians, and of every nation in Greece—he avoids describing those 
sorrows in much detail at this point. Rather, he is preparing the audience to view 
Aeschines in a distrustful light making these general claims. 
The passage above occurs early in Demosthenes’ speech, and it clearly serves to 
ramp up the vividness of his defense. The orator is beginning to build vividness into his 
speech, and he is careful not to evoke too strong of emotions early. Similarly, as the 
orator closes his defense in the epilogue, he scales back the vividness of his speech, and 
moves from moderate or high levels of vividness to one that is less emotional and appeals 
to the rationality of his audience. For example, he says, “You must compare me with the 
orators of to-day; with yourself, for instance, or anyone you like: I exclude none. When 
the commonwealth was at liberty to choose the best policy, when there was a competition 
of patriotism open to all comers, I made better speeches than any other man, and all 
business was conducted by my resolutions, my statutes, my diplomacy” (Dem. 18.319-
320).78 After an impassioned plea to the Athenian Assembly to regard Aeschines as a 
                                                
77 “ὁ δὲ ταύτης τῆς πίστεως αὐτῷ συνεργὸς καὶ συναγωνιστής, καὶ ὁ δεῦρ᾿ ἀπαγγείλας τὰ 
ψευδῆ καὶ φενακίσας ὑµᾶς, οὗτός ἐσθ᾿ ὁ τὰ Θηβαίων ὀδυρόµενος νῦν πάθη καὶ διεξιὼν ὡς 
οἰκτρά, καὶ τούτων καὶ τῶν ἐν Φωκεῦσι κακῶν καὶ ὅσ᾿ ἄλλα πεπόνθασιν οἱ Ἕλληνες 
ἁπάντων αὐτὸς ὢν αἴτιος” (Dem. 18.40-41). 
 
78 “καὶ σὺ πρὸς τοὺς νῦν ὄρα µε ῥήτορας, πρὸς σαυτόν, πρὸς ὅντινα βούλει τῶν ἁπάντων· 
οὐδέν᾿ ἐξίσταµαι. ὧν, ὅτε µὲν τῇ πόλει τὰ βέλτισθ᾿ ἑλέσθαι παρῆν, ἐφαµίλλου τῆς εἰς τὴν 
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criminal, Demosthenes mellows his message in order to appeal to the rational faculties of 
an audience who has been swayed by the emotional and vivid fervor of his speech. In this 
sense, Demosthenes understands that as a rhetorical performance, he must be persuasive 
but leaving his audience in an emotionally agitated place could work against him. The 
denouement of the speech reflects his ability to reinforce his vivid appeals with logic. 
Another aspect of performance of style related to low levels of vividness is that of 
pacing in a speech. Demetrius discusses the use of periodic style as one that has a clear 
teleological purpose, which he says creates an image in the mind of movement toward an 
identifiable goal: 
For the very use of the word “period” implies that it has had a beginning at one 
point, will end at another, and is speeding towards a definite goal, like runners 
sprinting from the starting place. For at the very beginning of their race the end of 
the course is already before their eyes. Hence the name “period,” an image drawn 
from paths which go round and are in a circle. (Demetrius 11)79 
 
Demetrius enacts the periodic style here in his description, clearly setting up a “goal” for 
his discussion of periods, naming that goal, and moving logically to reach that goal. This 
feature of vividness is one of rhythmic patterning, setting a verbal pace and approach to 
an idea in a way that the audience can expect what to hear. Demetrius refers to the period 
as “exclusively verbal,” comparing it to the enthymeme, which he calls a “form of 
reasoning” (Demetrius 32). The degree of vividness that a period creates has more to do 
                                                                                                                                            
πατρίδ᾿ εὐνοίας ἐν κοινῷ πᾶσι κειµένης, ἐγὼ κράτιστα λέγων ἐφαινόµην, καὶ τοῖς ἐµοῖς καὶ 
ψηφίσµασι καὶ νόµοις καὶ πρεσβείαις ἅπαντα διῳκεῖτο“ (Dem. 18.319-320). 
 
79 εὐθὺς γὰρ ὁ τὴν περίοδον λέγων ἐµφαίνει, ὅτι ἦρκταὶ ποθεν καὶ ἀποτελευτήσει ποι καὶ 
ἐπείγεται εἴς τι τέλος, ὥσπερ οἱ δροµεῖς ἀφεθέντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων συνεµφαίνεται τῇ ἀρχῇ 
τοῦ δρόµου τὸ τέλος ὥσπερ οἱ δροµεῖς ἀφεθέντες· καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων συνεµφαίνεται τῇ ἀρχῇ 
τοῦ δρόµου τὸ τέλος. ἔνθεν καὶ περίοδος ὠνοµάσθη, ἀπεικασθεῖσα ταῖς ὁδοῖς ταῖς 
κυκλοειδέσι καὶ περιωδευµέναις. (Demetrius 11) 
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with the structuring of an audience experience than intentional creation of vivid 
experience. Instead, Demetrius describes periodic style as “the stones which support and 
hold together the roof which encircles them” as opposed to “stones which are simply 
thrown out near one another” in disjointed style (Demetrius 10).80 
 Regarding forms of speech, Demetrius also discusses brevity of proverbs and 
maxims, which contain large amounts of information in short statements. While the 
potential for high vividness might exist within the brevity of a maxim or proverb, 
Demetrius refers compares these rhetorical devices “just as seeds [that] contain the 
potential for whole trees” (Demetrius 10).81 The usefulness of a seed is as something that 
will grow to something much larger than its beginning size, but alone it does not elicit a 
sustained response. However, a seed is easy to carry, just as a maxim or proverb can 
spread easily because of its brevity. 
 Much of what constitutes information of low vividness are the building blocks of 
rhetorical image making: narrations of events, the arrangement and pacing of 
information, commonly held beliefs or logical patterns, and the like. When considering 
what constitutes low levels of vividness, it is important to consider the ways in which 
those elements might assist in achieving greater vividness at other points in the speech or 
the ways in which elements might temper the intensity of more vivid information just as a 
blacksmith might quench and temper hot steel to produce stronger material. 
 
                                                
80 “ἔοικε γοῦν τὰ µὲν περιοδικὰ κῶλα τοῖς λίθοις τοῖς ἀντερείδουσι τὰς περιφερεῖς στέγας 
καὶ συνέχοθσι τὰ δὲ τῆς διαλελυµένης ἑρµηνείας διερριµµένοις πλησίον λίθοις µόνον καὶ οὐ 
συγκειµένοις” (Demetrius 10). 
 
81 “καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς σπέρµασιν δένδρων ὅλων δυνάµεις” (Demetrius 10). 
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Moderate Vividness 
 As the vividness of information increases, the discussion of the style takes on 
more emotional components. While still referring to form, Demetrius discusses the 
emotional and imagistic effects that grand style has with its long syllable placement: 
For a long syllable has in its very nature something grand, and its use at the 
beginning [in grand style] is immediately striking, while as a conclusion it leaves 
the listener with a sense of grandeur. Certainly we all uniquely remember and are 
stirred by words which comes first and last, while those in the middle have less 
impact, as though they were obscured or hidden among the others. (Demetrius 
39)82 
 
The emphasis on the patterns in which words are spoken as well as the words themselves 
contributes to higher degrees of vividness, and thus greater emotional and imagistic 
effect. Demetrius argues that the “elevation of the language virtually corresponds to the 
size of the clause,” and the length of particular styles suits particular characterizations; 
“That is why the hexameter is called heroic, because its length suits heroes” (Demetrius 
5).83 Demetrius’ comments on style here necessarily call attention to the relationship 
among speaker, audience, and performance. The discussion of language is not as 
something that is inert but instead enacted and performed. Heroic style is heroic because 
of the experience of hearing it rather than examining the text as disconnected from 
speech. 
                                                
82 φὐσει γὰρ µεγαλεῖον ἡ µακρά, καὶ προλεγοµένη τε πλήσσει εὐθὺς καὶ ἀπολήγουσα ἐν 
µεγάλῳ τινὶ καταλείπει τὸν ἀκούοντα πάντες γοῦν ἰδίως τῶν τε πρώτων µνηµονεύοµεν καὶ 
τῶν ὑστάτων, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων κινούµεθα, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν µεταξὴ ἔλαττον ὥσπερ 
ἐγκρυπτοµένων ἢ ἐνφανιζοµένων. (Demetrius 39) 
 
83 “σκεδὸν γὰρ τῷ µεγέθει τοῦ κώλου συνεξῆρται καὶ ὁ λόγος. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ <τὸ> 
ἑξάµετρον ἡρῷόν τε ὀνοµάζεται ὑπὸ τοῦ µήκους καὶ πρέπον ἥρωσιν” (Demetrius 5). 
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 Aristotle identifies poets as the first artisans of style, “for words are imitations, 
and the voice also, which of all our parts is best adapted for imitation” (Aristot. Rh. 
3.1.8.1404a).84 Imitation as a moderate form of vividness makes sense within the context 
of vivacity, energeia, which is a result of images called into the mind through linguistic 
association or description. The instantiation of energeia through metaphor has been a 
common topic of visuality in this dissertation because of its reliance on visual imagery 
related to concepts in order to most effectively reach an audience.  
 Similar stylistic choices that can be placed within the realm of moderate degrees 
of vividness include ekphrasistic descriptions to encourage visualized practice, the use of 
specific images related to the topic of a speech, or crafting one’s speech in response to an 
anticipated emotional state of an audience. These stylistic choices might not elicit a high 
level of emotional or vivid imagery in the minds of an audience, but they do capitalize on 
the conditions of a speech act. Demetrius also identifies the subject of a speech as 
encouraging a certain level of response in an audience: 
Grandeur also comes from the subject, for example when the subject is a great 
and famous battle on land or sea, or when earth or heaven is the theme. For the 
man who listens to an impressive subject immediately supposes that the speaker 
too is impressive—mistakenly, for we must consider not what but how he says it, 
since an unimpressive treatment of an impressive topic produces 
inappropriateness. (Demetrius 75).85 
 
                                                
84 “τὰ γὰρ ὀνόµατα µιµήµατα ἐστίν, ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πἀντων µιµητικώτατον τῶν 
µορίων ἡµῖν” (Aristot. Rh. 3.1.8.1404a). 
 
85 Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐν πράγµασι τὸ µεγαλοπρεπές, ἂν µεγάλη καὶ διαπρεπὴς πεζοµαχία ἢ 
ναυµαχία, ἢ περὶ οὐρανοῦ ἢ περὶ γῆς λόγος· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ µεγάλου ἀκούων πράγµατος εὐθὺς 
καὶ <τὸν> λέγοντα οἴεται µεγάλως λέγειν, πλανώµενος· δεῖ γᾶρ οὐ τὰ λεγόµενα σκοπεῖν, 
ἀλλὰ πῶς λέγεται· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ µεγάλα µικρῶς λέγοντα ἀπρεπές <τι> ποιεῖν τῷ πράγµατι. 
(Demetrius 75) 
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In this excerpt, the effects of vivid information begin to take on that high level of energy 
that Socrates fears. That the subject alone could inspire a sense of grandeur in an 
audience and a high regard for the speaker on that subject signals a wariness of the soul-
leading, psychagogic properties of vivid language. However, Demetrius notes that choice 
of subject alone does not guarantee successful emotional arousal for an audience, so there 
must be a greater force present in one’s speech to succeed in actualizing imagery where 
subject alone cannot go. 
 Demosthenes often employs moderate levels of vividness in his speech. These 
moments allow the orator to convey emotional or detailed information for an audience 
while not exciting too strong of an emotional response. Demosthenes also uses these 
moments of moderate vividness to prepare or condition his audience for a particular 
response. For example, to instill pride in the Athenian city-state, Demosthenes describes 
the city’s history, “To serve an honourable ambition and the common welfare of Greece 
she had expended her treasure and the lives of her sons far more generously than any 
other Hellenic state fighting only for itself” (Dem. 18.66-67).86 In this moment of the 
speech, Demosthenes is comparing the virtues of Athens with the acts of Philip, “a man 
reared at Pella, that a mean and insignificant city” in order to emphasize the tendency of 
Athenians to regard themselves as superior to other Greeks, and he honors the 
Assembly’s decisions to resist the surrender of Athens to Philip (Dem. 18.68-69). 
Demosthenes interweaves a variety of images in his description, which serves to activate 
a wide range of possible images for his audience. By associating those images with pride 
                                                
86 “ἀεὶ περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιµῆς καὶ δόξης ἀγωνιζοµένην τὴν πατρίδα, καὶ πλείω καὶ χρήµατα 
καὶ σώµατ᾿ ἀνηλωκυῖαν ὑπὲρ φιλοτιµίας καὶ τῶν πᾶσι συµφερόντων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων 
ὑπὲρ αὑτῶν ἀνηλώκασιν ἕκαστοι” (Dem. 18.66-67). 
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for Athens and disdain for Philip/Pella/Aeschines, Demosthenes brings Aeschines’ shame 
to light for the audience and supports his attempts to discredit his prosecutor. 
High Vividness 
 Whether the use of high degrees of vividness is acceptable is a frequent debate 
among Greek rhetoricians. Isocrates states that orators “are not permitted the use of such 
devices,” and only poets can “bewitch their listeners” through speech that takes 
advantage of rhythm, harmony, and emotion (Isoc. 9.19). Demetrius speaks also to the 
effect of rhythm as means to elicit an image, quoting Χenophon: 
Sometimes, then, a long clause may be appropriate for the reasons given, at other 
times a short one, for instance when our subject is small, as in Xenophon’s 
account of the Greeks’ arrival at the river Teleboas, “this river was not large, it 
was beautiful however.” The short, broken rhythm brings into relief both the 
smallness of the river and its charm. (Demetrius 6).87 
 
What brings this use of rhythm to a higher level of vividness, however, is its use as a 
variation on style. Χenophon is not using this short, broken rhythm throughout his 
performance, instead using it sparingly to call attention to particular images. The use of 
this syncopation of delivery allows for an actualization of image through bringing new 
rhythmic life into a performance. In this moment, Χenophon’s description more readily 
calls to mind the image of the small river through that rhythmic variation. Dionysius also 
identifies the importance of musicality and rhythm in creating effective oratory: 
Consider, if in composing the most beautiful melody for vocal or instrumental 
performance one paid no attention to rhythm, could the resulting music possibly 
be endurable? And what if the performer paid due attention to both of these, but 
persisted in the same melody and rhythm without any change or even decoration, 
                                                
87 Μαρκοῦ µὲν δὴ κώλου καιρὸς γίνοιτ᾽ ἄν ποτε διὰ ταῦτα· γίνοιτο δ᾽ἄν ποτε καὶ βραχέος, 
οἷον ἤτοι µικρόν τι ἡµῶν λεγόντων, ὡς ὁ Ξενοφῶν φησιν, ὅτι ἀφίκοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐπὶ 
τ῀ον Τηλεβόαν ποταµόν· ῾οὗτον δε ἦν µέγας µὲν οὔ, καλὸς δὲ.᾽ τῇ γὰρ µικρότητι καὶ 
ἀποκοπῇ τοῦ ῥυθµοῦ συνανεφάνη καὶ ἡ µικρότης τοῦ ποταµοῦ καὶ χάρις. (Demetrius 6) 
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would he not destroy the whole merit of the piece? Again, if he aimed at variation 
too, but clearly took no thought for propriety in relation to his subject, would not 
all his efforts in other parts be fruitless? (D.H. Dem. 48)88 
 
Demosthenes, Dionysius reports, recognizes the importance of variability and sufficient 
decoration in his speeches. It is through this effect that he can create vivid speeches for 
his audience.  
One of the most interesting forms of highly vivid information is the use of 
onomatopoeic words to call into one’s mind the sound that the word represents. In Greek, 
onomatopoeia is referred to as, “τὰ δὲ πεποιηµένα ὀνόµατα,” “that which makes its name” 
(Demetrius 94). Demetrius explains: 
They create grandeur by their resemblance to inarticulate sounds, and above all by 
their novelty. The speaker is not using existing words but words which are only 
then coming into existence, and at the same time the creation of a new word is 
thought clever, as though it were the creation of a new usage. So the creator of 
new words is like those who originally created language. (Demetrius 94-95)89 
 
Once again, the concept of novelty and imaginative use of language result in the 
actualization of vivid imagery. Presenting highly vivid information has less to do with the 
selection of specific material that might elicit emotional response as it does performing 
                                                
88 φέρε γάρ, εἲ τις ᾠδαῖς ἢ κρούµασιν ὀργάνων τὸ κάλλιστον ἐντείνας µέλος ῥυθµοῦ µηδένα 
ποιοῖτο λόγον, ἔσθ᾽ ὅπως ἄν τις ἀνάσχοιτο τῆς τοιαύτης µουσικῆς; τί δέ; εἰ τούτωνµὲν 
ἀµφοτέρων προνοηθείη µετρίως, µένοι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς µελῳδίας καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ῥυθµῶν, 
οὐδὲν ἐξαλλάττων οὐδὲ ποκίλλων, ἆρ᾽ οὐχ ὅλον ἂν διαφθείροι τὸ ἀγαθόν; εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτου 
στοχάσαιτο, µηδεµίαν δὲ πρόνοιαν ἔχων φαίνοιτο τοῦ πρέποντος τοῖς ὑποκειµένοις, οὐκ 
ἀνόνητος αὐτῷ πᾶς ὁ περὶ ἐξεῖνα ἔσται πόνος; (D.H. Dem. 48) 
 
89 Τὰ δὲ πεποιηµένα ὀνόµατα ὁρίζονται µὲν τὰ κατὰ µίµησιν ἐκφερόµενα πάθους ἢ 
πράγµατος, οἷον ὡς τὸ ‘σίζε’ καὶ τὸ ‘λάπτοντες,’ ποιεῖ δὲ [µάλιστα] µεγαλοπρέπειαν διὰ τὸ 
οἷον ψόφοις ἐοικέναι καὶ µάλιστα τῷ ξένῳ· οὐ γὰρ ὄντα ὀνόµατα λέγει ἀλλὰ τότε γινόµενα, 
καὶ ἅµα σοφόν τι φαίνεται ὀνόµατος καινοῦ γένεσις, οἷον συνηθείας· ἔοικεν γοῦν <ὁ> 
ὀνοµατουργῶν τοῖς πρώτοις υεµένοις τὰ ὀνόµατα. (Demetrius 94-95) 
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within the moment, considering and responding to a dynamic audience that clearly plays 
a major role in the ultimate message that is communicated. 
 Dionysius imagines the audience listening to Demosthenes, whom he regards as 
achieving the pinnacle of Greek rhetorical style: 
And I have often wondered what on earth those men who actually heard him 
make these speeches could have felt. For if we, who are so far removed in time 
and unaffected by the events, are so carried away and overpowered that we follow 
wherever the speech leads us, how must the Athenians and the rest of the Greeks 
have been excited at the time by the orator addressing them on live and personal 
issues, using all his prestige to display his own feelings and to bare his soul, and 
adding beauty and colour to every word with the appropriate delivery, of which 
art he was, as everyone agrees, the most brilliant exponent. (D.H. Dem. 22)90 
 
The most vivid information, then, seems to be the most responsive to the current 
environment. An orator equipped with clear understanding of the relation among content, 
form, and audience and experienced with performing and embodying rhetorical skills, 
will find themselves crafting a speech, be it judicial, deliberative, or epideictic, that calls 
upon the skillful use of verbal images to “bring-before-the-eyes” of their audience (and 
themselves) that which is most effective to their purpose.  
 In one of his most vivid moments, Demosthenes crafts an image of a ship battered 
by a storm. In this vivid metaphor, he calls upon the Athenians to consider with a more 
readily identifiable image the position in which he finds himself trying to defend his 
actions in the Assembly that Aeschines claims have been negative for Athens: 
                                                
90 καὶ δή ποτε καὶ ἐνεθυµήθην, τί ποτε τοὺς τότε ἀνθρώπους ἀκούοντας αὐτοῦ λέγοντος 
ταῦτα πάσχειν εἰκὸς ἦν. ὅπου γὰρ ἡµεῖς οἱ τοσοῦτον ἀπηρτηµένοι τοῖς χρόνοις καὶ οὐθὲν 
πρὸς τὰ πράγµατα πεπονθότες οὕτως ὑπαγόµεθα καὶ κρατούµεθα καὶ, ὅποι ποτ᾽ ἂν ἡµὰς ὁ 
λόγος ἄγῃ, πορευόµεθα, πῶς τότε Ἀθηναῖοί τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες ἤγοντο ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς 
ἐπὶ τῶν ἀληθινῶν τε καὶ ἰδίων ἀγώνων, αὐτοῦ λέγοντος ἐκείνου τὰ ἐαυτοῦ µετὰ τῆς 
ἀξιώσεως, ἧς εἶχε, τὴν αὐτοπάθειαν καὶ τὸ παράστηµα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδεικνθµένου, 
κοσµοῦντος ἅπαντα καὶ χρωµατίζοντος τῇ πρεπούςῃ ὑποκρίσει, ἧς δεινόντατος ἀσκητὴς 
ἐγένετο, ὡς ἅπαντές τε ὁµολογοῦσι καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ἰδεῖν ἔστι τῶν λόγων. (D.H. Dem. 22) 
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If the hurricane that burst upon us had been too strong, not for us alone, but for 
every Hellenic state,—what then? As if a shipowner, who had done everything in 
his power for a prosperous voyage, who had equipped his craft with every 
appliance he could think of to ensure her safety, should encounter a great storm, 
and then, because his tackle was overstrained or even shattered, should be accused 
of the crime of shipwreck! “But,” he might say, “I was not at the helm”—nor was 
I in command of the army—“and I could not control fortune, but fortune controls 
all.” (Dem. 18.194)91 
 
In the face of Aeschines’ charges that Demosthenes misled the Athenians in his 
recommendations and caused them difficulties, the orator speaks to the inability of any 
person to predict the future. By describing this concept through the parallel imagery of a 
ship tossed about in a storm, Demosthenes encourages his audience to visualize the 
uncontrollable circumstances related to Philip’s campaign against Greece, and also calls 
upon their fears of being a victim of the ship’s mishap. By creating a moment in which 
the Athenian Assembly understands the orator’s lack of control, he then is able to turn 
Aeschines’ argument back, and challenge the prosecutor to explain why he did not 
prevent the same events if he were in possession of such knowledge. By encouraging the 
audience to sympathize with him, visualize a specific, intense image, and then deflect the 
charges against him, Demosthenes demonstrates the ways in which this vivid information 
can be used persuasively. 
Conclusion 
 As this chapter has demonstrated, the interconnection of vivid description, 
emotional appeals, and use of appropriate style can have high levels of impact upon an 
                                                
91 εἰ δ᾿ ὁ συµβὰς σκηπτὸς µὴ µόνον ἡµῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων µείζων 
γέγονε, τί χρὴ ποιεῖν; ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ναύκληρον, πάντ᾿ ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ πράξαντα, καὶ πᾶσι 
κατασκευάσαντα τὸ πλοῖον ἀφ᾿ ὧν ὑπελάµβανεν σωθήσεσθαι, εἶτα χειµῶνι χρησάµενον καὶ 
πονησάντων αὐτῷ τῶν σκευῶν ἢ καὶ συντριβέντων ὅλως, τῆς ναυαγίας αἰτιῷτο. ἀλλ᾿ οὔτ᾿ 
ἐκυβέρνων τὴν ναῦν, φήσειεν ἄν, ὥσπερ οὐδ᾿ ἐστρατήγουν ἐγώ, οὔτε τῆς τύχης κύριος ἦν, 
ἀλλ᾿ ἐκείνη τῶν πάντων. (Dem. 18.194) 
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audience’s experience of a rhetorical performance. Greek concepts of emotions being 
socially and visually constructed also speak to the effects of successfully tailoring 
messages and images for an audience. Through Hill’s concept of the scalability of vivid 
information, this chapter has provided a framework for understanding the degrees by 
which an orator can employ that sensory and emotional information to achieve rhetorical 
success. Russell says that for an orator to be successful in one’s craft, “There is a good 
deal of understanding, in practice, of the organic connection between form and content” 
(1981, 130). I would add to that practice the importance of understanding and using the 
organic connections between speaker and audience—an orator must, above all, be aware 
of the ways in which language, vision, and audience interact and the modes by which the 
content of a rhetorical performance can be impacted by style and emotion.  
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CHAPTER 5 
APPLYING CONCEPTS OF VISUALITY AND STYLE TO ON THE EMBASSY 
This chapter uses the analytical frameworks developed in the previous three 
chapters to explore Demosthenes’ speech before the Athenian assembly, On the Embassy, 
in which he makes a failed attempt to convict Aeschines of crimes against Athens during 
peace negotiations with Philip II of Macedon. Through this multi-layered analysis of On 
the Embassy, I demonstrate the ways in which the analytical frameworks using language 
cues, audience memories and ideologies, and vividness of information can contribute to a 
more complex and thorough understanding of the ways in which rhetorical performances 
invite audiences to visualize the content of a speech and the effect those images have on 
the reception of that performance. While the judicial failure of On the Embassy might 
make Demosthenes’ speech seem less useful for an analysis of successful use of visuality 
and social awareness, I argue that the speech not only provides a breadth of tactics to 
employ visuality as discussed in previous chapters of this dissertation, but it also 
demonstrates the ways in which the arguments presented in the case establish a visual 
precedent for On the Crown, which ultimately aid in that later speech’s success. 
In this judicial speech, which precedes Demosthenes’ more famous and successful 
speech On the Crown by 13 years, Demosthenes sets the groundwork for many of his 
later arguments against his political rival, Aeschines. In the Loeb translators’ introduction 
to On the Embassy, C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince argue, “The speech, though technically 
forensic, was composed for political purposes—to bring discredit upon a policy and a 
party, as well as to convict a culprit of a definite defense. For this reason it is discursive, 
and often irrelevant to the indictment; […] Yet the effect is cumulative” (1939b, 244). 
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Demosthenes employs many of the tactics he later uses in On the Crown, but the 
execution of those skills in On the Embassy is less effective. It is apparent that the orator 
brings much more skill to his judicial rhetoric in the later speech. According to Vince and 
Vince, the trial resulted in the acquittal of Aeschines, “by a small plurality of thirty 
votes,” and they report, “the jury was not altogether well disposed to Demosthenes” 
(1939b, 233). In his biography of the orator, Plutarch says, “The political attitude of 
Demosthenes was manifest even while peace still lasted, for he would let no act of the 
Macedonian pass uncensured, but on every occasion kept rousing and inflaming the 
Athenians against him” (Plut. Dem. XVI.1).92 As On the Embassy demonstrates, 
Demosthenes clearly distrusts Aeschines, and the not-so-subtle attempts to discredit his 
political rival may have not settled well with the Assembly, which could also explain the 
lack of judicial success. 
Historical Background 
 Demosthenes delivered this prosecutorial speech in 343 BCE, approximately three 
years after an Athenian embassy had travelled to Macedonia to negotiate a peace treaty 
with Philip. The Macedonian ruler had been waging a military campaign against northern 
and central Greece, and after capturing Amphipolis, which was an Athenian colony, 
Philip informed Athens that he was willing to discuss a peace treaty with the city-state. 
According to C. D. Adams, “The Athenians, discouraged by the failure of their weak 
attempts to check his advance during the past ten years, sent ambassadors to Macedonia” 
(1919, 158). Demosthenes and Aeschines were members of that initial embassy; the 
                                                
92 “Ἡ δὲ τοῦ Δηµοσθένους πολιτεία φανερὰ µὲν ἦν ἔτι καὶ τῆς εἰρήνης ὑπαρχου´σης, οὐδὲν 
ἐῶντος ἀνεπιτίµητον τῶν πραττοµένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Μακεδόνος, ἀλλ᾽ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ ταράττοντος 
τοὺς Ἀθηνάιους καὶ διακαίοντος ἐπὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον” (Plut. Dem. XVI.1). 
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orator describes how Aeschines had an apparent change of heart during the second day of 
the embassy’s negotiations and instead of protesting the proposed peace treaty, Aeschines 
sided with another embassy member, Philocrates. The negotiations ultimately resulted in 
the Peace of Philocrates, and offered protections for Athens and her allies. 
 The subject of Demosthenes’ speech here regards the conduct of the second 
embassy to Philip, at which time the Athenian representatives attempted to secure 
specific guarantees from the Macedonians that had not been specified in the original 
treaty. After considerable delay, which Demosthenes claims Aeschines assisted in 
causing, the treaty was signed. However, in the duration between the first and second 
embassies, the Macedonian forces had conquered the Thebans and Phocians, who may 
have been protected as allies of Athens had the original peace been inclusive of those 
cities. Philocrates, the author of the original peace treaty, “had so shamelessly made it 
evident that he was in the paid service of Philip, that he had been forced to flee from the 
city in order to escape the death penalty” (Adams 1919, 160). In light of this 
development, Demosthenes argues that Aeschines had been in conspiracy with 
Philocrates and is thus equally guilty of betraying Athens and its allies. On the Embassy 
represents Demosthenes attempts to convince his peers of Aeschines guilt based largely 
on speculation. To do this, the orator must persuade the Assembly to “see things” from 
his point of view; this prosecutorial strategy thus allows for extensive attempts to 
encourage visualized experiences and images in the speech. 
Analysis One: Language Cues 
 In Chapter 2, I argued that Greek rhetorical theory has its basis in visuality and 
that the visual nature of rhetoric can be seen through an analysis of the language that an 
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orator uses to discuss the art of persuasion and to invite an audience to visualize the 
content of a speech. Through a discussion of Greek verbs of seeing and knowing (ὁράω, 
θεωρέω, δηλόω, etc.), I identify those language cues that invite an audience to visualize 
what is being said. These invitations can occur through a variety of means, and in the 
analysis that follows, I consider how Demosthenes uses the following language tactics to 
visualize what he is saying: using visual language directly to invite an audience to 
perceive the speech; asking the audience to imagine the content of the speech; and adding 
clarity to the concepts that he discusses in the prosecution. 
Perceiving the Speech 
 In his first remarks, Demosthenes activates the sensory experience for his 
audience by describing the actions that have preceded his speech: “Citizens of Athens, I 
do not doubt that you are all pretty well aware that this trial has been the centre of keen 
partisanship and active canvassing, for you saw the people who were accosting and 
annoying you just now at the casting of lots” (Dem.19.1).93 The verb Demosthenes uses 
here is ᾐσθῆσθαι, to perceive with all the senses; by initiating his speech through calling 
upon the actions that the audience has just previously witnessed, Demosthenes activates the 
Assembly’s sense perceptions and pairs the activity that was witnessed with the content of 
the speech he is about to deliver.  
 While his introductory statement asks his audience to consider what they have just 
previously perceived, another feature of Demosthenian rhetoric occurs when he introduces 
an outside speech or policy to be read aloud. In those moments, it is common for him to 
                                                
93 “Ὅση µέν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, σπουδὴ περὶ τουτονὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ παραγγελία γέγονε, 
σχεδὸν οἶµαι πάντας ὑµᾶς ᾐσθῆσθαι, ἑορακότας ἄρτι τοὺς ὅτ᾿ ἐκληροῦσθ᾿ ἐνοχλοῦντας καὶ 
προσιόντας ὑµῖν” (Dem. 19.1). 
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state that his audience will see the text’s relation to the information he presents. For 
example, the first textual evidence that Demosthenes supplies in his performance is the 
letter written by Aeschines; when instructing the letter to be read aloud, he says, “You will 
observe that it agrees exactly with my description” (Dem. 19.38).94 The verb used here is 
σποπεῖθ, which is a verb of abstract sight; here, he asks his audience to consider in visual 
terms the content of the evidence that he presents. The frequent use of this verb when 
introducing texts situates a piece of textual evidence as something that is viewable to the 
mind’s eye and encourages the audience to give it fuller consideration because they are 
indirectly seeing the words that are read to them.  
 Similarly, Demosthenes invites his audience to view the speeches of his 
opponents, this time in an unfavorable light. For this invitation to perceive, Demosthenes 
uses the more direct ὄψεσθε, which is a future-tense conjugation of the verb ὁράω, to see: 
—and you will see how glibly they will testify. You must not notice what a fine 
loud voice he has, and what a poor voice I have. If you are wise, you must not treat 
this trial as a competition of forensic eloquence; but in regard to a dishonourable 
and perilous catastrophe, cast back upon the guilty the dishonour that attaches to it, 
after reviewing transactions that lie within the knowledge of you all. (Dem. 19.217-
218)95 
 
By casting the words of his opponents in a negative light and raising attention to the ways 
in which those individuals will use their oratorical skill to override Demosthenes’ speech, 
he attempts not only to discredit his opponents but also to argue that grand sounding 
                                                
94 “καὶ σκοπεῖθ᾿ ὅτι τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, ὃν διεξελήλυθ᾿ ἐγώ” (Dem. 19.38). 
 
95 ὄψεσθε δ᾿ ὡς ἑτοίµως αὐτῷ µαρτυρήσουσιν· µηδέ γ᾿ εἰ καλὸν καὶ µέγα οὗτος φθέγξεται, 
µηδ᾿ εἰ φαῦλον ἐγώ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ῥητόρων οὐδὲ λόγων κρίσιν ὑµᾶς τήµερον, εἴπερ εὖ φρονεῖτε, 
προσήκει ποιεῖν, ἀλλ᾿ ὑπὲρ πραγµάτων αἰσχρῶς καὶ δεινῶς ἀπολωλότων τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν 
αἰσχύνην εἰς τοὺς αἰτίους ἀπώσασθε, τὰ πεπραγµένα, ἃ πάντες ἐπίστασθε, ἐξετάσαντες. 
(Dem. 19.217-218) 
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speech might mask the truth of his own less dynamic oratorical style. The contrast 
between σκοπέω and ὁράω, between verbs of theoretical and actual seeing, invites the 
audience to view these two speech acts as accomplishing very different tasks. 
Demosthenes hopes that his audience will see the ways in which textual evidence 
supports his claims, but he argues assuredly that they will be able to view the attempts to 
persuade through performative measures alone. In doing so, he not only invites the 
audience to experience those moments as visually cogent, but also plays upon their 
potential distrust of rhetoric. By suggesting to the audience that Aeschines believes he 
can gain their favor through impressiveness of voice, Demosthenes likens that 
performance to nothing more than a cheap trick to mask the truth, a fear that hearkens to 
discussions of Sophistic rhetoric as manipulative attempts to win whatever case rather 
than speak for truth and justice. 
One of the central considerations that Demosthenes asks of his audience is that 
they “fix [their] minds” on whether Aeschines’ actions “purposely wasted and threw 
away any chances that came to the embassy of saving the Phocians” (Dem. 19.30).96 
Vince and Vince translate the phrase “σποπεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν,” to see (abstractly) and to see 
(directly), as “fix your minds” due to the allusion of these verbs of seeing to placing all of 
one’s attention on a particular image. This phrase encapsulates the ideas present in asking 
an audience to perceive the content of a speech and inviting them to consider the effect of 
the words presented to them as something that is potentially visible. It’s a concept that 
rhetoricians such as Aristotle call upon in their descriptions of rhetoric as “an ability, in 
                                                
96 “τοῦτο δὴ δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν, εἰ ὅσα τῆς Φωκέων σωτηρίας ἐπὶ τὴν πρεσβείαν ἧκε, 
ταῦθ᾿” (Dem. 19.30). 
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each [particular] case, to see the available means of persuasion” (trans. Kennedy, Aristot. 
Rh. 1.2.1.1355b).97 It also signifies the invitation by an orator for an audience to imagine 
the images that are created through discourse. Rather than regarding his audience as 
passive recipients of the rhetorical performance, Demosthenes encourages them to 
examine the images and ideas that he discusses, and in doing so, represents an attitude 
that audiences are active and dynamic members of rhetorical performances. They can see 
what is discussed through means of their own visualized mental images that the orator 
places before them or invites. 
Imagination and Performance 
 As discussed in Chapter 2, Hawhee argues that rhetorical vision “occurs on the 
part of the audience as a result of the ‘bundle’ of ideas contained in the images” (2011, 
155). The role of imagination in rhetorical performance is in referring to and describing 
the mental images that occur in hand with the topics under consideration. For 
Demosthenes, the use of imaginative descriptions and vision-based vocabulary in those 
descriptions allows him to activate greater emphasis on the effects of Aeschines’ 
supposed misconduct. In the introduction, he asks his audience to imagine not only the 
actions of Aeschines but those of any man as they would result in similar political 
conditions: “Reflect rather that, if any man soever, placed by you in the position he filled, 
and trusted to deal with the occasions that arose, had taken hire, and had sought to deceive 
and mislead you as Aeschines did, he would have brought about exactly the same disaster 
                                                
97 “ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δὐναµις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόµενον πιθανόν” 
(Aristot. Rh.1.2.1.1355b). 
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as Aeschines” (Dem. 19.29-30).98 This strategy serves to deflect the audience’s potential 
inclination toward the character of Aeschines and instead to supply a generic “man” to 
the events that transpired. By asking his audience to literally picture (ὁρᾶν) a generic 
figure, he invites them to actively imagine the actions of the scene and the account that 
follows. 
 In contrast to asking his audience to imagine the perpetrator of the crimes as a 
generic individual, later in his speech, Demosthenes summons a mental image of his 
peers in the Assembly failing to view the treacherous actions of the guilty and themselves 
having “such dullness of hearing, such darkness of vision” in regarding the guilty parties 
that he must present his case (Dem. 19.227). The passage also includes the suggestion 
that Philip as co-conspirator with Aeschines, he possesses an apparent panoptic 
awareness of his cohort’s actions at Athens: 
It is shocking and scandalous, men of Athens, that Philip has such an acute 
perception of the fidelity or treachery of the men who have made subservience to 
him their policy, that they all expect that nothing they do even in Athens will escape 
the master’s eye, as though he stood at their very elbow, and that they must needs 
choose their private friends and enemies in obedience to his wishes; while those 
whose lives are devoted to your service, and who covet and have never betrayed the 
honour that you can bestow, encounter in you such dullness of hearing, such 
darkness of vision, that here am I to-day contending on equal terms with these 
pernicious persons, even in a court well acquainted with the whole history. (Dem. 
19.226-227)99 
                                                
98 “ἀλλ᾿ ἐκεῖν᾿ ὁρᾶν, ὅτι ὅντιν᾿ ἂν ὑµεῖς εἰς ταύτην τὴν τάξιν κατεστήσατε καὶ τῶν 
συµβάντων καιρῶν ἐποιήσατε κύριον, οὗτος, εἴπερ ὥσπερ οὗτος ἐβουλήθη µισθώσας αὑτὸν 
ἐξαπατᾶν ὑµᾶς καὶ φενακίζειν, τῶν ἴσων αἴτιος ἦν ἂν κακῶν ὅσωνπερ καὶ οὗτος” (Dem. 
19.29-30). 
 
99 οὐκοῦν δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ σχέτλιον τοῖς µὲν τὰ Φιλίππου πράγµαθ᾿ ᾑρηµένοις 
θεραπεύειν οὕτως ἀκριβῆ τὴν παρ᾿ ἐκείνου πρὸς ἑκάτερ᾿ αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσθ᾿ ἕκαστον, 
ὥσπερ ἂν παρεστηκότος αὐτοῦ, µηδ᾿ ὧν ἂν ἐνθαδὶ πράξῃ µηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι λήσειν, ἀλλὰ 
φίλους τε νοµίζειν οὓς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοκῇ καὶ µὴ φίλους ὡσαύτως, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑµᾶς ζῶσι καὶ 
τῆς παρ᾿ ὑµῶν τιµῆς γλιχοµένοις καὶ µὴ προδεδωκόσι ταύτην τοσαύτην κωφότητα καὶ 
  127 
 
The contrast between the Assembly’s blindness to the actions of Aeschines while Philip 
possesses “such an acute perception of the fidelity or treachery” in his political control 
serves to shame the audience and to visualize themselves as literally in the dark. 
Demosthenes also accuses the Assembly of lacking the ability to critically reflect on their 
own situation, instead saying, “You see the distresses of others, but take no precaution for 
yourselves; you have no thought for the steady and alarming deterioration of your 
commonwealth” (Dem. 19.224).100 In this accusation, Demosthenes proclaims “οὐ 
φυλάττεσθαι,” “you have not kept watch for yourselves,” a charge that implies the 
Assembly has lacked critical reflection into the effects of the peace on their own 
situation.  
The Assembly’s inability to see or imagine the true motivations of Aeschines’ 
actions is a common feature of Demosthenes’ prosecution, and early in the speech he 
suggests that “everything else was thrown into the shade by the hopes and expectations that 
were suggested to you; contradiction seemed to be mere annoyance and malice; and these 
great achievements were thought amazingly fine and most beneficial to the 
commonwealth” (Dem. 19.24).101 Here, Demosthenes says he supposes or imagines (οἶµαι) 
this dilemma for the Assembly; the use of the phrase “thrown into the shade” (ἦν τῶν 
                                                                                                                                            
τοσοῦτο σκότος παρ᾿ ὑµῶν ἀπαντᾶν, ὥστε τοῖς ἀλειτηρίοις τούτοις ἐξ ἴσου νῦν ἔµ᾿ 
ἀγωνίζεσθαι, καὶ ταῦτα παρ᾿ ὑµῖν τοῖς ἅπαντ᾿ εἰδόσιν. (Dem. 19.226-227) 
 
100 “ἑτέρους δὲ πάσχοντας ὁρῶντες οὐ φυλάττεσθαι, οὐδὲ φροντίζειν τῆς πόλεως πάλαι κατὰ 
πολλοὺς καὶ δεινοὺς τρόπους διαφθειροµένης” (Dem. 19.224). 
 
101 “πάντα γὰρ τἄλλ᾿, οἶµαι, τότε δεύτερ᾿ ἦν τῶν ὑποκειµένων προσδοκιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐλπίδων, 
οἱ δ᾿ ἀντιλέγοντες ὄχλος ἄλλως καὶ βασκανία κατεφαίνετο, ταῦτα δὲ θαυµάσι᾿ ἡλίκα καὶ 
συµφέροντ᾿ ἐδόκει πεπρᾶχθαι τῇ πόλει” (Dem. 19.24). 
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ὑποκειµένων) serves as a metaphor for the conduct of the Assembly and helps “bring-
before-the-eyes” of Demosthenes’ audience the conditions by which Philip’s peace was 
accepted and enacted. 
 Prior to Aeschines’ trial, Philocrates, another member of the Athenian embassy, 
was convicted of similar charges. Demosthenes argues that Aeschines had knowledge of 
Philocrates’ actions and was party to the same crimes. Arguing from that case’s precedent, 
Demosthenes says that the proof that some ambassadors benefitted from the dealings with 
Philip is “as clear as daylight,” and Philocrates “not only confessed to his gains repeatedly 
in the Assembly, but paraded them before your eyes, dealing in wheat, building houses, 
boasting that he would go abroad even if you did not appoint him, importing timber, 
changing his gold openly at the bankers” (Dem. 19.114).102 Demosthenes uses the verb 
ἐδείκνυεν, to show forth, to describe how Philocrates’ ill-gotten wealth was apparent before 
the Assemblymen. That showing forth also calls upon the audience to once again visualize 
those memories. 
 Demosthenes also uses vivid description to encourage his audience to visualize. In 
an extended scene in which Demosthenes describes the treatment of the Olynthians by 
Aeschines and his co-conspirators, Demosthenes uses the word “θεάσασθ᾽,” to gaze upon 
(translated here as “you shall see”), to invite his audience to visualize the events that 
transpired: 
Now let us compare the banquet of Satyrus with another entertainment which these 
men attended in Macedonia; and you shall see whether there is any sort of 
                                                
102 “εἰ δὲ Φιλοκράτης µὴ µόνον ὡµολόγει παρ᾿ ὑµῖν ἐν τῷ δήµῳ πολλάκις, ἀλλὰ καὶ 
ἐδείκνυεν ὑµῖν, πυροπωλῶν, οἰκοδοµῶν, βαδιεῖσθαι φάσκων κἂν µὴ χειροτονῆθ᾿ ὑµεῖς, 
ξυληγῶν, τὸ χρυσίον καταλλαττόµενος φανερῶς ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις, οὐκ ἔνι δήπου τοῦτον 
εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ εἴληφε, τὸν αὐτὸν ὁµολογοῦντα καὶ δεικνύντα” (Dem. 19.114). 
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resemblance. These men had been invited to the house of Xenophron, a son of 
Phaedimus, who was one of the Thirty Tyrants, and off they went; but I declined to 
go. When the drinking began, Xenophron introduced an Olynthian woman, —a 
handsome, but a freeborn and, as the event proved, a modest girl. At first, I believe, 
they only tried to make her drink quietly and eat dessert; so Iatrocles told me the 
following day. But as the carouse went on, and they became heated, they ordered 
her to sit down and give them a song. The poor girl was bewildered, for she did not 
wish, and she did not know how, to sing. Then Aeschines and Phryno declared that 
it was intolerable impertinence for a captive, —and one of those ungodly, 
pernicious Olynthians too, —to give herself such airs. “Call a servant,” they cried; 
“bring a whip, somebody.” In came a flunkey with a horsewhip, and—I suppose 
they were tipsy, and it did not take much to irritate them, —when she said 
something and began to cry, he tore off her dress and gave her a number of lashes 
on the back. Maddened by these indignities, she jumped to her feet, upset the table, 
and fell at the knees of Iatrocles. If he had not rescued her, she would have 
perished, the victim of a drunken orgy, for the drunkenness of this blackguard is 
something terrible. (Dem. 19.196-198)103 
 
While the scene depicted here is terrible and vivid in itself, the instruction to visualize 
what is described increases the effect of the anecdote upon the audience. As discussed 
later in this chapter, this story plays upon several other types of visuality, and the effects 
of those strategies are doubtlessly aided by Demosthenes’ initial activation of the 
audience’s imagination. 
 
                                                
103 Ἐξετάσωµεν δὴ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ Σατύρου τοῦτο συµπόσιον τὸ τούτων ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ 
γενόµενον, καὶ θεάσασθ᾿ εἰ παραπλήσιον τούτῳ καὶ ὅµοιον. κληθέντες γὰρ οὗτοι πρὸς 
Ξενόφρονα τὸν υἱὸν τὸν Φαιδίµου τοῦ τῶν τριάκοντ᾿ ᾤχοντο· ἐγὼ δ᾿ οὐκ ἐπορεύθην. ἐπειδὴ 
δ᾿ ἧκον εἰς τὸ πίνειν, εἰσάγει τιν᾿ Ὀλυνθίαν γυναῖκα, εὐπρεπῆ µέν, ἐλευθέραν δὲ καὶ 
σώφρονα, ὡς τὸ ἔργον ἐδήλωσεν. ταύτην τὸ µὲν πρῶτον οὑτωσὶ πίνειν ἡσυχῇ καὶ τρώγειν 
ἠνάγκαζον οὗτοί µοι δοκεῖν, ὡς διηγεῖτ᾿ Ἰατροκλῆς ἐµοὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ· ὡς δὲ προῄει τὸ 
πρᾶγµα καὶ διεθερµαίνοντο, κατακλίνεσθαι καί τι καὶ ᾄδειν ἐκέλευον. ἀδηµονούσης δὲ τῆς 
ἀνθρώπου καὶ οὔτ᾿ ἐθελούσης οὔτ᾿ ἐπισταµένης, ὕβριν τὸ πρᾶγµ᾿ ἔφασαν οὑτοσὶ καὶ ὁ 
Φρύνων καὶ οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν εἶναι, τῶν θεοῖς ἐχθρῶν, τῶν ἀλειτηρίων Ὀλυνθίων αἰχµάλωτον 
οὖσαν τρυφᾶν· καὶ “κάλει παῖδα,” καὶ “ἱµᾶντά τις φερέτω.” ἧκεν οἰκέτης ἔχων ῥυτῆρα, καὶ 
πεπωκότων, οἶµαι, καὶ µικρῶν ὄντων τῶν παροξυνόντων, εἰπούσης τι καὶ δακρυσάσης 
ἐκείνης, περιρρήξας τὸν χιτωνίσκον ὁ οἰκέτης ξαίνει κατὰ νώτου πολλάς. ἔξω δ᾿ αὑτῆς οὖσ᾿ 
ὑπὸ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τοῦ πράγµατος ἡ γυνὴ ἀναπηδήσασα προσπίπτει πρὸς τὰ γόνατα τῷ 
Ἰατροκλεῖ, καὶ τὴν τράπεζαν ἀνατρέπει. καὶ εἰ µὴ ἐκεῖνος ἀφείλετο, ἀπώλετ᾿ ἂν 
παροινουµένη· καὶ γὰρ ἡ παροινία τοῦ καθάρµατος τουτουὶ δεινή. (Dem. 19.196-198) 
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Making Concepts Clear 
 The final type of language cue to consider in this analysis regards the ways in 
which an orator clarifies or illuminates the content of the speech. In addition to verbs 
such as δηλόω, to make clear, this concept also manifests in discussions of how an orator 
brings those visualizations or mental images to an audience. It is a deliberate attempt for 
the orator to reveal the effects of a speech or to make an audience aware of the ways in 
which those concepts can be understood. As discussed in Chapter 2, “making clear,” also 
functions as a method for the orator to establish or reinforce a particular ethos. 
Demosthenes assures his audience, “I will now prove to you that I am not making up a 
story or claiming merit after the event, but that I formed my judgment, kept my eye on 
your interests, and told the envoys, without any delay” (Dem. 19.154).104 The phrase, 
“ἐγνώκειν και προεωρήµην," “to perceive and to see before the eyes,” establishes that 
Demosthenes renders his judgment as a result of witnessing the events firsthand rather 
than speculation.  
One of the key verbs of “making clear,” δηλόω is less common in Demosthenes’ 
speech than his use of ὁρᾶτε, “to view.” This likely reflects the orator’s own belief that 
Aeschines is clearly guilty. Instead of discussing the ways in which Aeschines’ actions are 
made clear, he compares the man’s conduct with what is expected of an Athenian citizen. 
For example, Demosthenes argues, “it does not follow that the honest men take their cue 
from the knaves; as soon as they detect one of themselves in misconduct, they lay 
                                                
104 “καὶ ταῦθ᾿ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς συµβεβηκόσι νυνὶ πλάττοµαι καὶ προσποιοῦµαι, ἀλλὰ τότ᾿ 
εὐθὺς ἐγνώκειν καὶ προεωρώµην ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν καὶ τούτοις ἔλεγον, ἐκεῖθεν εἴσεσθε” (Dem. 
19.154). 
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information before the Council and the Assembly” (Dem. 19.190).105 Here, the guilty party 
displays their knowledge before his peers and allows judgment to occur. Similarly, 
Demosthenes argues that the events of the case sufficiently convict Aeschines in and of 
themselves. For the orator, the inartistic proofs are seemingly enough to persuade: “That 
the deeds done were disgraceful, monstrous, and venal, you have already discovered; let 
facts disclose who were the participators” (Dem. 19.157).106 The phrase, “αὐτὸ δηλώσει,” 
“they reveal themselves,” signals how Demosthenes approaches his prosecution in this 
case. Demosthenes is sure that Aeschines is guilty, and that the persuasiveness of the events 
alone will make that guilt evident to the jury. While it is clear that Demosthenes asks his 
audience to visualize the ideas and events that he discusses, the evidence is often left to 
stand alone on the assertion that it is enough.  
 The attention given to language in rhetorical studies demonstrates the importance 
of choosing one’s words well and constructing a message with the careful deliberation to 
ensure that it is as effective as possible. By considering not simply the words that 
Demosthenes uses but how those words also activate the visual experiences of his 
audience, this analysis demonstrates the ways in which the sensory experience of the 
rhetorical performance is considered and activated. Demosthenes’ On the Embassy 
represents a deliberate attempt to activate the visualization processes of his audience in a 
variety of ways, and the language cues present in this speech show that the orator is 
                                                
105 “ἀλλ᾿ ἐὰν ἀδικοῦντα λάβωσί τιν᾿ αὑτῶν, τῇ βουλῇ καὶ τῷ δήµῳ δηλοῦσιν. ἡ βουλὴ ταὐτὰ 
ταῦτα, εἰσιτήρι᾿ ἔθυσε, συνειστιάθη” (Dem. 19.190).  
 
106 “ὅτι µὲν γὰρ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δεινὰ καὶ οὐ προῖκα τὰ πεπραγµένα, πάντες ὑµεῖς ἑοράκατε· 
οἵτινες δ᾿ οἱ τούτων µετεσχηκότες, αὐτὸ δηλώσει” (Dem. 19.157). 
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concerned with engaging the audience’s imaginative processes in order to effectively 
persuade them of Aeschines’ guilt.  
Analysis Two: Audience Expectations, Memories, and Ideologies 
 The social contingencies of rhetorical performance come into view in the second 
mode of analysis. The ways in which Demosthenes’ audience is prepared to understand and 
visualize the content of his speech can be categorized using Poulakos’ description of 
intellectual movements. The three levels at which this analysis occurs are these: analyzing 
genre and expectations, identifying historical and contextual cues for performance, and 
exploring cultural ideologies and memories. Within this second mode of analysis, the 
surface-level features of a text such as language choice and genre practices are augmented 
by discussions of history, memory, and ideology to more readily identify the social factors 
at play. In conversation with the analysis of language cues, the influence of sociality in 
rhetorical theory becomes more readily identifiable. 
Analyzing Genre and Expectations 
Poulakos says, “Intellectual movements are born not in vacuo, but in the midst of 
a set of cultural givens of practice and thought already in motion” (J. Poulakos 2008, 12). 
In order to examine the “cultural givens of practice and thought” that make up the first 
level of intellectual movements, features that come under scrutiny include the 
performance features of a text; the history of practice regarding the genre; the makeup 
and positioning of its audience; and the author of a text. As mentioned near the end of 
Analysis One, Demosthenes relies on factual evidence as a primary feature of his case 
against Aeschines. While that reliance is understandable and justifiable, I argue that the 
persuasiveness of his argument is perhaps limited by his desire to let the events speak for 
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themselves. Additionally, in this mode, Demosthenes must account for Aeschines’ 
defense in which he can challenge the events presented as evidence. Because this speech 
is forensic in nature, Demosthenes identifies for his audience that which is most 
important within the genre. He asks, “A man can do no greater wrong than by telling lies 
to a popular assembly; for, where the political system is based upon speeches, how can it 
be safely administered if the speeches are false” (Dem. 19.184).107 In this assertion, 
Demosthenes identifies what he believes the audience to value most of all. Truth, above 
all else, is what allows justice to prevail in the Athenian Assembly.  
Furthermore, Demosthenes expects that his opponents will value factual evidence 
above all else. In this speech, he argues for their essential objectivity and accuses 
Aeschines of modifying those facts for his own benefit during the trial against 
Philocrates. Demosthenes in that trial argues that Aeschines bent the truth to prevent his 
alleged co-conspirator’s conviction. “You cannot find fault with facts,” he says, “and say 
that they are what they are in deference to somebody, or to oblige somebody. They are 
what your treachery and perversion have made them, and such they appear on 
examination” (Dem. 19.120).108 Interestingly, Vince and Vince note that in response to 
Demosthenes’ charges in On the Embassy, Aeschines, “while disputing the inferences, 
does not contradict […] except in minor details” the narrative that Demosthenes presents 
(1939b, 241). Although Demosthenes argues that Aeschines has perjured in previous 
                                                
107 “οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσθ᾿ ὅ τι µεῖζον ἂν ὑµᾶς ἀδικήσειέ τις, ἢ ψευδῆ λέγων. οἷς γάρ ἐστ᾿ ἐν λόγοις ἡ 
πολιτεία, πῶς, ἂν οὗτοι µὴ ἀληθεῖς ὦσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἔστι πολιτεύεσθαι” (Dem. 19.184). 
 
108 “καὶ οὐκ ἔνεστ᾿ εἰπεῖν οὐδ᾿ αἰτιάσασθαι, ὡς ἢ πεπεισµέν᾿ ἢ χαριζόµενά τῴ ἐστι τοιαῦτα, 
ἀλλ᾿ οἷάπερ αὐτὰ προδοὺς καὶ διαφθείρας σὺ πεποίηκας, τοιαῦτ᾿ ἐξεταζόµενα φαίνεται” 
(Dem. 19.120). 
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trials, the similarity between each orator’s accounts in the current trial likely neutralized 
the outrage that Demosthenes hoped to incite in the jury. 
The basic structure that Demosthenes employs in his speech is as follows: 
prologue, narrative of the first embassy, amplification of the charges, narrative of the 
second embassy, a lengthy epilogue, and a short peroration. Vince and Vince describe the 
epilogue as “exceptionally long and miscellaneous; and the arrangement of topics may 
seem disorderly” (1939b, 244). Most of his arguments about Aeschines’ character and 
actions during the speech occur in the epilogue, which takes up a majority of the text. As 
Aristotle instructs, “One of two things should be aimed at [in the epilogue], to show that 
you are either relatively or absolutely good and the adversary either relatively or 
absolutely bad” (Aristot. Rh. 3.19.1.1419b).109 Because Demosthenes’ central concern is 
to establish the poor character of Aeschines, he explores multiple discussions of 
Aeschines’ faults, which the audience understands as a key feature of establishing his 
guilt. This contributes to the “cumulative” nature of Demosthenes’ attack, which Vince 
and Vince describe in the introduction. 
In another critique of Aeschines’ forensic practice, Demosthenes recounts the trial 
against Timarchus, saying, “Moreover, having no witnesses to produce in support of your 
accusations, you quoted verses to the jury: ‘Rumour, that many people spread abroad, / 
Dieth not wholly: Rumour is a god’” (Dem. 19.243).110 In terms of genre expectations, 
                                                
109 “δυοῖν δὲ φατέρου δεῖ στοαχάζεσθαι, ἢ ὅτι τούτοις ἀγαθὸς ἢ ὅτι ἁπλῶς, ὁ δ᾽ ὅτι κακὸς 
τούτοις ἢ ὅτι ἁπλῶς” (Aristot. Rh. 3.19.1.1419b). 
 
110 “Ἀλλὰ µὴν καὶ ἔπη1 τοῖς δικασταῖς ἔλεγες, οὐδένα µάρτυρ᾿ ἔχων ἐφ᾿ οἷς ἔκρινες τὸν 
ἄνθρωπον παρασχέσθαι· ‘φήµη δ᾿ οὔ τις πάµπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥντινα λαοὶ / πολλοὶ φηµίξωσι· 
θεός νύ τίς ἐστι καὶ αὐτή’” (Dem. 19.243). 
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the reliance on poetry but no witnesses seems to be the key protest that Demosthenes is 
concerned with. He takes little issue with the inclusion of verse in a forensic case, as he 
soon after illustrates Aeschines’ own flaws by comparing him to the Sophoclean 
depiction of Creon in the drama Antigone, “I hold, and long have held, that man a knave / 
Who, standing at the helm of state, deserts / The wisest counsel, or in craven fear / Of 
any, sets a curb upon his lips” (qtd. in Dem. 19.247).111 The inclusion of this dramatic 
verse in these proceedings reflects the “cultural givens of practice and thought already in 
motion” (J. Poulakos 2008, 12). Based on the makeup of his audience, Demosthenes (and 
Aeschines previously) assumed that the listeners would understand the broader context 
from which these verses originate. Furthermore, they work from the assumption that the 
audience holds Hesiod and Sophocles in high esteem. Demosthenes refers to “Creon-
Aeschines” when introducing the excerpt from Antigone because Creon is a flawed 
character within the play. Although the character expresses judgment against those 
“knaves” who betray their country, his actions lead to ruin. By calling upon this figure, 
Demosthenes also invites the audience to picture Aeschines as Creon, and associate the 
character’s flaws with the individual. The orator assumes the audience’s familiarity with 
this story. Demosthenes positions Aeschines as not even willing to denounce the same 
cowardice but still carrying out actions for the Embassy that lead to ruin for Athens. 
Regarding the space and conditions in which a speech takes place, Demosthenes 
describes prior scenes from the Assembly at which time he was protesting the 
propositions of other politicians and “denouncing and incriminating” the men who sought 
                                                
111 “ἐµοὶ γὰρ ὅστις πᾶσαν εὐθύνων πόλιν / µὴ τῶν ἀρίστων ἅπτεται βουλευµάτων, / ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ 
φόβου του γλῶσσαν ἐγκλείσας ἔχει, / κάκιστος εἶναι νῦν τε καὶ πάλαι δοκεῖ” (qtd. in Dem. 
19.247). 
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to mislead the Athenian public (Dem. 19.207). He describes himself as “the nervous man, 
who can speak no louder than another,” but he can be heard “Because truth is strong, and 
consciousness of corruption weak” (Dem. 19.208).112 Demosthenes’ description here 
helps the audience visualize his prior attempts to discredit the corrupt individuals, but it 
also serves to remind the Assembly of the typical speech conditions when conducting 
business; the weak-voiced Demosthenes might not be easily heard, especially in contrast 
to Aeschines, who he describes as having a strong, loud voice. In these conditions, 
however, Demosthenes is able to voice his accusations clearly, and to focus his message 
on the misdoings of one individual. The orator is clearly focused on establishing himself 
as an ethical citizen, and his style, while not overly grandiose, speaks to a level of 
sophistication that his fellow citizens should respect, and contributes to the goal of the 
epilogue.  
As he concludes his epilogue, Demosthenes draws a closing comparison between 
his actions and Aeschines. This comparison serves not only as a reminder of all the 
strengths of character for the prosecution and flaws of the accused, but also attempts to 
once again safeguard the audience from awe at the vocal skill of the accused: 
I, for example, showed no respect for Philip; I kept my respect for the captives, I 
rescued them, I spared no effort. Aeschines, on the other hand, grovelled at Philip’s 
feet, sang his Hymn of Victory, and disregards you altogether. Again, when you 
observe eloquence, or vocal power, or any such merit, in a right-minded and 
patriotic speaker, by all means congratulate him and help him to exercise his gift, 
for you all share in its advantages. (Dem. 19.339)113 
                                                
112 “ὅτι τἀληθὲς ἰσχυρόν, καὶ τοὐναντίον ἀσθενὲς τὸ συνειδέναι πεπρακόσιν αὑτοῖς τὰ 
πράγµατα” (Dem. 19.208). 
 
113 ὥσπερ ἐγὼ Φίλιππον µὲν [450]οὐκ ἐθαύµασα, τοὺς δ᾿ αἰχµαλώτους ἐθαύµασα, ἔσωσα, 
οὐδὲν ὑπεστειλάµην. οὗτος δ᾿ ἐκείνου µὲν προὐκυλινδεῖτο καὶ τοὺς παιᾶνας ᾖδεν, ὑµῶν δ᾿ 
ὑπερορᾷ. ἔτι τοίνυν ὅταν µὲν ἴδητε δεινότητ᾿ ἢ εὐφωνίαν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ 
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The skill of delivery that Aeschines possesses is of great concern to Demosthenes, who 
clearly understands the rhetorical effects of delivery and performance on the audience’s 
deliberations.  
As Demosthenes establishes his moral character, he also attempts to build up the 
jury’s estimation of themselves. One way that he achieves this is through emphasizing the 
effects of their decision. He states, “To-day you are not merely adjudging this case: you 
are legislating for all future time, whether every ambassador is basely to serve your 
enemies for hire, or without fee or bribe to give his best service to you” (Dem. 19.232-
233).114 The arousal of prejudice—self-importance for the speaker and audience and 
defamation of the accused—according to Aristotle, must occur in the epilogue when 
making prosecutorial speeches (Aristot. Rh. 3.14.7.1415a). It is evident that 
Demosthenes’ regard for the audience is essential if he is to achieve victory in this case. 
The strategy of emphasizing the role of the audience is an effect he achieves with much 
more relatable skill in On the Crown, when “he addresses the jury as though they were 
not merely representative of the people, but the people itself” (Vince and Vince 1939a, 
16). When considering the arrangement and division of Demosthenes’ speech, it becomes 
apparent why he devotes so much time to the epilogue; Aeschines’ defense clearly 
demonstrates that he finds little at fault with his narrative. However, by focusing instead 
on the implications of those actions and the type of character that those events represents, 
                                                                                                                                            
χρηστοῦ καὶ φιλοτίµου γεγενηµένον ἀνθρώπου, συγχαίρειν καὶ συνασκεῖν πάντας δεῖ· κοινὸν 
γὰρ ὑµῖν πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ᾿ ἀγαθὸν γίγνεται· (Dem. 19.339) 
 
114 “οὐ µόνον κρίνετε τούτους τήµερον, οὔ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νόµον τίθεσθ᾿ εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν µετὰ 
ταῦτα χρόνον, πότερον χρηµάτων αἰσχρῶς ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐχθρῶν πρεσβεύειν ἅπαντας προσήκει ἢ 
προῖχ᾿ ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν τὰ βέλτιστ᾿ ἀδωροδοκήτως” (Dem. 19.232-233). 
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Demosthenes attempts to persuade the Assembly that those actions are those of a morally 
bankrupt man, and the fallout has resulted in conditions that are favorable only for those 
“in the pocket” of Philip. The epilogue thus serves as an attempt to identify and align 
current dissatisfactions with the Peace of Philocrates as a direct result of Aeschines’ 
meddling, which is assisted by discussions of the historical and contextual conditions that 
give rise to the case. 
Historical and Contextual Cues for Performance 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the second feature of intellectual movements is that 
“they spring up not simply as a result of a conducive climate but in order to address 
particular circumstances and to fulfill certain societal needs” (J. Poulakos 2008, 12). This 
feature of intellectual movements opens up the analysis to a consideration of the 
exigencies and conditions for the rhetorical performance. In judicial rhetoric, this also 
encapsulates the factual accounts that have led to the charges being brought and the ways 
in which legal precedent and conditions of the state play roles in the audience’s reception 
of the performance. 
One of the problems Demosthenes faces in his task is reminding his audience 
about the events that previously transpired. As mentioned earlier, approximately three 
years had elapsed since the first embassy. Demosthenes says, “the trials which come 
before you are affected quite as much by the conditions of the hour as by the facts; and I 
am afraid that the long lapse of time since the embassy has inclined you to forget or to 
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acquiesce in these iniquities” (Dem. 19.3-4).115 Demosthenes proceeds to describe the 
events that led to the first embassy to Philip and the attempt to establish peace. 
Demosthenes describes his protests at the embassy’s meeting with Philip, where he “did 
not hold my peace then, to run away from my actions now,—for I was laying my 
complaint, and trying to forecast results, at the first opportunity” (Dem. 19.31).116 He 
continues the synopsis of events, including the lack of courtesy that the hosts 
demonstrated toward the embassy, denying “these men either a vote of thanks, or an 
invitation to the public dinner in the Town Hall. We are told that these compliments had 
never before been withheld from any ambassadors since the foundation of Athens” (Dem. 
19.31-32).117 This slight toward the men reinforces the troubling relationship between the 
Embassy and Philip while encouraging suspicion toward Aeschines’ actions in the face of 
such treatment. In the account of the second embassy, Demosthenes describes his 
personal attempts to provide ransom money for captives of war while Aeschines and his 
co-conspirators profited from their alliance with Philip. In consideration of this historical 
context, Demosthenes levels the charge “that [Aeschines’] counsels were exactly opposed 
to right policy,” and “that he has betrayed everything, sold everything, taken bribes, and 
                                                
115 “ὅτι µοι δοκοῦσιν ἅπαντες οἱ παρ᾿ ὑµῖν ἀγῶνες οὐχ ἧττον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῶν 
καιρῶν ἢ τῶν πραγµάτων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ χρόνον γεγενῆσθαι µετὰ τὴν πρεσβείαν πολὺν 
δέδοικα, µή τινα λήθην ἢ συνήθειαν τῶν ἀδικηµάτων ὑµῖν ἐµπεποίηκεν” (Dem. 19.3-4). 
 
116 “ἵν᾿ εἰδῆθ᾿ ὅτι ἐγὼ µὲν οὐ τότε σιγήσας νῦν ἀφίσταµαι τῶν πεπραγµένων, ἀλλ᾿ εὐθὺς 
κατηγόρουν καὶ προεώρων τὰ µέλλοντα” (Dem. 19.31). 
 
117 “οὔτ᾿ ἐπῄνεσε τούτους οὔτ᾿ εἰς τὸ πρυτανεῖον ἠξίωσε καλέσαι. καίτοι τοῦτ᾿, ἀφ᾿ οὗ 
γέγονεν ἡ πόλις, οὐδεὶς πώποτέ φησι παθεῖν οὐδένας πρέσβεις” (Dem. 19.32). 
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stopped short of no iniquity” (Dem. 19.178).118 In labeling Aeschines as such, 
Demosthenes attempts to associate the political turmoil of Athens directly with the 
defendant, and in doing so persuade the audience that their current troubles can be 
located as a result of his actions. While the proclaimed guilt of Philocrates is readily 
accepted because of the previous trial, Demosthenes faces the challenge of now 
associating Aeschines with that same guilt. 
As a member of the embassies, Demosthenes must describe the events that 
happened while the group was away from Athens, and do so in a way that helps those 
listening visualize the events and their implications. To do this, he draws upon the social 
memories that the Assembly has of the Sophoclean play, Antigone, and declares that 
Aeschines has “bade a long farewell to the sage Sophocles” when the questionable peace 
negotiations failed to protect their Greek comrades, and in doing so reaffirms the 
similarities between Aeschines and Creon.119 He continues, describing Aeschines’ mother 
and father and their lives in Athens, and his rise to ambassadorship, establishing 
Aeschines’ lifelong connections to the city, which he then betrayed: 
He cared for none of these obligations; he took no thought that the ship of state 
should sail on an even keel; he scuttled her and sank her, and so far as in him lay 
put her at the mercy of her foes. […] You passed over the speech that you so often 
spoke on the stage, and knew by heart; you hunted up [speech] that in all your 
career you had never declaimed in character, and revived it for the undoing of 
your own fellow-citizen. (Dem. 19.250)120 
                                                
118 “πάντα τἀναντία συµβουλεύσαντ᾽ ἢ ἔδει [...] προδεδωκότα πάντα, πεπρακότα, δῶρ᾽ 
ἔχοντα, οὐδὲν ἐλλελοιπότα µοχθηρίας” (Dem. 19.178). 
 
119 “ἐρρῶσθαι πολλὰ φράσας τῷ σοφῷ Σοφοκλεῖ” (Dem. 19.248). 
 
120 τούτων οὐδὲν ἐσκέψατο, οὐδ᾽ ὅπως ὀρθὴ πλεύσεται προείδετο, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέτρεψε καὶ 
κατέδυσε καὶ τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ὅπως ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἔσται παρεσκεύασεν. […] ὃς ἃ µὲν 
πολλάκις ἠγωνίσω καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξηπίστασο, ὑπερέβης, ἃ δ᾽ οὐδεπώποτ᾽ ἐν τῷ βίῳ 
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Demosthenes clearly intends to portray Aeschines as a traitor, as someone who ignores 
the debt he owes to his homeland and its allies and pursues the most profitable path 
regardless of betrayal, “he sounded no warning, sent no timely report; rather he helped 
both to conceal and to execute the design, and obstructed those who were ready to tell the 
truth” (Dem. 19.249).121 This also serves to activate the audience members’ own 
fondness for Athens and to visualize their history with the city. It’s a tactic that 
Demosthenes controls much better in On the Crown by using the second-person plural 
pronoun more frequently, but here he does remind the Assembly that they are the ones 
who granted Aeschines the public offices he later betrayed for Philip’s favor. 
 Demosthenes draws historical parallels to Aeschines’ actions in the Embassy, and 
he uses legal precedent to suggest that the proper outcomes have been supplied already. 
For example, the orator recounts the story of Arthmius of Zelea, who was sentenced to 
death for taking bribes; he then follows with the example of Callias “who negotiated the 
celebrated peace” with the King of Persia but was almost put to death “because he was 
said to have taken bribes on embassy” (Dem. 19.271-273).122 Demosthenes uses these 
examples to convince the Assembly, “not to emulate your forefathers in some one respect 
alone, but to follow their conduct step by step” in order to guarantee the continued 
                                                                                                                                            
ὑπεκρίνω, ταῦτα ζητήσας ἐπὶ τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν βλάψαι τιν᾽ εἰς µέσον ἤνεγκασ. (Dem. 
19.250) 
 
121 “οὐ προεῖπεν οὐδὲ προεξήγγειλεν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον συνέκρυψε καὶ συνέπραξε καὶ τοὺς 
βουλοµένους εἰπεῖν διεκώλυσεν” (Dem. 19.248-249). 
 
122 “ταύτην τὴν ὑπὸ πάντων θρυλουµένην εἰρήνην προσβεύσαντα [...] ὅτι δῶρα λαβεῖν 
ἔδοξε πρεσβεύσας” (Dem. 19.271-273). 
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wellbeing of Athens (Dem. 19.273).123 The historical contexts that Demosthenes 
describes, as reflected in this section, function to serve as mnemonic beacons for the 
audience to consider and potentially bring before their eyes. The importance of drawing 
upon and reminding audiences of these events or ideas are to help them “revise” their 
understanding of the case. The audience imagines the tragedy of Creon, the guilty verdict 
and punishment of Arthimius, and other events in order that the orator might draw similar 
ideas regarding the treatment and character of Aeschines. 
Cultural Ideologies and Memories 
In consideration of the audience’s values, memories, and ideologies, this section 
of analysis considers the ways in which those features “inadvertently grow alongside 
some established cultural practices and against others, producing innovative results 
despite the resistance of the tradition or the potential risks of criticism that may eliminate 
them” (J. Poulakos 2008, 12). The intellectual and artistic qualities of a particular text 
come into scope for this level of analysis, and further consideration of the ways in which 
these an orator can draw “innovative results” through visuality becomes much more 
important. 
While the legal precedent for punishing those who have taken bribes contributes 
to the historical context for Demosthenes’ argument; the cultural argument also 
contributes to his desire that Aeschines be found guilty. As a cultural indicator, 
Aeschines symbolizes the corruption of Athens; near the beginning of his speech, 
                                                
123 “οὐ καθ᾽ ἕν τι µόνον τοὺς προγόνους µιµουµένους ὀρθῶς ἂν ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ 
πάνθ᾽ ὅς ἔπραττον ἐψεξῆς᾽” (Dem. 19.273). 
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Demosthenes locates all of the troubles regarding Philip’s political and military 
campaigns as centered around the defendant: 
Men of Athens, nothing more awful or more momentous has befallen in Greece 
within living memory, nor, as I believe, in all the history of the past. Yet through 
the agency of these men all these great and terrible transactions have been 
dominated by a single individual, though the city of Athens is still in being, the city 
whose ancestral prerogative it was to stand forth as the champion of the Hellenic 
race, and declare that such things shall not be. In what fashion these unhappy 
Phocians have perished you may learn, not from the decrees alone, but from the 
deeds that have been wrought—a spectacle, men of Athens, to move us to terror 
and pity indeed! (Dem. 19.64-65)124 
 
The spectacle (θέαµα) of Phocian ruin is clearly hyperbolic as presented by Demosthenes, 
but the assertion that Athens has is charged with being “the champion of the Hellenic 
race” readily identifies the sense of Athenian moral and political superiority that is 
espoused by the audience. Demosthenes depicts Aeschines as the antithesis to all that is 
good in Athens with lasting effect through this ideology of Athens as the pinnacle of 
Hellenism. 
The existing Peace of Philocrates, Demosthenes argues, is troublesome to the 
people of Greece and their pride as its citizens, especially to those who regard Athens as 
the protector of their Hellenic allies. He is convinced that Philip is betraying the terms of 
the peace treaty, and that Athens will eventually face the same fate as their allies. To 
convince the Assembly that this is problematic, he describes the city of Arcadia and the 
ways in which it has been altered upon defeat: 
                                                
124 Τούτων, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δεινότερ᾿ οὐ γέγονεν οὐδὲ µείζω πράγµατ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἡµῶν ἐν τοῖς 
Ἕλλησιν, οἶµαι δ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ. τηλικούτων µέντοι καὶ τοιούτων πραγµάτων 
κύριος εἷς ἀνὴρ1 γέγονε διὰ τούτους, οὔσης τῆς Ἀθηναίων πόλεως, ᾗ προεστάναι τῶν 
Ἑλλήνων πάτριον καὶ µηδὲν τοιοῦτον περιορᾶν γιγνόµενον. ὃν µὲν τοίνυν τρόπον οἱ 
ταλαίπωροι Φωκεῖς ἀπολώλασιν, οὐ µόνον ἐκ τῶν δογµάτων τούτων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ 
τῶν ἔργων ἃ πέπρακται, θέαµα δεινόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἐλεινόν· (Dem. 19.64-65) 
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It has entered Arcadia, and turned Arcadian politics upside down; and now many of 
that nation, who ought to pride themselves as highly as you upon their 
independence—for you and they are the only indigenous peoples in Greece—
admire Philip, set up his effigy in bronze, decorate it with garlands, and, to crown 
all, have enacted a decree that, if he ever visits Peloponnesus, he shall be made 
welcome within their walls. (Dem. 19.261-262)125 
 
Here, Demosthenes calls upon the traditional Athenian sense of superiority. While 
Macedon is technically Greek, it is perceived as more vulgar and less refined. 
Demosthenes associates the Arcadian pride of independence with that of Athens, and 
then depicts the praise that they now shower upon Philip, their conqueror and one who 
was previously regarded as less than the Arcadians. Clearly, the Athenian Assembly has 
not yet decided that Philip is a sufficient threat to their welfare, so the visualized parallel 
between the two cities encourages them to imagine similar conditions for their own city. 
 Demosthenes also compares Athens to the loss of Thrace and its outposts. He 
argues that those who have betrayed Thrace with their dishonesty or actions faced severe 
punishment, and attempts to shame his audience by saying, “But in those days, men of 
Athens, you were still careful to be on your guard against perils, and not sparing of 
precaution; now you overlook anything that at any given moment does not disturb you or 
cause immediate annoyance” (Dem. 19.180-181).126 These charges of Athenian apathy are 
intended to chastise the Assemblymen into action; according to Demosthenes, they have 
                                                
125 ἕστηκεν, ἀλλ᾿ εἰς Ἀρκαδίαν εἰσελθὸν πάντ᾿ ἄνω καὶ κάτω τἀκεῖ πεποίηκε, καὶ νῦν 
Ἀρκάδων πολλοί, προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἐπ᾿ ἐλευθερίᾳ µέγιστον φρονεῖν ὁµοίως ὑµῖν (µόνοι γὰρ 
πάντων αὐτόχθονες ὑµεῖς ἐστὲ κἀκεῖνοι) Φίλιππον θαυµάζουσι καὶ χαλκοῦν ἱστᾶσι καὶ 
στεφανοῦσι, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον, ἂν εἰς Πελοπόννησον ἴῃ, δέχεσθαι ταῖς πόλεσίν εἰσιν 
ἐψηφισµένοι. (Dem. 19.261-262) 
 
126 “ἀλλ᾿ ἔτι γὰρ τότ᾿, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἐκ λογισµοῦ τὰ δείν᾿ ἐφυλάττεσθ᾿ ὑµεῖς καὶ 
προεωρᾶσθε· νῦν δ᾿ ὅ τι ἂν µὴ καθ᾿ ἡµέραν ὑµᾶς ἐνοχλῇ καὶ παρὸν λυπῇ, παρορᾶτε, εἶτα τὴν 
ἄλλως ἐνταῦθα ψηφίζεσθε” (Dem. 19.180-181). 
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clearly failed in upholding the righteousness of Athenian culture and been corrupted. The 
orator argues that it is essential for the Assembly to correct this trend by finding 
Aeschines guilty. He builds such a case by attempting to connect images of prior and 
current Hellenic ruin, such as the surrender of the Thracian territories or Arcadian 
supplication to Philip, to the figure of Aeschines. To secure his conviction, Demosthenes 
must build the association that the failure of Athens can be contained within and 
punishable toward Aeschines. The challenge of drawing these connections is evident in 
the length by which Demosthenes constructs the epilogue of his speech and the continued 
attacks on the defendant’s character. 
 Demosthenes is troubled by the conditions of cities under Philippic rule, but 
casting Aeschines in an even worse light should help him secure victory in the case. To 
achieve this, Demosthenes begins his epilogue with two anecdotes about the treatment of 
Olynthians after being conquered by Philip. In the first anecdote, Philip is granting favors 
to guests in attendance at the Olympic games, and notices that one person, Satyrus, has 
not asked him for anything. When pressed to ask for that which he wanted, Satyrus 
explained that his friend Apollophanes of Pydna had been assassinated and his two 
daughters were now in Philip’s captivity; Satyrus asks that they be released into his care 
so that he can take care of his deceased friend’s daughters and find them suitors. Philip 
grants Satyrus’ request, despite the fact that “Apollophanes was one of the men who had 
slain Philip’s own brother Alexander” (Dem. 19.192-195).127 This account of Philip’s 
quality of character and virtue in this moment seems aberrant from the other accounts that 
                                                
127 “καίτοι τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων ἦν τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν Φιλίππου οὗτος ὁ 
Ἀπολλοφάνης” (Dem. 19.192-195). 
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Demosthenes provides in his speech, but he uses this anecdote to severely contrast the 
tyrant’s character with the terribleness of Aeschines. 
 In the anecdote of the banquet at Xenophron’s house in Macedonia and the 
mistreatment of the Olynthian servant woman referenced in discussing language cues and 
imagination (see page 129), Aeschines’ and Phryno’s disregard for the captive Olynthian 
and desire to see her punished for her refusal to sing for the men is abhorrent (Dem. 
19.196-198). In contrast with the leniency that Philip demonstrates at the Olympic festival, 
the egregious order to whip the captive who failed to entertain appears that much more 
severe. Furthermore, that the men would mistreat this woman who was a freeborn woman 
in a captive city suggests that Aeschines holds little regard for those allies who have 
already fallen to the Macedonian forces. The enthymematic implication here is that 
Aeschines would endorse such treatment for other women, including the Athenians because 
he has become blinded to sympathy as a result of Philip’s support. This ideological 
argument is difficult to establish in Demosthenes’ speech because of his apparent deviation 
in treatment toward Philip in the first anecdote. While the effect of the example might serve 
the “cumulative” nature of his epilogue, the deviation so far from the case might discourage 
his audience from accepting the premise of that argument. Furthermore, while the 
conditions of defeated citizens in other cities are of some concern, the level of concern that 
the Athenian Assembly has for those individuals is less than that of the political fallout that 
could occur in finding Aeschines guilty and troubling the negotiated peace treaty. 
 While the first analysis of language cues demonstrated the ways in which 
Demosthenes invited his audience to envision the speech being delivered, the second 
analysis regarding audience knowledge and ideas demonstrates the ways in which the 
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orator anticipates and composes his speech for the Athenian Assembly. The connections 
between narrative and image that are activated because of the orator’s ability to connect his 
argument with the needs and expectations of the audience allow him to begin to persuade 
the Assemblymen of Aeschines’ guilt. Through this analysis, we see that the activation of 
vision or mental images for an audience extends beyond language cues and becomes 
something that is socially determined. 
Analysis Three: Vividly Performing 
 The anecdote regarding Xenophron’s party also functions as a performance with 
vivid, emotional description. As discussed in Chapter 4, stylistic and emotional 
components of rhetorical performance can have immediate and/or lasting effect on the 
audience’s reception of a text. Hill asserts that vividness “will not make a bad argument 
convincing, but it will, if properly employed, enhance the persuasiveness of a reasonably 
strong position” (2004, 32). In this section, then, I explore the ways in which 
Demosthenes uses a range of vivid information in his speech against Aeschines in order 
to assist in or magnify its persuasiveness, and suggest that these tactics can help heighten 
the listening experience.  
Low Vividness 
 Rhetorical performances that induce low levels of vividness include things such 
as level of style (grand, middle, plain, or hybrid), the use of maxims and proverbs, calling 
upon factual or commonly accepted premises and beliefs, and basic description of events 
or ideas. The selection of style, be it grand, plain, or middle style, affects the orator’s 
relationship with an audience. Select instances within a particular style might be 
interpreted as being more vivid, but the overall identification of an orator’s style helps 
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contribute to a baseline understanding of the vividness contained within a speech. For 
example, speaking in a grand style in front of an audience that is not prepared to 
understand the delivery would detract from the vividness of the overall text, while 
preparing a speech with an audience in mind would facilitate vividness. In his essay on 
Demosthenes, Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises the middle level of style that 
Demosthenes typically employs, and he argues: 
Those who attend the public assemblies, the law-courts and other meetings where 
civic speeches have to be made, are neither all outstanding intellectual geniuses 
like Thucydides, nor all simpletons with no experience of how a good speech is 
composed. They are a collection of men who work on the land and the sea, and 
common tradesmen, whose sympathies are most readily won with a 
comparatively straightforward and ordinary style of oratory. (D.H. Dem. 15)128 
 
Demosthenes’ regard for his audience and corresponding selection of style allows him to 
scale the degree of vividness to suit the needs of any particular instance. He also utilizes 
his awareness of the audience to point out those moments in other styles where an 
orator’s intention might be seen. For example, in describing the peace treaty, 
Demosthenes notes, “how full the decree is of compliments and fine phrases,” which 
clearly demonstrate Aeschines’ alliance and dealings with Philip (Dem. 19.48).129 Those 
compliments and the promises included in the decree, Demosthenes argues, occlude 
Philip’s true intentions, despite the orator’s attempts to bring those discrepancies to light 
during the negotiations.  
                                                
128 οἱ συνιόντες εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συλλόγους, ἔνθα 
πολιτικῶν δεῖ λόγων, οὔτε δεινοὶ καὶ περιττοὶ πάντες εἰσὶ καὶ τὸν Θουκυδίδου νοῦν ἔχοντες 
οὔθ᾽ ἅπαντες ἰδιῶται καὶ κατασκευῆς λόγων γενναίων ἄπειροι, ἀλλ᾽ οἳ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν 
βαναύσων τεχνῶν συνερρυηκότες, οἷς ἁπλούστερον καὶ κοινότερον διαλεγόµενος µᾶλλον 
ἄν τις ἀρέσαι. (D.H. Dem. 15) 
 
129 “ὅσων ἐπαίνων καὶ ὅσης εὐφηµίας µεστόν ἐστι” (Dem. 19.48). 
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As mentioned previously, Aeschines’ vocal skills are a source of great concern for 
Demosthenes, but he attempts to offset the effects of that presentation by describing his 
failure as an actor “when he tried to represent the woes of the House of Thyestes, or of 
the men who fought at Troy, [and] you drove him from the stage with hisses and catcalls, 
and came near to pelting him with stones” (Dem. 19.337).130 Demosthenes has witnessed 
firsthand Aeschines’ attempts to make emotional pleas to an audience, and although those 
attempts were not always successful, as he describes, he perhaps anticipates that 
Aeschines’ will take advantage of the jury’s hesitation to convict him because of current 
political conditions with Philip. This concern is especially high because Demosthenes is 
keenly aware how little vividness his own voice can inspire in a speech.  
 The necessity of describing the events of the first and second embassies as part of 
the case also contributes to information that is low in degree of vividness but helps 
prepare the audience to process more intense imagery throughout the speech. The orator 
uses these historical accounts in order to offset the likelihood “that the long lapse of time 
since the embassy has inclined you to forget or to acquiesce in these iniquities” (Dem. 
19.3).131 Demosthenes is fairly skilled at vividly describing the events of the first and 
second embassies throughout the narratives, and he typically does so in simple enough 
descriptions that they do not overly excite the mental images that the audience creates as 
they listen to that narrative. In this sense, Demosthenes activates low levels of vivid 
information through narrative and uses instances of higher vividness to emphasis those 
                                                
130 “εἰ ὅτε µὲν τὰ Θυέστου καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ Τροίᾳ κάκ᾿ ἠγωνίζετο, ἐξεβάλλετ᾿ αὐτὸν καὶ 
ἐξεσυρίττετ᾿ ἐκ τῶν θεάτρων καὶ µόνον οὐ κατελεύεθ᾿” (Dem. 19.337). 
 
131 “καὶ τὸ χρόνον γεγενῆσθαι µετὰ τὴν πρεσβείαν πολὺν δέδοικα, µή τινα λήθην ἢ συνήθειαν 
τῶν ἀδικηµάτων ὑµῖν ἐµπεποίηκεν” (Dem. 19.3). 
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portions of the speech where he desires greater visual or emotional comprehension for the 
audience. 
Moderate Vividness 
Vividness begins to take on greater levels of effect in many portions of 
Demosthenes’ speech. Moderate levels of vividness occur through drawing similarities 
between events, describing with more detail the “sights” of particular events, recognizing 
and using the emotional states of the audience to excite them, and drawing clear 
metaphors that can be pictured.  
 While in cooperation with the Peace of Philocrates, Athens faces very minimal 
danger from Philip’s army, but the potential for Philip to betray that peace, according to 
Demosthenes, is quite high, especially when Philip’s agents such as Aeschines are still 
within positions of power in the city. However, because the danger is not immediate to 
the Athenian Assembly, Demosthenes relies on imagined comparisons to elicit fear: “Do 
you not see, men of Athens, what a conspicuous and striking example is offered by those 
miserable Olynthians, who owe their ruin, unhappy men, to nothing so much as to such 
conduct as I have described?” (Dem. 19.263).132 Here, the activation of pity for the 
Olynthians through asking the Assembly to “see” their current situation and the attempt 
to assert that Aeschines’ betrayal will result in similar conditions activates the 
imaginative capabilities of the audience while not being overly wrought with imagery.  
 An extended comparison that Demosthenes presents asks the Assembly whether 
they would erect statues of any Macedonian ambassadors or provide them benefits such 
                                                
132 “Οὐχ ὁρᾶθ᾿ ὡς ἐναργές, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ σαφὲς παράδειγµ᾿ οἱ ταλαίπωροι 
γεγόνασιν Ὀλύνθιοι;” (Dem. 19.263). 
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as would be granted to their supporters; the orator asserts, no, they would not “because 
they did everything for Philip and nothing for us. Then do you suppose that Philip acts on 
an entirely different principle from yours, and gives all those handsome presents to 
Aeschines and his friends because they conducted their mission duly and honestly in your 
interest? That is not so” (Dem. 19.330-331).133 Asking this hypothetical question invites 
the audience to visualize the absurdity of granting ambassadors such privileges within 
their own city, and thus opens up doubt regarding the similar treatment that Aeschines 
and other members of the Embassy received from Philip. He does not ask the audience to 
visualize in great detail, but the images that result from the technique probably have their 
desired effect. 
 Among the examples of figurative language found in On the Embassy, 
Demosthenes describes democracy as, “the most unstable and capricious thing in the 
world, like a restless wave of the sea ruffled by the breeze as chance will have it” (Dem. 
19.136).134 In this characterization of a political system, the orator depicts the 
unpredictability and difficulty of maintaining control over the political system; crafting 
the image of a wave being blown about by the wind imitates the many political forces 
that try to act upon a particular government and the ways in which the ever-shifting 
nature of those conditions can be dangerous for the city’s longevity. 
                                                
133 “ὅτι πάνθ᾿ ὑπὲρ Φιλίππου καὶ οὐδ᾿ ὁτιοῦν ὑπὲρ ἡµῶν ἔπραξαν, εἴποιτ᾿ ἄν, […] εἶτ᾿ οἴεσθ᾿ 
ὑµεῖς µὲν οὕτω γιγνώσκειν, τὸν δὲ Φίλιππον οὐχ οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τούτοις διδόναι τηλικαύτας καὶ 
τοσαύτας δωρεάς, διότι ὑπὲρ ὑµῶν καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ἐπρέσβευσαν; οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα” (Dem. 
19.330-331). 
 
134 “ὡς ὁ µὲν δῆµός ἐστιν ἀσταθµητότατον πρᾶγµα τῶν πάντων καὶ ἀσυνθετώτατον, ὥσπερ 
ἐν θαλάττῃ πνεύµατι κῦµα ἀκατάστατον, ὡς ἂν τύχῃ, κινούµενον.” (Dem. 19.136). 
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 As an illustration of this difficulty, Demosthenes later discusses the trial against 
Timarchus, at which time Aeschines accused the man of being deceitful to the city. The 
prosecution’s speech focused on the idea that the city must punish those who are 
dishonest toward its intentions, an argument similar to the one Demosthenes makes in his 
own speech against Aeschines. He argues, “In truth, on that day all that declaiming 
against immorality was like water flowing upstream” (Dem. 19.287).135 The absurdity of 
water flowing upstream in this image imitates the absurdity with which Demosthenes 
regards Aeschines’ actions, and the visualization of this event encourages the Assembly 
to regard the hypocrisy of Aeschines’ actions in a similar light. 
 The final metaphor worth mentioning in this section is the description of peace, 
which Demosthenes says, “at once has pulled down the walls of your allies and is 
building up the houses of your ambassadors, which robbed the city of her possessions and 
earned for them wealth beyond the dreams of avarice […] You are giving them a trial of 
words with their evil deeds before your eyes” (Dem. 19.275).136 In this atypical depiction 
of peace as destructive, Demosthenes captures the difficulty of the Peace of Philocrates 
that currently exists. While the concept of peace in itself is normally something positive, 
Demosthenes views the existing situation as benefitting the dishonest and being unjust. 
The final accusation, that they are conducting a trial when the guilt is so readily apparent, 
                                                
135 “ἀλλὰ δῆτ᾽ ἄνω ποταµῶν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡµέρᾳ πάντες οἱ περὶ πορνείας ἐρρύησαν λόγοι” 
(Dem. 19.287). 
 
136 “ὑµεῖς δ᾽, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν αὐτὴν εἰρήνην ἑορακότες, τὰ µὲν τῶν συµµάχων τῶν 
ὑµετερων τείχη καθῃρηκευῖαν, τὰς δὲ τῶν πρέσβεων οἰκίας οἰκοδοµοῦσαν, καὶ τὰ µὲν τῆς 
πόλεως κτήµατ᾽ ἀφῃρηµένην […] καὶ λόγῳ κρίνεθ᾽ ὧν ἔργῳ τἀδικήµατα πάντες ὁρῶσιν” 
(Dem. 19.275). 
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also condemns the lack of immediate action to protect the city from this destructive peace 
that is clearly seen by all the Assembly. 
High Vividness 
 Highly vivid information includes stylistic choices that bring a detailed level of 
description, capitalize on high emotions of an audience, or function within a speech to 
draw special attention to a key image in the performance. The performative experience of 
a particular text is also an important consideration when determining the vividness of a 
particular description or facet of style.  
  Much of Demosthenes’ prosecutorial speech focuses on the moral issues related 
to Aeschines’ endeavors as part of the Embassy. While Demosthenes has concerns about 
the well being of Athens, much of the evidence presented in his case rests in discussion 
of how the deeds should be punished rather than description of events that are related to 
the case. However, early in the speech, Demosthenes describes the aftermath of Philip’s 
conquering forces: 
Not long ago, when we were travelling to Delphi, necessity compelled us to look 
upon that scene—homesteads leveled with the ground, cities stripped of their 
defensive walls, a countryside all emptied of its young men; only women, a few 
little children, and old men stricken with misery. No man could find words 
adequate to the woes that exist in that country to-day. (Dem. 19.65)137 
 
The words that Demosthenes does find in this description are clearly intended to concern 
the Assembly, and the remaining citizens, all women and children except those “old men 
stricken with misery,” represent the inability to protect these individuals from the 
                                                
137 ὅτε γὰρ νῦν ἐπορευόµεθ᾿ εἰς Δελφούς, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἦν ὁρᾶν ἡµῖν πάντα ταῦτα, οἰκίας 
κατεσκαµµένας, τείχη περιῃρηµένα, χώραν ἔρηµον τῶν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, γύναια δὲ καὶ παιδάρι᾿ 
ὀλίγα καὶ πρεσβύτας ἀνθρώπους οἰκτρούς· οὐδ᾿ ἂν εἷς δύναιτ᾿ ἀφικέσθαι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν ἐκεῖ 
κακῶννῦν ὄντων. (Dem. 19.65) 
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conquering forces. The passage is clearly intended to create fear in the audience—fear 
that Athens could bear a similar fate—and to create sympathy for those who have been 
wronged by the actions of Aeschines in negotiating the peace. 
 As mentioned in the analysis of imagination and language cues, Demosthenes 
describes the figurative panoptic ability of Philip to identify “fidelity or treachery of the 
men who have made subservience to him their policy,” that they fear betraying him, “as 
though he stood at their very elbow, and that they must needs choose their private friends 
and enemies in obedience to his wishes” (Dem. 19.226).138 The image that Philip 
maintains such control over his associates and has instilled such fear in them speaks 
toward the level of control that the ruler has in Athenian politics. The description of the 
men being viewed from afar by their “master’s eye” is that much more strange to the 
classical Greeks than it may be to contemporary readers, but the emotional effect is clear. 
The foreign influence and presence associated with Philip “seeing” all that these men do 
calls upon the Assembly’s likely fear of outsiders, especially the influence of those 
people on Athenian politics and culture, which are notably xenophobic. Demosthenes 
makes the implicit argument here that freedom under Philip or as an associate of Philip, 
has very little sense of actual freedom; instead, he describes individuals who live in 
constant fear of displeasing the man they have signed on with, the man for whom they 
have betrayed their homeland. It’s a level of vividness that might persuade the Assembly 
                                                
138 “µὲν τὰ Φιλίππου πράγµαθ᾿ ᾑρηµένοις θεραπεύειν οὕτως ἀκριβῆ τὴν παρ᾿ ἐκείνου πρὸς 
ἑκάτερ᾿ αἴσθησιν ὑπάρχειν […] µηδ᾿ ὧν ἂν ἐνθαδὶ πράξῃ µηδὲν ἡγεῖσθαι λήσειν, ἀλλὰ 
φίλους τε νοµίζειν οὓς ἂν ἐκείνῳ δοκῇ καὶ µὴ φίλους ὡσαύτως, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑµᾶς ζῶσι καὶ 
τῆς παρ᾿ ὑµῶν τιµῆς γλιχοµένοις” (Dem. 19.226). 
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to begin the process of renegotiating or challenging the existing peace treaty rather than 
experience similar conditions themselves. 
 In a similar ideological move, Demosthenes speaks of the dead. He argues that 
throughout history their Athenian ancestors have been quick to judge those men who 
betray their homeland by accepting bribes as endangering the whole city. Demosthenes 
argues that Aeschines has disparaged the glories of the Athenian forefathers, and in a 
charge that the Assembly pursue the honorable path of justice states the challenge: “Let 
the man who would rob the dead of their reward be stripped of his own honours: that 
retribution you will levy on him for your forefathers’ sake” (Dem. 19.313).139 In this 
heightened imagery, which occurs near the end of his epilogue, Demosthenes offers what 
is arguably the climactic moment of his speech, speaking with a fervor that has been 
strong throughout the speech but spikes in this moment. It is a moment where lasting 
effect could be made, although the recapitulation of his arguments soon thereafter may 
have affected the strength by which the imagery persisted. 
 This analysis of vividness within On the Embassy helps illustrate the ways in 
which Demosthenes can help control the intensity of images summoned throughout his 
speech. The goal is not to be constantly vivid, but to use rhetorical decision making 
processes to use vividness for effect and emphasis when an orator determines that a 
scene, concept, or argument demands extra attention for the audience. By composing a 
speech in which Demosthenes attempts to sway public opinion against Aeschines, the 
orator must employ enough vivid imagery to stir the emotions while drawing upon those 
                                                
139 “ὧν ἀποστερῶν ἔκείνους οὗτος αὐτὸς ἂν τῆς ἐπιτιµίας δικαίως νῦν στερηθείη, καὶ 
ταύτην ὑπὲρ τῶν προγόνων ὑµεῖς δίκην λάβοιτε παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ” (Dem. 19.313). 
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heightened emotional states to augment the logical arguments being made against the 
politician.  
Conclusion 
 Demosthenes’ On the Embassy uses a variety of visual and social cues in order to 
engage with the Athenian Assembly, as this series of analyses has demonstrated. Through 
the examination of language cues, exploration of social and cultural forces at play in the 
speech, and discussion of vividness, it is clear that Demosthenes has crafted a forensic 
speech that attempts to address his audience in ways that ensure understanding and 
encourage persuasion. While history shows that Aeschines is acquitted of the charges 
presented in the case, the narrow margin of defeat for Demosthenes’ speech indicates that 
his argument was convincing to many of those in attendance. Furthermore, the arguments 
established within this text continue to be revised and to improve as is evident by 
reviewing his later success, On the Crown. The rhetorical concepts of visuality and 
audience that have been established in previous chapters and explored as used by 
Demosthenes demonstrate the importance of continued practice and development of those 
concepts to achieve successful oratory.  
 By employing the three analytical frameworks developed in this project’s 
previous chapters, I have demonstrated the ways in which concerns of visuality can be 
understood through multiple layers. The use of specific language cues in Analysis One 
helps activate the visual and imaginative capacities of an audience and reflects the 
orator’s concern with audience comprehension. In order to understand the audience’s 
ability to comprehend, Analysis Two looks at the features of Demosthenes’ speech and 
the ways in which he calls upon culturally shared memories and ideas to assist in the 
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persuasive act; these memories and ideas function visually through the act of memory 
recall and in the framing of the ideas that the orator uses to “bring before the eyes” the 
perspective of one’s speech. Finally, in Analysis Three, examining the degree of 
vividness for particular images within Demosthenes’ speech allows us to understand the 
ways in which emotional impact and stylistic choices, which are understood through 
visual means, affect the audience’s reception of the text. While these analyses can be 
used individually for a target text, by employing all three to the same performance, it is 
possible to more thoroughly see the ways in which language, audience, and performance 
impact the visual experience of rhetorical delivery and through that new understanding 
arrive at an appreciation of the orator’s craft and ability to engage with diverse audiences. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The beginnings of this dissertation project arose through a joint interest in the 
history of rhetoric and an interest in contemporary neurosciences that hypothesize a link 
between the presence of mirror neurons in human brains and the development of 
language and social empathy as possible extensions of those neurons’ functions 
(Rathgeber and Gutmann 2008; Iacoboni 2009). A key component of my research centers 
on the attempt to understand how the work of language, social groups, and cultural 
memories and ideologies interrelate through concepts of visuality. For the purposes of 
this dissertation, I have focused that examination on the field of classical Greek rhetorical 
theory, but many of the principles explored in this dissertation can be applied to other 
contexts of language use, including studies of similar contexts for visuality within other 
time periods or concerning multimodal forms of communication. As the previous 
chapters have demonstrated, concepts of visuality and social considerations of rhetorical 
performance permeate Greek thought. The importance of visuality can be seen through 
language cues; appeals to audience expectations, memories, and beliefs; and through the 
effects of different levels of vivid image-making during rhetorical performances. These 
features of Greek rhetoric are essential for understanding the ways in which visuality 
affects shared ways of seeing in oratory. 
The question to which I return first in this final chapter is that which Fleckenstein 
asks in the beginning of her edited collection: “How are the constitutions of our world 
and our identities composed of the intricate interweaving of word, image, and shared 
ways of seeing?” (2007, 6). In previous chapters, I have sought answers to this question 
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as they relate to theories and performances of rhetoric in classical Greece. To help answer 
this question, I have developed three heuristics that can be used to explore concepts of 
visuality and audience in Greek rhetorical texts in order to make visible the inherent 
connections between verbal and visual modes of thinking and the importance of 
communities and practice in sharing and understanding these patterns.  
The first heuristic, examining language practices and theories of epistemology 
within a society in order to illuminate the ways in which words and images are 
interconnected, provides a framework for approaching Greek texts and word choice to 
determine the ways in which visualization is invited or encouraged between speaker and 
audience; implicit in this discussion is the belief that the heuristic developed in that 
chapter can be adapted through a close examination of other language practices in order 
to be used in different cultural or linguistic contexts. As my analysis in chapter 2 
demonstrated, the use of vocabulary related to seeing and images in rhetorical 
performances reflects the understanding that audiences will visualize what is being 
presented to them. Aristotle articulates this concept clearly, Isocrates and Plato discuss 
the influence of visuality on knowledge-making, and the performances of Isaeus and 
Theophrastus, among others, help demonstrate how these language cues are used to invite 
a visualized component of rhetorical performance. These surface-level cues signify a 
deeper understanding of the relationship between verbal and visual. 
Next, I built a heuristic for determining the ways in which cultural systems of 
established practice, memory, and ideology contribute to shared experiences of visuality 
and rhetorical performance; using Poulakos’ definition of intellectual movements as the 
framework for that heuristic, I identify three levels of cultural influence—genre practices, 
  160 
historical contexts, and cultural memories and ideologies—that rhetoricians can draw 
upon for building a relationship with their audience or to determine the ways in which an 
audience has been previously prepared to encounter the images and ideas contained 
within a speech. As my analyses of Lysias’ Olympic Oration and Demosthenes’ On the 
Crown demonstrate in chapter 3, the orators identify and employ tactics specific to their 
genres, audiences, and purposes in order to ensure that their listeners can visualize the 
content of their speeches. Rather than working from the assumption that visually-
engaging language and description is universal, this heuristic helps determine the ways in 
which concepts of visuality and visually engaging rhetorical performance are socially 
driven. 
For the third heuristic, I discussed the role of vivid information and the experience 
of an audience when encountering concepts or figures at varying levels of vividness, 
including concerns of style. Through identifying those practices that can function at low, 
moderate, or high levels of vividness, I provide a framework for understanding the 
intensity at which an audience processes information and the degree of effect that those 
vivid experiences have upon the audience. Using Demetrius’ On Style, the commentary 
On Demosthenes by Dionysius of Halicarnassus, and Demosthenes’ On the Crown, I use 
this heuristic to demonstrate the techniques that can be used to activate varying levels of 
vividness within a rhetorical performance and the effects that those vivid moments have 
upon an audience’s experience of the performance.  
In Chapter 5, I used these heuristics to explore the ways in which these 
approaches to visuality and audience in a rhetorical performance by Demosthenes are 
used to relate to the audience for his forensic speech. Through the use of those heuristics 
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to analyze a text, I argue that one can begin to identify the ways in which these systems 
illuminate the ways we view and approach the world. Demosthenes’ On the Embassy 
serves as an example of how an orator clearly understands the audience’s dispositions, 
knowledges, and emotional states and then crafts a speech that allows listeners to vividly 
experience the performance. Chapter 5’s use of all three heuristics demonstrates the ways 
in which each heuristic provides insights into distinct features of visuality and in concert 
illuminate the ways in which visuality is layered through multiple factors. 
This project complicates the ways in which rhetorical theory is categorized. 
Rather than considering visual rhetoric as a distinct field from verbal rhetorical studies, 
this project explores the ways in which visual and verbal modes of thinking are 
interconnected and how ways of knowing are bilaterally constructed through the 
interrelation of word and image. By bridging these two areas of rhetorical study and 
arguing that verbal rhetoric can instantiate internalized visual phenomena for audiences, 
the dichotomy between verbal and visual is problematized. Furthermore, by focusing on 
the ways in which these internalized images are spread and shared by particular 
audiences, I argue that the social contingencies of Greek rhetoric were influenced by the 
oral culture that preceded and accompanied the formation of recorded rhetorical theory. 
By focusing on the rhetorical theory of classical Greece, this project also invites future 
research into the ways in which Western historic and contemporary systems of 
epistemology and rhetoric are influenced by the Hellenistic comingling of verbal and 
visual in classical texts. That is, essential to understanding the ways in which 
contemporary “shared ways of seeing” are constructed is an understanding of the ways in 
which those factors apply to classical Greeks.  
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Research Questions and Findings 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, my research questions for this project reflected my 
dual concerns with visuality and with social constructs as they relate to rhetorical 
performances. In this final chapter, I return to those questions in order to synthesize the 
arguments of the previous chapters and to articulate how these questions can be answered 
using this dissertation project. 
 Question 1: How are Greek rhetorical theories understood through the lens of 
visuality? The epistemological systems that underlie much of Greek rhetorical theory are 
built using language that directly reflects the relationship between the visual and 
rhetorical performance. Chapter 2’s heuristic of using language cues to explore the ways 
in which visuality and visualization are encouraged through rhetorical practice and 
understood through similar terms illuminates the importance of visual understanding for 
Greek rhetoricians. While Aristotle’s visuality-based definition of rhetoric is readily 
identifiable as a manifestation of the relationship between rhetoric and the visual, the 
heuristics and concepts that appear in this dissertation speak to the importance of visual 
features in many different aspects of Greek rhetorical theory, and they reflect the theories 
and practices of figures other than Aristotle. For example, the vividness of a particular 
image can have lasting effect upon an audience’s reception of a speech. This is the 
concern of Socrates and Plato through the concept of psychagogia in the Phaedrus as 
discussed in Chapter 4, and Demosthenes is similarly concerned with the impact of image 
and sensory perception as mentioned in his forensic speeches against Aeschines. Seeing 
and knowing in Greek rhetorical theory are interwoven, as reflected in language use, and 
the use of sense-based language and the use of vividly impactful rhetorical strategies to 
  163 
engage with audiences is more than coincidental; although Greek rhetorical theory is not 
understood solely through visual terms, the influence of vision on the field is evident. By 
utilizing the analysis of language cues discussed in Chapter 2, one can theorize the 
epistemological theories underlying a rhetorical performance that suggest the connections 
between visuality and rhetorical theory. The idea of an embodied experience of rhetoric, 
which manifests throughout this project, similarly builds upon rhetorical theory in which 
sense-based ways of knowing impact communication practices. 
Question 2: How do rhetoricians discuss their concerns regarding shared cultural 
experiences, memories, or ideologies? The linguistic connections between visual and 
verbal explored in Chapter 2 also suggest the relationship between visuality and audience 
considerations in rhetorical theory, especially when the language cues function as 
invitations for an audience to visualize a description or idea that follows. This approach 
to sharing a vision with a potentially diverse audience also draws upon the considerations 
of cultural memories and ideologies as discussed in Chapter 3. In addition to these 
memories and beliefs, rhetoricians also consider the genre practices and expectations of 
an audience to achieve persuasive effect; for example, the practice of connecting 
panegyric to Greek myth in Lysias’ Olympic Oration and the orator’s choice to compare 
the myth of Heracles to the contemporary conditions of Greece allows Lysias to build 
from genre practice and draw imagery of Greece as Heracles facing the trials of the 
conquering Philip of Macedon. In Demosthenes’ On the Embassy, he draws an extended 
series of images in the epilogue in order to portray the deplorable character of Aeschines 
in as many areas of concern as possible; the prolonged epilogue attempts to weigh the 
events of Demosthenes’ narrative even more in his favor. The imagistic undercurrent of 
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social considerations for Greek rhetorical theory provides a method for orators to 
construct speeches that take into consideration audience attitudes, beliefs, and 
expectations while concurrently theorizing the ways in which these audience 
considerations can be constructed in ways that are visually engaging with the audience on 
multiple levels. 
Question 3: How do considerations of visuality facilitate community building? As 
mentioned in Aristotle’s discussion of metaphor, there must be some degree of familiarity 
in a metaphorical construction so that it is effective. Also at play in the best practices of 
metaphor is using images and language that are “beautiful” to the audience. The idea that 
images build from the people for whom they are constructed mandates that orators 
consider the knowledge of an audience as they construct a speech. In this act of meeting 
audiences where they are and then constructing or manipulating shared images or ideas to 
serve a particular purpose of a speech, the role of the orator becomes similar to that of a 
guide, helping lead the audience to a particular outcome. In contrast to Socrates’ depicted 
concern that an unvirtuous orator might use the art to mislead an audience, the concept 
that persuasion occurs through a relationship among speaker and audience and through 
visual means tempers the force of the “absolute” rhetorical power suggested by Socrates. 
Furthermore, the civic emphasis that Isocrates and others encourage in rhetorical 
education are also primarily concerned with the ways in which orators account for the 
populace in their work. In Chapter 5’s discussion of On the Embassy, the impact of 
Aeschines’ actions upon Athens and its allies is the lens through which Demosthenes 
builds his case. Recalling upon historical precedents related to Athenian bribe-takers and 
the political conditions of conquered cities, Demosthenes draws images in his speech that 
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encourage a guilty verdict. Tying imagistic concerns with community knowledge and 
expectations situates Greek rhetorical theory as socially driven, as phronetic in nature, 
and as an art rather than a simple knack. The analysis of audience expectations and 
beliefs as outlined in Chapter 2’s heuristic provides insight into the ways in which 
community building is an integral part of Greek rhetorical theory, and the consideration 
of language cues and vividness amplify understanding of the ways in which community 
experience of rhetorical performance can be understood. 
Question 4: What are the roles of style and emotion as they relate to visuality, 
audience, and performance? As explored in Chapter 4, emotion and style are direct 
factors toward the degree of vividness that information achieves in rhetorical 
performance. Greek orators call upon particular emotions by vividly describing the 
scenes surrounding a particular emotion or by appealing to a particular emotion in their 
speech; for example, Demosthenes hopes to inspire fear that Athens will suffer a fate 
similar to Arcadia as part of his speech in On the Embassy; by describing the previously 
proud Arcadians bowing to Philip, he seeks to activate a similar sense of impending 
shame for the Athenian Assembly. However, as Chapter 3 discusses, these emotional 
effects are only possible when an audience is prepared to experience them. If successful, 
these emotional moments can function with a high degree of vividness, which help 
support the claims of a speech. Similarly, stylistic choices impact the effects of a speech; 
selecting a particular level of style affects the ways in which an audience regards the 
speech and the orator, and the auditory experience of tempo, vocabulary, voice, and other 
factors create a character for the speech itself. Dionysius of Halicarnassus argues that 
Demosthenes is the best Attic orator primarily due to the effect of his stylistic choices 
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(D.H. Dem. 22). As Chapter 4 demonstrates, the Greeks understand much of style 
through sensory means. This is partly due to the embodied experience of rhetorical 
performance; the spaces in which speeches were heard impacted their formation and the 
experience of the performance. By determining the vividness of particular speech 
elements and considering the ways in which an audience is conditioned to respond in a 
particular way through the heuristics presented in chapters 2 and 3, one can begin to 
appreciate the impact of style and emotion as they related to the visual experience of an 
audience. 
Limitations to this Project 
 The answers to my research questions presented above reflect my research into 
issues of visuality and audience in Greek rhetorical theory, but do not encapsulate the 
whole of Greek rhetorical theory. One major limitation of this project is related to the 
scope of authors that have been consulted in developing the theories and analyses 
contained herein. While this dissertation consults 24 primary texts from 11 attributed 
authors, the breadth of sources could have reflected a greater range of authors and topics 
to better represent the range of opinions that fall under the umbrella of Greek rhetorical 
theory and performance. A more diverse representation of texts could introduce new 
concepts or manifestations of visuality and audience as they relate to Greek rhetoric. 
Furthermore, additional frameworks for understanding the relationship between visual 
and verbal could further enrich the study of visuality and audience. However, even with 
the current selection, the discussion here has necessitated a flattening of contexts and 
theories in order to draw upon so many texts. While I have done my utmost to ensure that 
the theories presented in this dissertation reflect the authors consulted, the scope has 
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prevented me from thoroughly researching and presenting the distinct perspectives of 
each author and/or text. As such, some of the claims and support contained in this project 
have been flattened in an attempt to present a cohesive and comprehensible theory of 
visuality and audience. 
 Although this dissertation project is concerned with the relationship between the 
verbal and the visual in Greek rhetorical theory, it does not draw from visual artifacts to 
suggest the relationship between visual and verbal. While I readily acknowledge the 
importance of rhetorical theory and investigations that include visual texts in their 
purview, my investigation was primarily into the ways in which language-based texts 
reflect the relationship with the visual, and the internalized images discussed within this 
text might reflect identifiable visual artifacts, but the connections between an audience 
member’s internal mental image and a concrete visual artifact fall well outside of my 
expertise. Further research into the relationship between visual artifacts and speeches that 
refer to the subjects of those artifacts in classical Greece would doubtlessly help 
illuminate that relationship. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 Although some flattening of the theories contained herein has occurred due to the 
range of texts and authors presented in this dissertation, I argue that this dissertation 
contributes to the history of rhetoric through the use of a pan-historiographical approach. 
As Hawhee and Christa J. Olson justify in their own work, “the expansion of the wide-
ranging histories we are working on necessitates the contraction of more focused 
histories, and vice versa. In this way, disciplinarity breathes and moves through its 
histories, by turns zooming and hovering, simultaneously posing big-picture questions 
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and fine-grained ones” (2013, 91). For example, while scholars such as Modrak (1987, 
2001), Hawhee (2011), O’Gorman (2005), Newman (2002), and others have explored the 
relationship between imagination and rhetoric in the Aristotelian corpus, the range of this 
project tries to explore how concepts of visuality in Greek rhetorical theory more broadly 
have manifested. The research presented in this dissertation project attempts to expand 
the discussion of visuality to a broader ranger of Greek sources, so that future work might 
explore these concepts as they relate to particular authors. 
Classical Greece represents an important moment in the development of Western 
literacy practices, and the impact of the concepts developed in that time is still felt today. 
While the introduction of written language and its adoption allowed for the words of 
classical Greeks to be recorded for those that followed, the literate practices of all Greeks 
were still in a period of great transition. Written literacy was not widespread, and so the 
earliest theories of rhetoric reflect the importance of an oral-culture that depended on 
speech performances for meaning making, but also allowed for revision and deeper 
investigation because those performances could be recorded as texts, reviewed (literally), 
and revised. The literate practices were shifting, and the speakers who worked on behalf 
of the polis had to develop rhetorical principles that spoke to a wide range of literacies. 
The idea that a listener would visualize the content of a speech was likely the experience 
of those involved in the development of rhetorical theory, perhaps aided by their 
newfound ability to see that language as a visual thing in itself; those with written 
literacies could envision not only the concepts contained in the rhetorical performance 
but also the actual words being used. Sharing knowledge was most accessible through 
speechmaking, but the importance of recording that knowledge in written form was 
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evident to the Greeks. The mixture of sense perception (hearing and visuality especially) 
with the development of rhetorical theories and recorded language intertwined the verbal 
and visual in new and exciting ways. 
 Today, written literacy is much more widespread. The United Nations 
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reports the global literacy 
rate at 85 percent for adults (2015, 1). This number still reflects a privileged population, 
and “UIS data show that 757 million adults–two-thirds of whom are women–still lack 
basic reading and writing skills” (2015, 1). While the written literacy issue is clearly an 
issue that requires continued contemporary attention, we face increasing challenges to a 
dynamic world of literate practices including issues of technology and access. The nature 
of communication is increasingly multimodal, and the advantages of broadcast and 
internet media have doubtless impact on the ways in which information is spread. In this 
environment, the interplay of verbal and visual require investigation into their shared 
impact on cultures and audiences. As Fleckenstein argues, 
Our integration of image, rhetoric, and scopic regime in world making comes at 
an important time in Western culture. Many have pointed out that our world and 
lives have taken a linguistic turn so that world making has been increasingly 
analyzed for its constitution as a set of linguistic practices that “persuade” 
phenomena such as science, gender, ethnicity, and technology into existence. At 
the same time, we live in a migratory, fragmented, and diasporic visual culture. 
(Fleckenstein 2007, 6) 
 
Developing new tools to understand the ways in which language helps reflect the images 
in society; the converse relationship of visual to verbal can allow for new understanding 
into the ways in which the world is co-constructed verbally and visually. While this 
dissertation explores the ways in which verbal and visual are related in classical Greek 
rhetorical theory and performance, it suggests approaches for understanding how that 
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relationship can be viewed in other texts. The Greek fascination with visuality can 
provide a framework for understanding the ways in which contemporary audiences 
consume and process the information presented to them, especially through the growing 
multimodal forms of communication. Rather than approaching rhetorical analysis through 
dichotomous verbal or visual methodologies, my research suggests that these methods 
can be combined through an understanding of the ways in which the verbal and visual 
comingle.  
 Additionally, I argue that Greek rhetorical and epistemological theory have had 
lasting impact upon Western culture. Future historical research into the ways in which the 
verbal and visual are comingled in other societies and theories of rhetoric will help 
illuminate the ways in which our understanding of the visual in rhetoric has developed 
over time. While the adoption of verbal-visual systems of rhetoric and epistemology in 
other cultures and periods might not result directly from Greek influence, references to 
Greek figures are a common feature throughout texts in the long history of rhetorical 
study. Furthermore, the primary sources cited within this project reflect a privileged few 
whose voices were deemed worthy of record and distribution, and further research into 
the recovery and inclusion of voices previously left out of histories of rhetoric is needed. 
In particular, I see value in expanding the discussion of visuality as it relates to the 
Sophistic period of Greek rhetoric. While some effort has been made in this project to 
include Socratic dialogues with Sophists, there is a wealth of texts and perspectives 
available through Jarratt’s (1991) identification of Sophistic historiography in order to 
identify those perspectives. 
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Finally, the influence of contemporary neurosciences in the advent of this project 
provides another area for research. As Jeanne Fahnestock argues, neurosciences and 
rhetoric, “because they deal with dovetailing or overlapping phenomena, should 
eventually be compatible. They should ‘touch’ at certain points, the one handing off its 
accounts to the other, cognitive science to rhetoric, though they operate on different 
scales and answer to different systems of explanation” (2005, 161). This dissertation 
attempts in part to make the society-building functions theorized of mirror neurons 
understandable through Greek rhetorical theory. While mirror neuron science and 
rhetorical historiography do not directly engage with each other, the theories and 
hypotheses of each field might provide ideas for future research. A bridging of sciences 
and humanities through consideration of verbal, visual, and cognition could help 
illuminate theories of social development as discussed by Iacoboni (2009), and scientific 
insight into the inner workings of human brains would suggest new ways of looking at 
rhetorical world-making. 
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